

EDUCATING FOR CITIZENSHIP

GEORGE A. COE

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
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Educating for citizenship

To the author of
"Character in Human Relations"
and to his Friend
Evangeline
from their Friend
George A. Coe

October 9
1932



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EDUCATING FOR CITIZENSHIP

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
THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

Educating for Citizenship

The Sovereign State as Ruler
and as Teacher

BY

GEORGE A. COE



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1932

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A



TO
A GOOD CITIZEN
JOHN H. GRAY

FOREWORD

WHAT THE TITLE OF THIS BOOK MEANS

The modern state both rules and teaches, both commands and explains; it coerces, but it also submits its case to the intelligence of those whom it coerces. The schoolhouse is a public building co-ordinate with the city hall, the courthouse, and the capitol. The schoolteacher and the policeman walk side by side, each bearing a commission from the same sovereign authority.

What is the relation between this ruling and this teaching? Are they, in any important sense, different functions?

Is the school, in reality, an instrument for enforcing the will of the sovereign by the employment of scientific psychology in the manipulation of young minds?

If so, what the teacher does is merely a subtle form of the same activity that goes on in a sheriff's office. If, on the other hand, teaching is profoundly, not superficially, different from coercion through law, this truth contributes something to the meaning of sovereignty itself. Both the ends of state authority and the scope of state action have now to be determined in the light of the meaning and the process of education.

What we conclude, or unwittingly assume, to be the true relation between the sovereign as ruler and the sovereign as teacher becomes the cornerstone of

education for citizenship. In the public school the pupil comes into direct, official relations with the state. He hears the state speak through its accredited spokesmen, sees it in action in one of its deliberately organized institutions, experiences from it pressure or attraction, and makes response, then and there, *to the sovereign*.

Here is the primary, psychologically first thing in schooling for life in the state. We might give it the clumsy name of attitude-of-sovereign-towards-pupil-begetting-attitude-of-pupil-towards-sovereign. At its best, it is a mutual facing and frank self-opening in a situation that is favorable to learning as well as to obedience. In the same experience in which the pupil discovers how it feels to be a citizen, he begins to realize how it feels to be a sovereign. The nature of the sovereign is revealed, in part, then, in the conditions that are favorable to learning, and the self-disclosure of the specific nature of *our* sovereign becomes the basic stimulus to civic virtue.

That something is lacking in present education for citizenship is understood and deplored by leaders of public education in this country. They know that in the United States, the homeland of universal, tax-supported, free, and compulsory schooling, we have not yet a politically educated citizenry. How can this be possible? The reply that this essay makes is that lack of thoroughness in dealing with the fact and the implications of sovereignty—specifically failure to face the peculiar problem of authority in a government of the people by the people—has produced neglect, weakness, and misleading teaching all along the line of civic education.

In the public-school consciousness, the state has been an overshadowing, majestic, indefinitely power-

ful, indefinitely ethical, elusive, even shifty, entity. We have endeavored to induce in pupils definite attitudes towards an indefinite object. We have asked them to face squarely, ethically, towards the sovereign, but we have not shown them a sovereign facing squarely and ethically towards them. We have talked much of duties *to* the state, but we have been silent concerning the duties *of* the state. We have fancied that we were engaged in character education when we have insisted upon certain principles for individual conduct, though at the same time we praised the state for conduct that violates the same principles. In short, we have sought to discipline the young for life in an undisciplined state. Let the schools awake from this vain dream.

This book has to do with the sovereign authority that suffuses all education that is conducted by the state. Ruling and teaching, it is contended, are not the same. Endeavor is made to clear up ambiguities at this point so that selection among alternatives for school practice may take place in clear consciousness. In particular, this is an attempt to show what political authority must be made to mean for a genuinely self-governing people. Accordingly, education for life in the state is here presented as the experience of children and youth in the gradual assumption of the responsibilities of sovereignty. In our society, obeying and ruling must be consciously fused into one.

Vastly increased participation of ordinary men and women in the exercise of political functions is, of course, implied. This means, in the present discussion, the exercise of authority, the actual guidance of state policy, not merely acquiescence, and not merely trust in chosen leaders. The sovereignty of the people, it is assumed, can and should advance from

government by consent to government by creative self-assertion.

The defects of the modern state, which make all thoughtful patriots sick at heart, are not to be remedied by minimizing the political order. Such a policy would result merely in bestowing state functions upon something that does not call itself the state nor hold itself fully responsible for its conduct to all the persons who are affected thereby.

Nor are the defects of the state to be remedied by accepting the self-estimation of a few who regard themselves as uniquely qualified to rule. The "divine right of kings" must not be allowed to return under the claim that nature instead of God has fixed a gap between ruling and being ruled. I should like to strengthen our public-school teachers' faith in democracy. They have not yet bowed the knee to the widely current disrespect for man that is the reverse side of respect for dictatorships and for ruling aristocracies. Our teachers are the great bulwark of popular government. They really believe in it; they will not yield an inch to any dictatorship that is honorably open. The danger is that they will not be wary towards dictatorships under the name and the form of popular government, nor towards class rule that waves the flag and shouts the catchwords of loyalty.

Democracy must be made to mean, for teachers, vastly more than the popular franchise plus legal equality before lawyers' law; vastly more than this plus merciful kindness; it must be made to mean nothing less than fellowship among neighborly men who progressively take into their hands instruments of coercion for protecting, deepening, and extending their fellowship. The truly democratic state is based

upon the worth of persons; its mission is to protect this worth and make it grow through co-operative action by the persons concerned. The nature and the proper limits of its authority cannot be otherwise determined.

Inasmuch as the theme concerns directly only the political aspect of social living, I am silent here about many things that would be essential in an exposition of the principles of character education, or in any proposal for a rounded system of social studies. Upon the political aspect of both the movement for character education and the movement for enrichment of the social studies some comments are made, but these comments should be taken as supplementary to the general treatment of these fields by other authors.

GEORGE A. COE.

*Finished at Claremont, California,
on the 200th Anniversary
of the Birth of Washington.*

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EDUCATING FOR CITIZENSHIP

EDUCATING FOR CITIZENSHIP

CHAPTER I

HAVE WE ANY SCHOOLS OF CITIZENSHIP?

THEORETICALLY, YES; BUT, IN PRACTICE?

If you ask any school administrator, or any professor of education, "What are state schools for?" he will reply that their main function is to make good citizens. We may differ as to what constitutes good citizenship; we may disagree as to methods for promoting it; we may hold that the schools have other functions also, but that the central reason for their existence is the same public good for the sake of which the state itself exists—from this there is no dissent.

Supposably, then, the millions of children and youth now in our elementary and secondary schools are engaged, principally, in learning to be good citizens. But this is a theory, an ideal. What are the facts? From within the ranks of schoolmen themselves there is arising a cry that the schools are neglecting this, their central duty. This cry is not at all the same as the grumbling of some taxpayers over "fads and frills." The question is not, What needless things can we omit? but, What must we by all means not omit? The complaint is that we are neglecting, or doing ineffectively, that which is of supreme import.¹

¹This conviction appears to be general among the leaders in the public-school system. Typical utterances are those of William Mc-

What would a school be like that did attend effectively to this supremely important function? If there is anywhere a school of citizenship, what makes it just this rather than something else? This question is not answered by those who content themselves with saying, "Let us require a study of the Constitution"; or, "Let us improve our course in civics by making a direct study of the community"; or, "Let us stiffen the discipline of the school"; or, "Let the pupils get acquainted with governing and obeying by participating in the government of their school." Some of these procedures, without doubt, would promote good citizenship; they are found in the best of our schools already. Yet, taken by themselves, they may be—they often are—only patches upon an old garment. A school can practice any number of such special procedures at the same time that the base line of its work, looked at from the standpoint of the life-career of its pupils, is preparation for high school or college, or help in getting a job, or holding or achieving a desired social status, or just accommodating oneself to the demands of parents and teachers.

A school of citizenship, on the other hand, would be like a medical school in that, though it taught many things, it would choose and organize them all with reference to a central interest, namely, definable functions that are to be performed throughout life. Schools of citizenship in this sense we do not have. No elementary school, no high school, no college or university, whether supported by taxation or by private funds, organizes the total experience of its pupils or students upon this basis.

Andrew in many numbers of *School and Society* and of Thomas H. Briggs in his *The Great Investment*. (Cambridge, 1930.) See also a resolution on "The Main Purpose of the Public Schools" by the Department of Superintendence, 1929.

POLITICAL AND EXTRA-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF
THE SCHOOLS

Within the history of our public schools in their modern or tax-supported, non-ecclesiastical form, there is, of course, a continuous thread of civic consciousness. Popular government—popular education; these two poles are ever discernible in American educational thought. Because the people are the ultimate source of authority, schooling is made universal and compulsory. It is expected to fit them to perform the duty of governing, particularly of voting. Because of the vital importance to the state that voters generally should be competent, a school tax is imposed even upon persons who have no children in school.

This is our accepted tradition. Yet Horace Mann, who did more than any one else to fix it indelibly in American political philosophy, seems also to have attributed to the schools of the state what most persons would call extra-political aims. "I believe," he said, "in the existence of a great, immutable principle of natural law, or natural ethics . . . a principle of divine origin . . . which proves the absolute right to an education of every human being that comes into the world."² So, also, American thought universally conceives of even tax-supported education as directed towards the enrichment of individual and social life in other than directly civic relations. Not only educators, but also statesmen, and even several of our state constitutions, express this unequivocally. Religion, morality, happiness, knowledge in general, useful knowledge, agriculture, the mechanic arts, prosperity, wealth, vocational fitness, worthy family life, worthy use of leisure—all these and more

² *Tenth Annual Report*, 1846, p. 180.

have been recognized in high places as true objectives of the public-school system.

The range and variety of these objectives are so great that we should not find it easy to discover and define succinctly any unifying principle within them.³ On the other hand, a distinctly civic constant is easily recognizable. Recognizable, yet never given the dominating position that the theory calls for. Several objectives are here, each simply existing by the side of the others, not bound into unity by any civic, social, ethical, or intellectual principle. No educator is likely to dispute this statement except, possibly, upon the ground that these not-directly-civic goals do indirectly contribute to the ends of political society. There is, in fact, a growing custom that defines the good "citizen," for school purposes, in terms that might just as well define the good "man." Indeed, any individual or social virtue is now freely taken up by teachers into school standards of "citizenship." The distinction between moral training and civic training is being obliterated. Even vocational training at public expense is accepted upon the ground that the good citizen must carry his own weight.

³ Frank D. Boynton endeavored to define such a principle before the Department of Superintendence in 1929. "There is a doctrine," he says, "that is fundamental in American education. That is: that every child born in or adopted by this republic has by virtue of that fact the right to have developed through education whatever of talent he may possess without reference to the quality, quantity or type of that talent; and that he shall have assured to him the opportunity to go as far as his ability and ambition will permit in order that he may live his life more abundantly than he otherwise could." This was printed, with the heading, "Our Educational Creed," upon the official programme of the meeting. Just how this doctrine is to be fitted to the declaration, adopted at this meeting, that the main purpose of the public schools is that of "preserving and improving our political institutions," is an important question. Probably an answer is possible, but it has not been given.

Whither this movement is carrying our schools, and how far the concept of citizenship can wisely be expanded, we shall not at this moment inquire. For the sake of clarity as we proceed it may be well to state at once, however, that the trend of this book is towards expansion, not contraction, of the concept of the state and of education for citizenship. Wise and controlled expansion depends, of course, upon clear perception of alternatives, but this we have not yet attained. The process whereby "good citizenship" has acquired enlarged meaning is confusing. Suppose that every virtue of the individual is a virtue because it contributes something to social living; and suppose that the true interest of every citizen is as broad as the totality of social good; does it follow that the identification of all sorts of goodness with that of the good citizen is sound?

In the background of this question lies the problem of the nature and scope of the political state. Teachers who think upon such matters at all would be quick to limit the sphere of state action. But if the functions of the state are less broad than the functions and ends of society, education for citizenship should clearly reflect the fact.

These remarks do not imply any particular theory of the nature of the state or of our American constitutional system, but only that some theory must be in mind in order to give definiteness, point, and fullness to the central duty of the public schools. *What constitutes goodness in a citizen depends upon what constitutes goodness in a state.* Few of us would assent to the doctrine that all states are always good; probably all of us would say that no state is invariably either good or bad. But if so—and indeed in any case—a school of citizenship would have for its

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corner-stone some definite concept of what constitutes good and what constitutes evil in the behavior of states. Then, and only then, could teachers definitely discriminate the citizen who is good *as a citizen* from the one who is not good.

CONFUSION AND ILLUSION AS TO POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

It is easy to think that we have specific civic goals when we have them not. There are at least three ways of being deceived concerning this matter. The first way, in accordance with the tendency just named, is to define good citizenship in terms of general moral virtues—honesty, truthfulness, industriousness, kindness, etc. What more do we want? one might ask. Do not these designate the good man, and would not a good man be *ipso facto* a good citizen?

Answer might be made as follows: Not so fast! Do you really believe that, without noting the concrete situations in which a man is placed, and without reference to specific acts that are called for by these situations, you can perceive his quality? What is it to be good? Is it not to fulfil some relationship as parent or as child; as teacher or as pupil; as employer or as employee; as seller or as buyer; as physician or as patient, and so on and on? When the virtues are conceived in blank generality, apart from issues that arise, decisions that have to be made, and acts that are required in concrete situations, they are entirely abstract. They do not name anything actual; their use is merely to prepare us to notice acts of which they are a single, abstracted aspect.

If you ask whether a man who is industrious, hon-

est, kind, etc., is not *ipso facto* a good citizen, the reply might be a counter-question: Do you claim that moral badness is the real ground of everything that is deleterious or even destructive in politics and in the administration of the state? Surely, one of the most tantalizing of civic situations is that in which "good men" are the bulwark of evil policies. When training for citizenship takes the form of inculcating generalized virtues, it simply leaves to chance nearly all, if not quite all, the issues upon which the fate of the state depends.

A second way of deceiving ourselves is over-estimation of the influence of patriotic sentiments and of patriotic ritual. Even if the salute to the flag, the pledge of loyalty, the observance of national anniversaries, and other incitements to admiration of our America should issue in life-long habits—and this is an over-generous supposition—what habits? we must ask. Why, habits of saluting the flag, using the phrases of loyalty, observing national anniversaries, and admiring our America! In due time this discussion will probe still more deeply this type of training. At present it is sufficient to point out that it does not touch citizenship conceived as significant functions to be performed.

We may be misled, in the third place, by putting political principles into formal terms that yield little or no guidance in the most commonly experienced situations. To be patriotic, to reverence the flag, to obey the laws, to vote regularly, to be for honesty and against dishonesty in public officials, even to be willing to die in defence of the country—one can be and do all this and yet be on either the right or the wrong side of the most vital questions of public welfare and of state policy. A majority could be like

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this while one's party, or one's city, or one's country was drifting into the greatest evils.

NEGLECT OF NECESSARY POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

To what extent, then, does neglect, confusion, one-sidedness, or abstractness prevail in the citizenship-training of today? Only approximate answers, involving considerable opinion, can be given. All schools, of course, are consciously pressing towards the good life, all look towards the good of the state. The question, then, is, How is the good life most commonly conceived? and, How is the good of the state specifically represented in ideals of citizenship? Let us imaginatively place the most common objectives upon a line or scale that begins with what is most definite and concrete, and ends with what is least so. The result, there is reason to think, would be somewhat as follows:

Objectives that are clear, concrete, and pointed

Hygienic living

Good sportsmanship

Kindness to animals

Help for certain kinds of suffering, as in famines and floods

The work-attitude towards vocations

Honesty (at least in school work and in money matters)

Truthfulness (though hardly in politics nor in advertising)

Objectives in the form of generalized ideals that in concrete application are either ambiguous or one-sided

Being a good neighbor

(Chiefly in matters that do not bring into question economic and other stratifications of society)

Respect for law

(All laws equally? In view of conditions recognized by the Wickersham Commission, such as lawlessness in the administration of law, what can be the practical meaning of "respect for law"?)

Respect for property

(As against pilfering, vandalism, etc. But there remains a question as to the ethical validity of various property rights that interested parties have secured by many sorts of direct and indirect means.)

Mutuality of employer and employee

(Does this mean combining capital and labor against the consumer? Does it aim to make employees contented with a wage-and-profit system of production? If neither of these, just what does it mean?)

Democracy as against privilege

(Mostly in the restricted sense of our theoretical but not actual equality before the law. The ideal of *industrial* democracy is commonly ignored or opposed.)

Participation in government

(This means little more than voting in primaries and elections. What are the schools doing about the fact that, because of the increasing size and complexity of our governmental units, and because of the control of legislation and of administration by interested groups and classes, the significance of the ballot grows less and less?)

Objectives that receive scanty or else sentimental treatment

The obligations of majorities

The functions of minorities

The maintenance of our civil liberties

(The rights of speech, press, and assemblage were suppressed during the World War by extra-constitutional procedures. These rights have been only partly restored, and in some influential quarters there seems to be a disposition to effect a permanent reversal of civil liberty as the fathers understood it.)

Right relations of the United States to weaker peoples

Desirable race relations

(With respect to some aspects of this question, perhaps the best that is now possible in many of our schools is vague aspiration or even silence. If so, civic education in this matter is simply surrendered.)

Patriotism

The way to world peace

(Everybody desires peace and deplures war. But the schools touch in only gingerly fashion, as a rule, the particular concrete processes that are involved in bringing about either war or permanent peace.)

Evaluation of industrialism

(Thus far, with few exceptions, the schools have endeavored to adjust the individual to the industrial system without doing anything that looks towards adjusting the system to individual or social needs.)

If this is anywhere near the truth, then this is the case: The so-called private virtues stand out distinctly; the more general social virtues are acknowledged, but left obscure at points where the pinch comes at the present stage of American history; the political virtues are distinct only where they are easy, and the social assumptions and the national principles to which the actual, present-day American state gives effect are either neglected or hazy.

So much for the elementary and secondary schools. What shall be said about the colleges and universities as agencies for the making of citizens? The educators of the country are in a quandary as to what these institutions really are for; their specific contributions to our civic life are particularly in question. Towards what are they pushing? Indeed, are they pushing? Of course some political drift always is present in a college community; now and then there is intended pressure towards a particular contested measure; occasionally there are

contrary currents that, by jostling students into thinking, have an educative effect. That studies in several fields—sociology, political science, sanitation, and various technologies, for example—make important contributions to the social weal, as does scientific research as a whole, is true enough, yet no trace of a policy of civic education for the generality of students is here discoverable. We have simply no guarantee that their attention will be directed at any time during their entire academic career to the functions of the state, to goodness or badness in existing states, or to contemporary ways of being a good or bad citizen. There is plenty of reason to believe that political naïveté is common among college graduates.

EDUCATION FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY CONCEIVED AS EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

But it will be asked whether contributions to economic efficiency are not of themselves contributions to citizenship and to the welfare of the state. To understand and to master our natural resources—so the reasoning runs—is to raise the standard of living of the populace as a whole. The economic power of the United States, and its unique place among the nations, bear testimony to the significance of academic learning for national life and destiny. After all, aren't we an industrial commonwealth, and do we need any longer to separate the citizen as an economic unit from the citizen as a political unit?

Here is a complex of problems, most of which must be postponed to other chapters. Let us grant at once, however, that ours is an industrial state, and that the individual as an economic unit is all one with the citizen as a political unit. The question

then becomes whether education for economic efficiency, as education and economic efficiency are now understood, does definitely promote effectively good citizenship in an industrial commonwealth. The answer to this question shouts at us from the politico-economic muddle that we are in. If there is one political problem that is of supreme importance to us just now, it is the problem of the relation of economic self-interest to the common weal, to law, and to national policy. At this point our supposedly trained citizens are proved to be utterly unfinished. Our most astute and disciplined guides in industry and finance are helpless in the presence of the most rudimentary questions in their own field.

How this has come about is not a mystery. In the background of the most commonly accepted economic philosophy is the doctrine that the amassing of wealth, even by self-seeking processes, benefits the community as a whole. Our schools and colleges have lived and moved in this atmosphere with no clear consciousness of the poison that it contains. They have proceeded as if it were actually true that the good of society and of the nation is promoted by teaching students how to make the most money!

MARKS OF REASONED AND COHERENT EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

A reasoned and coherent education for citizenship would be characterized by at least four marks. *First*, in the background there would be definite convictions as to what constitutes worthwhile living. These convictions would involve antitheses between real worths and pseudo-worths, and the schools would be against illusion as well as for truth in the field of values.

Another way of saying this is that character education is one of the foundation pillars of civic education. For this reason our next chapter will be devoted to the movement that bears the name of "character education." The recognition of human worths would be partly stimulated, partly restrained or at least rendered cautious, by two considerations—that the state is not in position to tell the whole truth about the good life, much less to impose uniformity upon men, and that our insight into the good life is in process of unfolding. New conditions bring new duties and new opportunities, making ancient good uncouth. Therefore there is an experimental aspect of the good life that must by all means be fostered. State education, accordingly, would be characterized by moral zeal, and yet by self-restraint, modesty, and humble expectancy.

Throughout the system, in the *second* place, suffusing all guidance of pupils, the dominant interest would be definitely in socially shared values. The possibilities of "togetherness" would furnish stimulus, guide the selection of material, and determine methods. Something of this sort underlies the present agitation for extension and revision of the "social studies," a movement that may issue in curricula controlled from centre to circumference by specific and defined interest in the social weal. To this movement a whole chapter will be devoted.

But the state is not identical with all the sorts of "togetherness" that we call society. Hence, a *third* mark of a reasoned system of civic education. Society is an enormous complex of heterogeneous groupings and interactions. No catalogue ever has been made of them; apparently none can be made nor needs to be. Most of them are beyond the horizon of the state.

Though law, and the institutions that it creates, include every individual, they do not, and they cannot, include all interests or activities of any individual. Nor does this extra-political phase of society exist by either the creation or the suffrage of the state; it is primordial. Even if we should become convinced that the state should promote all social good whatsoever, still we should find that the only way in which some kinds of social good can be promoted by the state consists in guarding an open space where citizens may freely do what they will without official guidance or pressure or discrimination. Therefore, our imagined system of schools of citizenship, though it will be guided by generous appreciation of many sorts of social weal, will bring to a special and definite focus the parts of the social weal with which the state directly concerns itself. Young citizens will learn not merely "how we are governed" and how to say, "Yes, Sir" to properly constituted authority; they will learn also to enter into a present wrestling with the forces that make both the state of today and the state of tomorrow.

This brings us to a *fourth* mark. With proper regard for gradation based upon pupil capacity, our ideal system will initiate young citizens into our unsolved problems—yes, into our conflicts and our defects also. When the schools deal with patriotism or citizenship "as such," or in general and not *ad hoc*, the result is vagueness or sentimentality, and in either case, inefficiency. Schools are the very place where we should make sure that our faults, and controverted questions of social weal and of state policy, are habitually discussed. The inmost actualities of government as it is today conducted should there be unfolded. How, otherwise, can political parties

and government officials ever be made truly responsible to the people? What could more surely stupefy our citizenry than the present endeavor to develop political idealism by silence concerning political actualities? The result of such concealment is ultimate, usually early, disillusionment. "What's the use? My vote doesn't make any difference, anyhow." The spread of political cynicism, with its obverse—a determination to "dig in" on behalf of my narrow self, or a determination to "get mine while the getting is good"—is promoted, not hindered, by present school policy.

A SELF-TEST FOR PUBLIC-SCHOOL EDUCATORS⁴

1. Why are Americans, who have compulsory schooling for all citizens, as inept as they notoriously are in local self-government, particularly in cities?

2. Why do so many citizens fail to vote—in one presidential election, more than half of them?

3. How comes it to pass that a self-governing people, supposedly trained for self-government in schools of the people, can become notorious for disrespect for its own laws? This question has no especial reference to our liquor laws; it would be pertinent if the 18th Amendment had not been adopted.

4. Why is no refutation forthcoming of the oft-repeated complaint that our government is in reality a class-government? If this complaint is well founded, what should the schools do about it? If not well founded, what?

5. Why do intolerance and social sectarianism fill the air—economic intolerance, race intolerance, po-

⁴ Cf. Peters, C. C., *Objectives and Procedures in Civic Education*. (New York, 1930.) See also a further self-test for teachers in the closing section of Chapter IV of the present work.

litical intolerance? The country is spotted with societies and groups or classes that, arrogating virtue to themselves, would excommunicate any one who disagrees with their policy or standpoint. The prohibition muddle is only one of many evidences that our people have not yet received the kind of training that prepares men to sit down together in peace and good will to canvass their differences, or even to ascertain, in cool blood, three facts that bear upon these differences.

6. How shall we account for the ethical and social crudities of our large-scale, highly organized, and government-favored industries? Even the rudimentary concepts of good character that every school intends to inculcate do not find acceptance in large-scale economic practice.

7. How explain the gap that almost everywhere appears between private character and corporate conduct? Our people tolerate or even approve political and economic conduct in the mass that they would condemn in the face-to-face relations between individuals.

This is not an inventory of our good and bad points, of course. It contains no hint that we are worse than other peoples. But does it not indicate some of the tasks that educational thinking should now take up?

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHARACTER-EDUCATION MOVEMENT

THE CHANGING FOCUS OF THE SCHOOLMASTER'S MIND

A nation-wide movement for "character-education" is upon us. It is more than a fad; more than a spasm of "pedagogy." If the giving of a prize of \$5000 for a children's code of morals be a superficial event, and if still we are not far from the surface when \$20,000 is awarded for the best plan for character education in public schools, surely there is something profound in the searching of the schoolmaster's conscience, and in the anxiety with respect to our civilization, that any one can witness in the current literature of education and in the proceedings of the National Education Association, the Department of Superintendence, and the Religious Education Association.

One of the surest signs that the deeps are stirred is the up-springing of research in this field. Never before were the resources of literature for the up-building of character minutely surveyed. Never until now were the beginnings of character in small children subjected to rigorous analysis and experiment. We are still in the first decade in which it has been possible to know by objective evidence how school children meet issues of conduct, and what determines their attitudes. There are many indications that this interest reaches beyond the educators into general society. One such evidence is expenditure for research.

It is known, for example, that a single research enterprise in this field has cost more than \$100,000.

What does all this excitement signify? It is one of the major signs that the focus of education—its recognized purpose and method—is shifting. The roots of the new interest in character run out into what is most characteristic of our civilization, which itself is largely new. Our present concern for the schools reflects in part the approach to precision in educational psychology and in school methods all along the line—we desire to replace guesses by knowledge; it reflects likewise an increasing demand made by the spirit of the times for efficiency in all planned activities. The roots go deeper than this, however. It is safe to say that the future historian of American education will relate how, within our generation:

1. The World War and its early after-effects intensified national consciousness and gave it a tone of anxiety.

2. Contemporary religion was at the same time encountering unprecedented problems within its own sphere, and was undergoing transition with anxiety. In fact, a religious-education movement in the churches parallels and partly coincides with the character-education movement in the public schools.

3. Industrialism, which was then reaching a climax and a crisis, had profoundly changed the relations of men to one another without developing ethical standards applicable thereto. The consequence was, in part, a practical denial that ethical standards apply within some areas of economic activity; in part, a reaching out after new standards; in part, an endeavor to restore to old standards an authority that was passing away.

4. Through science, invention, and commerce, the contacts among nations and races were just then being enormously extended and diversified, but without the help of accepted codes applicable to these new experiences.

5. The common man, partly through popular education, partly through a largely increased cash income, was acquiring modes of self-expression that were without precedent in history, and likewise without adequate foresight.

Cause enough for stirring ourselves on behalf of character education! The phase of this stirring that concerns the present discussion may be summed up thus: This whole unrest, and all the consequent endeavors for revision or reconstruction in education, have a political aspect—political, that is to say, not in the sense of party contests or of office seeking but in the sense of having a significant bearing upon the purposes, organization, and destiny of the form of society that we call the state. Our question, then, is, How does character education affect, and how is it affected by, the actualities or the ideals of the United States considered as a political entity?

Before we plunge into these deeps it may be well to make good the assertion, just made, that character education does have a political aspect. Just where does this aspect appear, and is it merely accidental or on the contrary inherent in the enterprise as such?

CHARACTER EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS ALWAYS HAS POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

It has this significance because, in the first place, all schools exercise authority, and, in the second

place, because school authority is exercised within the political state which also exercises authority at the same time, in the same place, and upon the same individuals. In state schools the sovereign power is omnipresent because the school is there at all only by legal command. Non-state elementary schools, for their part, must meet the requirements of compulsory-education laws; therefore the authority of the state coalesces with that of the teacher, whether the teacher's authority be conceived as religious, parental, or whatever. Indeed, no school of any grade, if it undertakes to promote general standards of conduct, escapes the fact that the encompassing state also is there at the same point exercising pressure with respect to some of the very same matters. If a teacher deals with the "thou shalt nots"—from murder to covetousness—he touches upon legal prohibitions and penalties that apply to unbridled desire in any of these directions. If he deals with the "thou shalts," he is bound to appreciate, and to lead pupils to appreciate, what the state does to promote or protect the good life (as in the family, protection of the weak, care for health, relief of suffering, etc., etc.). Indeed, moral consciousness as such is, in one of its aspects, social consciousness, and social consciousness is inseparable from the everywhere diffused presence of the one society to which all of us belong.¹

¹The manuscript of this book was in the publishers' hands before I had opportunity to examine the Tenth Yearbook of the Department of Superintendence, entitled *Character Education*. (Washington, National Education Association, 1932.) An examination of it while the present work is going through the press makes possible three brief comments:

First, character education is here given a theoretical basis that is social in a new sense—new because the controlling idea is no longer that of adjusting the individual to society or even society's ideals, but of adjusting society itself to the changing and unfore-

The character-education movement shades into an already powerful determination to extend and revise the social studies. Concerning the new studies that are resulting we shall in due time ask the same question that is here asked concerning the character-education movement—whither? At the present moment our concern is not with what text-books or teachers say about the sovereign state, but with the sort of authority that is exercised by principals and teachers, and also the sort that is tacitly assumed to inhere in what they offer as the good life. This pervasive influence is like the undertow at an ocean beach; there is a pull, not observable on the surface, towards the political deeps.

At the heart of the whole agitation for character education is concern, expressed or unexpressed, for appropriate use of authority and appropriate response to authority. To the extent that leaders of the movement are able to agree upon policies and methods, the foundation of their harmony is here; to the extent that they disagree, the point of their divergence is here. Here, then, is the clue to the political significance of each particular type of character education, whether old or new. A brief, touch-

seeable conditions of its own evolution. In particular, economic conditions come for the first time into the foreground of a theory of character education in the public schools.

Second, after laying out this radically new groundwork for character education, the book goes on to recommend types of school organization, administration, and method that do not unequivocally carry out the proposed new aims. Between the theory and the proposed school practice there is a gap.

Third, the specifically political significance of our new social and economic conditions is only faintly recognized even in the new theory, and the few suggested procedures for the political schooling of young citizens have the same generality and vagueness, and the same reliance upon an improbable transfer of training, that make our present education for citizenship so ineffective.

and-go examination of this single aspect of methods, old and new, some of them warmly contested, will now be presented as the simplest way of grasping the political significance of the character education at which we seem to be arriving.

THE POLITICAL PHASE OF VARIOUS METHODS OF CHARACTER EDUCATION

1. A convenient beginning may be made by reminding ourselves that not a few teachers and administrators have believed that reading the Bible without note or comment, and reciting the Lord's Prayer, in the opening exercises of a school, have strong influence upon character. Not many years ago I received direct testimony to this effect from some of the outstanding principals and superintendents of the country. Yet evidence in support of this opinion is scant; the chances are that it contains only a grain of truth. What certainly is true is that the total school situation and the social atmosphere that pervades the opening exercises do have influence. If we could disentangle the part of the total effect that is due specifically to the religious exercises in question, we should find that the main positive result is the addition of some impressiveness—that is, authority—to the social and political assumptions of the principal and of the teachers. Any religious emotion that is induced, all exposition and analysis being excluded, is bound to back up the official authority within the school regardless of its particular trend. It is probable, almost certain, likewise, that by means of such Bible reading the prevalent mental habit of the community with

respect to biblical authority is passed on to the young, and with it any support that such assumed biblical authority loans to state authority. The subjection of the individual to "rulers," recognized in both the Old and the New Testament, might easily be made into a guide for our relation to our elected officers, and thus Bible reading in schools might have the effect of bolstering up the general purposes, good or bad, that then and there control the government.

2. A still popular belief, once entertained by the generality of teachers, is that rigorous imposition of tasks and stern discipline—telling and compelling—take the wildness out of "little savages," making them tractable members of society. The fact is that such schooling does not make pupils into tractable members of the school itself; instead, it makes them into adepts at evasion. It trains them to use their wits to circumvent authority. If from the discipline of such a school any transfer to after-school life takes place—and some transfer is likely—it will be in the direction of the individualism that gets around laws by secrecy, lawyers' tricks, and collusion with officials; the individualism that then goes on to acquire control of legislation and of the courts on behalf of special interests. The sovereignty of the state, in such a case, is first set at naught, and then used as a tool for the exploitation of one's fellows.

3. Suppose, then, that the routine of the school is made mild, even pleasant; will it not then automatically make pupils responsive to law and order generally? There are plenty of reasons for insisting upon school routine, but too much is expected from routine as such. Pleasure-giving obedience to school regulations probably leads towards acquiescence in

respect to civil law. But acquiescence may be nothing more than making oneself comfortable within the existing status of public affairs. Thus, even happy loyalty in the school does not of itself prepare the young citizen to be anything more than a passive beneficiary, and consequently a willing tool, of a partisan or class administration of the state.

4. It is often said, and no one denies it *in toto*, that really good teaching of any school subject is *per se* character education. This no longer means that the study of arithmetic makes the mind accurate and truthful (a typical claim heard not much more than a generation ago), but that modes of approach to school problems can become generalized habits. "Yes," a critic might say, "they can, but under what conditions do they actually do it?" Here again too much is expected from a method because it works well within a school building. You say that the pupil has acquired sound method for attacking problems; he knows how to divide a question, how to find facts, and how to judge evidence. Excellent! Tell us, then, what problems he will attack in his after-school life. What will he feel to be the unmet needs in what he recognizes as his world? And in how large a world will his mind live? The truth is that one can become expert in respect to the problems raised in most curricula and yet be sleepy with respect to the human conditions in one's environment, and if one awakes to them, inept and clumsy. Many a drowsy citizen is awake to self-interest.

5. Let us, then, transform our concept of method in teaching so as to make it include specific processes of socialization. Let the whole process of study, recitation, and testing become co-operative, a present practice of mutual respect, helpfulness, generosity,

and enjoyment of a common product. This is what is meant by some prominent educationists when they proclaim that the best character education is simply good teaching of the curriculum. Again, excellent! But when a pupil thus trained becomes a mature citizen, with what parts of the population will he enter into co-operative relations? With all classes, or only with some classes? And, with respect to what interests? We know that one can be highly and generously co-operative with some persons or with respect to some interests, yet with no door or window of the mind opening towards other persons and other interests. A few years ago the famous head of a great industry proclaimed that business was becoming more moral because it was relying less upon deception and cut-throat competition, and more upon combination and co-operation. His facts were undeniable, but the co-operative group of which he was the president was pursuing a dictatorial, not co-operative, policy towards laborers, and it was using its economic power to bend the sovereign state to its own profit. We must conclude that even socialized methods of teaching and of learning can be politically ambiguous.

Wherever this political ambiguity exists, we may be sure that it is becoming an instrument of the political *status quo*, and therefore that it is partisan, though it does not intend to be so. A pupil who acquires ability to analyze problems of state without actually analyzing them when they are crying aloud in the community is acquiring a habit of not attending to political actualities, but of letting them slip along. One who acquires a habit of co-operation within a small compass without realizing the smallness of it is acquiring also a habit of not co-operating

on a larger scale. It appears, then, that if we are to have adequate character education, the pupil must deal, while he is a pupil, with the substance of adult experience and duty beyond the school.

6. Do courses on morals, then, giving information as to what is right and good, and perhaps offering incentives, make pupils moral, just as courses in spelling make them learn to spell? There is little evidence that they do; indeed, the predominant judgment of school leaders is that such courses are one of the surest ways to make goodness seem abstract, unattractive, even repulsive. But the old tradition that identifies teaching with telling dies hard. A recent official commission on character education actually formulated a tentative programme for a whole state in terms of courses on morals. The usual objection to such courses is that they make morals abstract, therefore fail to interest the pupil, and thus entail all the present moral evils that attend poor teaching. There is another, little-heard objection, also. It is that authority is assumed by the teacher and for his subject matter, but without making this authority good, and without causing any growth of the pupil in the sense of rational adjustment to authority, much less rational reconstruction of authority. Here again, accordingly, is political drift, with the ever-present tendency to accommodate oneself, as comfortably as may be, to the political *status quo*.

7. The discrediting of merely informational and "do and don't" courses, does not do away with the conviction that somehow the very substance of life beyond the school as well as in it must be represented in the school. Here we encounter the controversy that goes under the description, "direct *versus* indi-

rect method." Though the controversy grows out of a deep-lying diversity, the ordinary arguments do not show just what this diversity is. In fact, the terms themselves, as they are used, have no precise nor consistent meaning. Courses on morals are usually accepted as the perfect example of direct method. Yet, since these courses are made up of words and ideas about something that is not present, the approach is decidedly indirect. The thing itself, the conduct that we assume that we are to modify, is off yonder, or by and by. In the class we merely look at pictures of it. What, then, is currently meant by "indirect" method? If, upon occasion of a quarrel upon the playground, a teacher leads pupils to analyze the situation, and perhaps to arrive at general principles for self-guidance, the method is called indirect, though in point of directness it parallels the laboratory of physics! If a school is so organized that pupils constantly encounter concrete problems of conduct and seek to solve them then and there, even this hand-to-hand training is strangely called indirect.

It is probable that the debaters on both sides would maintain that vital character education must cause the pupil both to deal with concrete situations experienced by him, and also to form general ideas as to good and evil, right and wrong. What, then, is the real point of the controversy? It is the irreconcilability of two conceptions of the place of authority in education. This will appear if we attend closely to two typical policies representative of the two points of view. Let us call them "Policy A" and "Policy B" respectively.

Policy A. Put the pupil under the influence of ideals. See that he understands our terms for them.

Give him attractive historical, biographical, and literary examples, so that his emotions will be stirred. Bring to his attention situations in his own actual or prospective experience for which these ideals furnish an appropriate standard. Finally, find ways in which they can be practiced here and now, for it is food *plus* exercise that makes muscles grow.

Policy B. Plan all school experience, and handle the material of the curriculum, in such a way that the pupil—as far as possible through his own initiative—will see what are the alternatives for conduct both individual and corporate. Do not merely direct him to the best route, but let him become aware of difficulties, conflicts, and unsolved problems, so that he will acquire the attitude and the habits of a route finder and route maker. Cause him to trace, in the spirit and by the methods of science, the causes and effects of different sorts of conduct both individual and corporate. Above all, let him participate, in this spirit, in the management of the school, and do not fail to make the school a participant in the present life of the community (health, cleanliness, charities, recreation, public improvements, making and enforcing laws and ordinances, etc.).

At some points these two policies will lead to procedures that are much alike. In fact, I have purposely described under "Policy A" the type of mis-called "direct method" that is nearest like the equally mis-called "indirect method." What, then, is the still unobliterated opposition between the two policies? What but opposed assumptions concerning the values, and therefore concerning the authority, of things-as-they-are? One policy is that of "selling" a set of ready-made standards and modes of conduct

("imposing" may be too strong a term). "Ready-made" because determined in advance and outside of the educative process. However painless this kind of schooling may be, however convinced the pupils may become, the fact remains that the core of the activity of both teacher and pupil is adjustment, in the sense of conformity, to the habits and ideas of the generation that is passing away.

The extent of this conformity is concealed by formulæ for "ideals." A teacher who makes "loving one's neighbor" very winsome, and even inspires pupils to acts of neighborly love then and there, readily infers that now neighborly love is to become a general control of the pupil's after life. Yet nothing in *this* process gives the slightest guarantee that the pupil will not fall in with the current unbrotherliness in industrial and economic relations, in race relations, and in international relations. Indeed, one can see this pupil in his later life patting himself on the back for his brotherliness when he gives away a small fraction of his income for the relief of distress that his own economic policies have caused. The simple fact is that the teaching of ideals, as the career of the churches abundantly shows, can substitute sentimental and petty goodness for the larger and more difficult goodness that is required for guiding society and the state towards any morally approved goal whatever.

"Policy B," on the other hand, treats the young as participants in the process of creating appropriate standards, and it endeavors to make the young participate in a manner that is superior to that of their elders. Social approvals and disapprovals shift their bases from time to time, chiefly by a drifting process. In place of such drifting, "Policy B" pro-

motes conscious and deliberate control of social change. The concept of moral character now includes that of moral creativity, and the daily routine constantly provides stimulus towards moral practice of this type. If, now, the school life as such reaches out into the community in the form of participation in social and governmental projects, character education of this type will probably produce citizens who are politically creative.

Undoubtedly "Policy A" can inspire admiring loyalty to our country, but it will not bring out the social and political actualities that make new creations imperative. Its good citizen will be the conventionally good one who cannot be trusted not to stone the prophets of a better economic and political order. If, then, as is proper, we conceive the public school as the state engaged in teaching, this policy is to be interpreted as the *status quo* prolonging itself through education; it is state sovereignty guarding itself against revision of its traditions. The opposed policy, on the other hand, continually "goes behind the returns." Its realism with regard to facts arouses—purposely so—questioning as to what is valid and what is not. It awakens admiration for our country because of specific excellences, but the process of ascertaining these excellences uncovers also the rawness and crudity of much of our social and political conduct. In such character education society has the courage to open its own actualities before the eyes of the young—terrifying eyes for us of the older generation because of their moral naïveté.

8. We can now deal somewhat summarily with a rather common over-reliance upon sentiment and ritual for the development of citizenship. No one will question that the dignity of citizenship deserves

dignified verbal and other forms of expression. No one doubts, moreover, that sentimental attachment to the state can have value and can be made educative. Why, then, do many educators look askance at the present ritual of the salute to the flag, the pledge of loyalty, and various other incitements to sentiment? Because, usually, these are mass acts performed with a minimum of individual thought and purpose; because, further, they actively employ the symbols of citizenship apart from the performance of any function of a citizen. They are not a recognition of a present actuality that requires us to be or do anything in particular. Therefore they actually misrepresent true patriotism. Meantime, how undignified and formless are many of the most serious contacts of the citizen with his government. Is it not absurd that the same political system that has no ceremony for signalizing the attainment of voting age by the adolescent, no ceremony for the casting of one's first ballot, not even a dignified procedure for inducting aliens into citizenship, should subject children to a forced expression of what, under the circumstances, is not citizenship but an abstraction from it! The immediate effect is, at best, (*a*) readiness to repeat certain symbols of patriotism, and (*b*) an inclination to obey an undefined or dimly apprehended authority. The ultimate effect, as far as state authority is concerned, is readiness to accept some specious leadership as if it were identical with the "call of our country."

9. For the purposes of character education much reliance is placed upon the influence of the teacher's own character. Here a primary truth comes to the surface, but only partly and confusedly. The chief influence upon the young of any generation pro-

ceeds, not from isolated individuals, but from group, class, and mass relationships. Even families are, on the whole, media through which larger social units bring their pressure to bear upon the growing generation. It is true—let us never forget it—that now and then an individual, as one of the parents, or a teacher, inspires in a young person that which becomes characteristic of him. But to rely upon personality in the staff of a school to deflect the whole stream of community life is to delude ourselves and to be unfair to teachers.

In particular, why, without inquiring into a teacher's own habits as a member of the community and of the political body, do we assume that he is competent to exercise a wholesome personal influence? Do teachers, as a matter of fact, participate in affairs of state sufficiently to become examples or to have any positive personal influence upon pupils as growing citizens? The fact is not only that teachers are not distinguished for active good citizenship, but that they meet coldness, unfavorable discrimination, and obstruction when they attempt it. At a later point in this discussion we shall return to this matter, asking what sort of teachers we have, and what improvements are required in the training of teachers. At once, however, the affirmation may be made that already-schooled participation by the teacher in public affairs is an essential part of the background for wholesome personal influence upon the growth of the citizen in the pupil. If this factor in personal influence be lacking, the tendency of even the best teachers will be to produce in pupils either a merely sentimental patriotism or else an intellectual and non-functional attachment to the interests of the state.

IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE CHARACTER-EDUCATION
MOVEMENT THERE IS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
CONTEST

We have caught glimpses of this contest in the present chapter; it deserves a more direct examination. The whole of modern society is suffused by it. For, consider these phenomena:

Both deep distrust and profound trust towards the younger generation, which differs so markedly from the older.

Dogged defence of old moralities that are proved to be, in part, a protection for special privileges in the family and in other groups, and of moralities that are known to rest in part upon misunderstandings of psychical conditions—this against clamant demands, on the one hand, for release from such restrictions, and on the other hand for new and appropriate standards.

In the churches a strong centripetal tendency—manifested in ritualistic worship, mystical piety, and theological anxiety—as against participation in the current effort after economic justice, with its inevitable political aspect.

In wide circles of the population, concentration of political conscience upon the liquor traffic, in which these circles have no financial interest, with no similar sensitiveness towards profound economic injustice in which they do have a financial stake.

Numerous flare-ups of race discrimination at a moment when understanding and co-operation among races are increasing at an unprecedented rate.

A marked increase of governmental trespasses upon the legal rights of citizens even in countries that are regarded as most advanced. Here fall repression of civil liberties (of speech, of press, and of assemblage), the practice of lawless violence by police, and the uncorrected and even unrebuked arbitrariness of courts.

Widespread, if not general, administrative pressure upon

academic teachers to be silent or "discreet" with respect to the more ticklish issues of public policy at the very moment when for the first time scientific method offers to provide abundant and reliable social and political data and modes of analysis.

Growth of military expenditures and of armaments at a time when the ability of peoples to carry such a load is greatly reduced; at a period, too, when evidence of the futility of war is accumulating, and endeavors to reorganize the world upon a peace basis are more widespread, intelligent, and determined than ever before.

Affirmation of individualism as an economic philosophy just when manufacturing corporations, banks, holding companies, chain stores, and the like, obtain control of almost the whole industrial, commercial, and political structure. Individualism proclaimed as the true basis of distributed wealth at the moment when concentration of ownership in a few individuals stands out like a mountain peak in the economic landscape!

Strong resistance to organized labor and to labor parties that consistently work within the limits of existing constitutions, together with undisguised fear that these constitutions themselves will not stand against a rising tide of proletarianism. One economic-political extreme is pitting itself against an opposite extreme, with no prospect as yet of any mediating influence sufficient to prevent a direct clash.

This multiform conflict of opposites, these amazing antitheses, must, of course, influence the minds of those who are engaged in character education. The school concept of the good citizen, which carries with it implications concerning the economic order and the relation of the state thereto, is bound to be affected. Two broad and fundamentally opposed tendencies struggle for ascendancy. The struggle centres, as we have seen, in the use of authority in both the teacher's method and the content of what is taught.

How can the nature of this struggle be most suc-

cinctly stated? Perhaps by a summary somewhat like this: Every state in the history of the world thus far has been controlled predominantly—not, of course, exclusively—in the interest of some economically privileged class. Consequently, state sovereignty has meant, in practice, though not in abstract theory, that the supposed interest of a privileged class is an ultimate for the conduct of a whole people both collectively and individually—ultimate not only in the sense of force, but also in the sense of complete ethical validity. Hence the ethical sacredness or religiousness that all systems of state schools have attributed to patriotism conceived as willing obedience—obedience not merely to specified laws the reasonableness of which can be judged, but also to any command that may be issued in respect to the whole indeterminate region beyond these laws. The “good citizen” has been the one who willingly signs a blank check upon his ethical reserves, and places it in the hands of government officials, whoever they happen to be.

But states, like individuals, exhibit a certain self-transcendence. A widely spread franchise and popular education come to be accepted as state policies. They are adopted without any clear realization that they will sooner or later become instruments whereby special economic privilege will be challenged, and with it the traditional assumption concerning state sovereignty. But this is inevitable under the circumstances. We cannot have universal suffrage *plus* universal education and also a permanently servile class. Sooner or later the underprivileged masses will assume that their economic wants are to be finalities for the state. When this assumption looms above the social horizon, it creates a problem for character

education that cannot be escaped even though it be ignored. This problem is now beginning to grip American education. No release from it is possible. Even teachers who paddle about on the surface of moral conventionalities and platitudes lend whatever moral influence they have, as we have seen, to particular, though unmentioned, state policies.

Particular ways in which this issue is being met, or might be met, in the public schools will engage our attention in the chapters that follow. The present long chapter may appropriately be closed by describing an increasingly frequent type of practice that all experts agree marks real advance in education for citizenship.

THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE CHARACTER-EDUCATION MOVEMENT

Unquestionably the general trend of the character-education movement is away from reliance upon abstract formulæ for goodness toward a direct facing of concrete actualities; away from quasi-esoteric individual qualities towards social appreciation and social integration; away from the partitioning of life into segments—economic, political, and moral—towards inclusive conceptions of the good; away from reliance upon the supposed momentum of rules reinforced by sentiment to control of conduct by means of insight into causes and effects; away from a supposedly generalized preparation for the future towards actual practice of the good life here and now; all of which helps bring institutions, particularly political institutions, out of their old remoteness into present intimacy, endowing them with

greater spiritual meaning than they have ever had in the history of our country.²

The school itself now acquires fresh meaning. Already there is general agreement that pupil participation in thoughtful control of the actualities of life in the school is the very base line of character education. The least that is acceptable to any awakened school administrator is that each school should endeavor to organize itself, by free participation of all its members, into a society that maintains its own life by motives and processes that are worthy to be applied to social life on the largest scale.

Let us remind ourselves that public schools exist by legal command of the sovereign state. Administrators and teachers act wholly as agents of the sovereign power. To the extent that they have discretion, being treated as experts in their own field, this discretion itself is authorized and accredited by law. Note, now, that discretionary acts in such a setting become acts of the sovereign. Note, further, that when pupils and teachers mingle in mutual control of a school, the pupils also participate in discretionary acts that acquire the force of the sovereign will of the state! Thus, the accepted principles of character education include this: *Education for citizenship by actual participation in the exercise of sovereignty.*

² Cf. the report of a "Character Education Discussion Conference" in *School and Society*, **xxi**, No. 807 (June 14, 1930), pp. 813-819.

CHAPTER III

SELF-GOVERNMENT IN SCHOOLS AS A FUNCTION OF THE SOVEREIGN PEOPLE

TEACHERS AND PUPILS AS A PART OF THE SOVEREIGN POWER

The public school is the state itself engaged in teaching; the sovereignty of the state permeates every activity of the school; discretionary acts by school officers or by pupils determine then and there the direction in which the sovereign power of the state shall flow. Thus far the preceding discussion has brought us. In a self-governing school, teacher and pupil *as such* are politically functioning parts of the sovereign people.

Suppose that this truth were brought out of its present haziness into clarity in the mind of both teacher and pupil; what sort of education for citizenship would result? Provided that the teacher exercised the initiative that properly belongs to him, both he and the pupil would feel their capacities stretched by opportunity and by responsibility, and there would result a new and high type of school unity that might lead on to a high type of national unity. Co-operation would be achieved neither by herd action, persuasion, wheedling, and the pumping of "pep," on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, by a drilled and mechanized response of either teacher or pupil to a power outside himself. Socialized action and institutional unity would arise precisely by heightening individual self-determination on the part of each member of the school.

The paradox of increasing our social unity by increasing instead of decreasing our self-determination as individuals has been too much for two classes of minds. One class, desiring to increase our social cohesion, and to make sure of national unity, endeavors to decrease individual discretion, and to enlarge the number of mechanized conformities. Some character education is directed towards just such increase of one and decrease of the other. The other class, holding to the same mistaken psychology, but zealous for individual selfhood, would increase to the utmost activities in which one feels oneself responsible to oneself only. There are schools that come dangerously near to harboring this mis-interpretation of freedom. Both these classes are victims of a false antithesis. It is as if one were to assume that happiness is a fund, fixed in amount, so that the more I have the less there is for others. The truth is that individuality becomes most pointed, means most to one's self, *first*, when one arrives at one's own convictions and desires by friendly interaction with other minds, but without compulsion, persuasion, or imitation, and, *second*, when one knows that one's own self-determination is at the same time a co-determination of a social whole that is greater than one's self.

This is as much as to say that human nature has a capacity for fundamental democracy. By "fundamental" democracy is meant the production and maintenance of social unity by free, individual self-determination. What is here proposed is that this capacity should be developed in the school, not as a non-political society, but as a consciously functioning part and organ of the state in its full quality as sovereign. There always is a fraction of state sovereignty in the school; it really is there, whether it is exercised

thoughtfully or thoughtlessly. When it is thoughtfully used by all the parties concerned, the result will be not only democracy in the school itself but also a contribution to firmly knit democracy in the encompassing state.

It is easy to overestimate the amount of training for the political state that is received in schools that are social-minded but not political-minded. A mere glance at the ways of men will show that one can be highly democratic in one circle and highly undemocratic in another, as, for example, within a club and outside it. The fact that pupils of different races mingle freely in a school by no means indicates that they will not be racially antagonistic in after life. Co-operative labor for the common good within a school gives of itself simply no assurance that pupils will rise above self-seeking in the industrial and economic order, or above narrow partisanship in political affairs. Any adequate theory of school management must show how good school-citizenship can be made dynamically continuous with the life of the state in the largest sense. The surest bridge from one to the other is not *analogy* between school functions and the functions of the sovereign state, but *partial identity* of these functions, together with clear realization that they are partly identical. Many departures from scholastic traditions would be required; let us look at some of them.

ACTUALITIES AND ILLUSIONS IN SELF-GOVERNMENT

Our discussion has referred to "pupil participation" in the management of the school, not to "pupil self-government." If we use terms strictly we never shall employ this one. For such self-determination as

pupils exercise depends at every moment upon the existence of the school, and the school depends for its existence upon the will of persons outside it. Moreover, administrators and teachers never do nor can abdicate at any point; if they appear to do so, it is only in appearance, and the appearance may even be kept up as a means of securing the greatest possible control with the least possible inconvenience. Within the most free acts of the pupils, therefore, there is an immanent, inescapable activity that is more than theirs.¹ Let us speak, then, of "self-government in schools" or "school self-government," meaning thereby the frank and open mingling of discretion on the part of teachers and administrators with discretion on the part of pupils.

Illusion competes with actuality also when school discipline takes the form of city, state, or national government. In such cases one or another school function is translated into something that is not a school function, and this in turn is translated back into the original. For example, a pupil violates a "law," suffers "arrest," undergoes a "trial," before a "court," and then becomes once more just a pupil in a school. Though (in some instances) much of the substance of discipline be here the form is a make-believe that is not always aware of what it precisely is and does. Pupils can be thrilled with a sense of wielding authority when in reality they are being used by a principal as his instruments. In fact, the whole scheme exists by his consent; it can be abolished *in toto* at any moment that he chooses. Moreover, educators can too readily assume that imitating the externals of the state (voting, holding office, debate, party contests, etc.) gives

¹ I have discussed this at length in *Law and Freedom in the School* (Chicago, 1924), Chapter V.

pupils an experience of the fundamental dynamics of good citizenship.

Meantime, really fundamental problems of the school situation are withheld from pupils. Consider, for example, the frequent cases in which unco-operative conduct springs from the pressure of inappropriate curriculum material, or of a wooden method of teaching, upon an active-minded lad or lass. When the school "state" disciplines such a pupil without taking account of this causative factor in conduct, the whole procedure is illusory; it is educational quackery.

For reasons like these, it is better that the form of school government should grow up in each school from within—not, of course, without reference to precedents, but by freely building them into an original creation, and freely modifying the structure in response to changing experience or growing insight.² It should express the teachers and the principal as well as the pupils, and not merely in the form of restrictive rules or a veto power; rather, the whole positive function of school officers should find its highest expression in a conscious mutuality and commingled authority that pervade the entire personnel of the school.

There are at least four conditions upon which the political effectiveness and spread of school self-government depend:

First, there are irreducible, non-transferable, non-discretionary factors in the official responsibility of teachers and of principals. What shall be done with these unshared factors in a system of school self-government? They should be explicitly laid open to pu-

² This is substantially the position of Richard Welling, and of the Self-Government Committee, Inc., 2 Wall Street, New York, of which he has been the inspiration for many years.

pils. Moreover, official policies in the use of discretionary powers also should be fully and frankly disclosed. Partial disclosure is possible in any grade; full disclosure in the high school. The purpose of sharp definitions here is not to establish a mechanical distribution of powers, not to tell pupils "where they get off," but to establish a common basis of knowledge that is essential for co-operation in matters that are basic.

Second, conditions must be made most favorable for similarly frank disclosure, on the part of students, of their conceptions of school values, their wants, and facts that are related thereto. Therefore, no discrimination against the pupil who reveals something that is disagreeable to other persons (I do not refer to tattling, but to a policy that will make tattling unthinkable!), and especially no penalty for revealing one's own defects.

Third, the technical and professional problems of teaching, supervision, and administration must be made problems of self-government to the extent of the mental capacity of pupils of the different grades. The sphere of self-government is not "discipline," but education. Why just this curriculum? How good is this text-book? Why just this kind of drill? Why this sort of test? Why this marking system? What is the supervisor doing when he visits our room? What happens in a teachers' meeting? Maybe *we* need to do something about these things. If a scientific answer can be given to any such questions, a basis for student-teacher co-operation can readily be found therein.³ Both teacher and pupil then obey together. The absence of scientific control at many points should

³ See Chapter IV of my *Law and Freedom in the School*. (Chicago, 1924.)

likewise be frankly revealed, and pupils should be encouraged to offer out of their own experience data that they think may supplement the admittedly partial insight of the teacher or principal.

Fourth, let there be free interaction with school boards, city councils, and whatever other body determines school policies, conditions, or taxes; free interaction of all members of the entire organism. Superintendents, principals, teachers, pupils—all of them have first-hand information and points of view that the out-of-school school authorities need but cannot obtain except through out-speaking from every quarter. It is meet and right that even the pupils in any school or group, or pupils acting individually, should without embarrassment communicate to the Board of Education anything whatever that they think needs to be said for the good of the school. It would be a mark of wisdom if boards should invite such communications.

When these conditions are met, pupils acquire a rich experience of being at the same time subjects of authority and sources of authority—specifically, authority that they themselves recognize as that of the state. They need not imitate something that is elsewhere; they need not wait for a citizenship that is not yet; they can act now as citizens of the state, conscious that their action within the school is an integral part of a sovereignty that reaches on from them through teachers, school boards, and taxing bodies, to the legislature and to the constitution.

LET US FREE THE CITIZEN IN THE TEACHER

The capacity of teachers to educate for democratic citizenship is “cabin’d, cribb’d, confin’d” by common

practices in the field of administration and supervision. How can one lead youth into democratic citizenship who at the same time and at the same point is required to conform to an undemocratic set of human relations? The school system in too many cities is a secular hierarchy: The board does as it will with the superintendent, the superintendent with the principal, the principal with the teacher. For some years a struggle has gone on to induce school boards to realize that education involves technical processes that only the trained expert is fully capable of judging. Partial success has attended this struggle, but ambiguous success at the best. Though it is becoming customary for boards to grant wide discretion to superintendents, this discretion itself still can take the form of autocracy. There is no assurance that largeness of discretionary functions and rights will pass on down through the system to the classroom teacher. By the way, note this word, "down." See how the old-world category of "over"-lord and "under"-ling still rules our vocabulary. Some years ago a voluble layman, offering an extempore petition in a prayer-meeting in a college town, expressed his conception of academic administration as follows: "O Lord, bless President X, and them that are under him!"

Autocracy can be benevolent, paternalistic, even frictionless, of course. What claims our present consideration is not the conflicts that it may occasion, but rather the common failure to utilize and thus develop some of the most important citizenship capacities of members of school systems. Happily, light is beginning to dawn upon the horizon. Very recently teachers in many cities have been authorized to participate in curriculum revision. Further, supervision is coming to mean neither spying upon teachers, nor

giving them orders and holding them to account for obedience, but co-operation between principal and teacher in a task that is common to them—even co-operation in self-improvement of both! Yet the fact remains that one of the common conceptions of efficiency in school administration reflects the centralization and mechanization of our industrial and commercial establishments—one of the very things that are manufacturing trouble for society.

The training of prospective teachers for the use of discretion immediately becomes a question. It will concern us in a later chapter. At this moment our concern is with certain conditions that must be met within the teaching office if the citizen in the teacher is to be set free. There are at least three of them.

First, the teacher must become a prime, original source of administrative authority, not merely in relations with pupils, but also in relations with so-called “superiors.” He must be a source of authority precisely at the points where he is also at the same time subject to authority. What has to be achieved is a two-sided co-operation, genuine mutuality, not a master-and-servant relation. Perfect frankness in the expression of individual judgment concerning anything whatever that affects the quality of one’s official labors and relations should be habitual and taken for granted.

This principle includes also complete freedom of teachers to associate with one another and with other citizens for the promotion of anything that they desire in any branch of the government, the schools included. To commit to teachers the training of citizens, and yet to impose upon them “yellow-dog contracts” (the allusion is to Seattle), or other restrictions and discriminations that seek to accomplish the

same end, is absurd. This statement does not in the least imply approval of factionalism on the part of teachers, but it does imply disapproval of the factionalism that pervades many of those who are "over" teachers. The one and only method that will prevent factionalism while preserving efficient citizenship training is freedom and equality in consultations between teachers and administrators, and reciprocal rights in the creation of administrative policies.

Second, the teacher's political convictions must have free scope outside the school. Indeed, because of present repressions, positive encouragement to political activity is needed. How else can teachers develop in themselves a patriotism that is more than a detached and therefore weak sentiment? How else can citizenship in the concrete be known to be there? For words do not prove it! The notion that leaders of the young should be politically voiceless or else restrict their utterance to such generalities as everybody already accepts; the tradition that a teacher is a political neuter; the assumption that if he has positive convictions upon concrete issues he may corrupt the young by unfairness—this, if it were justified, would imply that our civic processes are incurably sick, and that patriotism, to be unqualified, must be secluded and celibate.

Third, since the result will be that acute political problems of the present will come into the school in the person of the teacher, rigorous measures must be taken to exclude partisanship, propaganda, precipitateness, and imitation. Shall the policy, within the school, be that of concealment, then? Or, shall it be that of openness and even self-disclosure? Full discussion of this question must be postponed until we can take up the question of propaganda in its en-

tirety. Meantime, as a feature of the perspective that is opening before us, this is here proposed as the true answer to our question: Nothing less than complete political realism is appropriate in relations between citizen and citizen in a democracy; the teacher-pupil relation is already a relation between citizens; self-disclosure on the part of the teacher, provided it is part of a realistic approach to political questions, can be anti-propagandist and truly educative.

THE LEGAL AMBIGUITY IN THE TEACHER-PUPIL RELATIONSHIP

What has now been said is this: That in our system of state schools the teacher-pupil relationship is not *sui generis*, not outside the processes of the political state but inside; that it is not merely preparatory to the exercise of sovereignty by the citizens in a popular government, but that it is already an exercise of sovereignty in that some fraction of the power of the state is here deflected into particular channels determined and created at the time and not before; that the experiences here involved, provided that they are lifted into clear consciousness and the implications of the situation are followed out, have unique force as education for citizenship in a democracy; and that the teacher's part in this education can best be fulfilled by one who is active in concrete affairs of the state.

All this is true, yet there is a shadow of ambiguity upon the truth. Teachers and pupils actually do perform the functions just named, yet not by virtue of any legally recognized duty, right, or policy. Any decision by pupils can be overridden, even a whole system of school self-government can be abolished.

without even consulting pupils. The teacher's initiative can be to any degree curtailed by the principal, and he, in turn, is "a man under authority"—an authority that can "scrap" any of his policies.

There is a legal duty to maintain schools; but what is a school, and what is education? The laws do not say. At the point where the schools count most for the state as such, the state has no officially declared preference for one sort of education rather than another. There is, as we shall see, an overplus of laws that prescribe what shall be taught; we shall find legislatures making lists of the virtues that are to be inculcated, and occasionally even deciding upon special methods. But such laws leave untouched the crux of citizenship training. The crux of this training is in the every-day, every-hour, relation between the will of one citizen, the teacher, and the will of another citizen, the pupil—a relation that runs through all the teaching of curriculum subjects, all the extra-curricular activities, everything called discipline, and every phase of administration.

Fortunately, much can be accomplished by custom, the influence of strong individuals, and the growth of professional standards, even in the absence of legal definitions of policy. Very great progress has been made thereby; we do not discount it in the least if we ask whether progress in education for citizenship might not be accelerated by legal reinforcement. What we have in mind is the removal of a political handicap from which the school system has suffered from the beginning. The fathers held that government derives all its just powers from the consent of the governed, but in those days nobody doubted that in the teacher-pupil relationship all just powers are derived from the teacher and from adults whom he

represents. Here was a schism in the body politic. In the state at large the citizen was to be an original source of sovereign authority, but the belief actually was held that in the rearing of young citizens no experience of being a source of authority, no experience of social unity through the free commingling of wills, was necessary. Somehow—so the tacit assumption ran—when the clock strikes the hour at which one attains the age of twenty-one years, one suddenly becomes competent to perform the full political function of the sovereign people, though one never has performed such acts before. Here was educational naïveté; here was reliance upon magic for the making of citizens.

The effect, of course, was to leave untouched in the schools the monarchical principle that was renounced outside them. This is the original sin of our public-school system. It has stunted alike those who exercise authority and those upon whom it is exercised. Against it enlightened and patriotic school leaders have been struggling for many years, though usually without perceiving the full political significance of their unrest and of their own efforts after democracy in schools. It is scarcely too much to say that almost every important improvement in methods for teaching school subjects, in methods of discipline, in methods of handling extra-curricular activities, and in methods of supervision, and, added to this, the central tendency of the character-education movement, have pointed backward to an autocracy that was being rejected and forward towards democracy in the making.

The bed-rock problem of the public schools, effective education for citizenship in our kind of state, has not been solved—this is certain. But we are moving towards a solution—this also is certain. Our progress

towards a solution has been most rapid and least wavering where we have developed in pupil-teacher relationships processes and experiences most like those of actively good citizens in a popular government. But this progress has been hampered by a general idea of schools and schooling that was derived from ante-American and anti-American social and political sources. Changes that bring school experience into line with experience in the state as America has conceived the state have been innovations in opposition to tradition and presumption. The burden of proof has been against them instead of for them. Administrators who are politically inert or autocratic-minded have had the advantage of a legal presumption in their favor. It is a fair question, then, whether we should not shift the weight of presumption to the other side by legislation that declares for a truly American policy in the training of citizens.

This suggestion does not look towards the imposition of legal mechanisms, coercion, and policing upon the schools. Not at all. The proposal implies reduction of these very things by the enfranchisement of both teachers and pupils; it implies more initiative, not less, on the part of both. For what is desired is a declaration of democratic educational policy, not prescription of either curriculum or methods. We are "in" for more school laws, it seems, in any case. We shall see in a later chapter that legislature after legislature is growing sensitive, but not always sensible, with respect to character education and citizenship training in the schools. The danger is upon us—the evil is already begun—of detailed legislative control based upon the old, ante-American and anti-American presumption as to schools and schooling. Nothing is clearer than that legislators lack intimate and

understanding contacts with experienced educators. Upon school leaders falls the duty, then, of sharing their light with those who make school laws. Law-makers should be made to understand that details, whether of curriculum, method of teaching, or method of discipline, belong in the sphere of the school specialist, not in the sphere of statute law. On the other hand, the general concept of the school as a place for the citizenship type of experience, if put into statutory form, will merely define what is to be understood by the constitutional prescription that schools shall be maintained.

As far back as 1919 I had the rashness to say that pupils should have a legal right to participate in school self-government (which, as yet, depends upon the preferences of those who are "over" pupils); that the duty of pupils to do their part therein should be a legal duty; and that they should have judicial protection against invasions of their prerogative.⁴ I see no reason for abandoning the main idea then expressed. On the contrary, what is happening in the halls of legislation gives ground for apprehension that citizenship training is to be hampered and possibly set back by legislation unless by legislation we set it forward. The only sure way to set it forward by law is to secure a definition of broad policy, with all technical problems and all details of execution reserved to professional educators. Why should we think it strange if a member of a legislature should introduce an intelligent bill to promote good citizenship through education? One can imagine a preamble that recites that a prime purpose of education supported by taxation is growth of the young into ma-

⁴"The Nature of Discipline for Democracy," *Religious Education*, June, 1919, pp. 136-146.

ture good citizenship in a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people." One can imagine, then, a "be it enacted" that it shall be the duty of all persons who administer educational institutions supported in whole or in part by taxation; likewise the duty of all persons who teach therein, to maintain throughout such institutions co-operation and self-government in which pupils or students shall have the right and the duty of sharing to the extent of their capacity to do so. Such a law would not only dignify and solemnize the status of pupils; it would also give to teachers a status that they do not now have except by the consent of administrators. Nothing that our wisest administrators now use would be taken from them. The only persons who would be hit are unco-operative persons and would-be dictators, all of whom are mis-educators.

CHAPTER IV

PROPAGANDA? OR EDUCATION: WHICH?

AN INESCAPABLE PROBLEM

If the policy that is outlined in the last chapter were to be strictly followed, it would change the ordinary relation of pupils not only to their immediate "superiors," but also to the sovereign state itself. Here is where the shoe is certain to pinch. Without doubt many teachers (let this term stand for all who teach and administer) who already take a democratic attitude in personal relations with pupils would question whether all the strictly official relations also should or can be put upon the basis of a present democratic citizenship in the political sense. In the nature of the case, it will be said, the state executes through the school purposes that far outrun the purposes of pupils. Each sovereign state is a particular social entity; it has a distinct history, and a character of its own; it has specific purposes, some of which are enforced by might exercised through law, others of which are protected by law. Over against this towering power stands the pupil, without a history, without formed and organized purposes, little more than a potentiality. Will not the basic purpose of the state in educating him be to make him obedient and compliant? To be completely frank about the matter, isn't political propaganda the very heart of popular education in all modern states?

The problem is even broader than this. Is not education as such a process whereby older persons, who feel themselves to be a part of an historical move-

ment, endeavor to incorporate into the same movement those who as yet are without a history? Can character education, if it is in earnest about anything, avoid being propaganda? What function can it have except to attach pupils to ways of life that the teacher assumes to be good? At the very least, must not propaganda be one factor in education, even though there be other factors? The last chapter has shown, it is true, that to the extent that the sovereign ruler forms and carries out his own will in and through discretionary acts by teachers and pupils, education for citizenship does not rely upon propaganda alone; but must there not be propaganda also, alongside these more free processes? In fact, if we are utterly realistic, shall we not perceive that the entire grip of the state upon the pupil is that of a steel hand, however soft be the glove that it wears? In the conception of the state is not "ruling" fundamental, and is not "teaching" secondary and accessory?

These questions challenge us in manifold ways. First of all, they demand that we make clear what we are to mean by propaganda, especially propaganda as a process within a teacher-pupil interaction. What is it, viewed from each end of this relation? How can the presence or absence of it be most readily detected? What can it accomplish in the way of education or training, and what can it not accomplish? Is it, as some educationists are claiming, not a genuine educative process at all, but rather an obstacle to education? If so, it might appear, in the end, that real education by the state implies plasticity in the state as well as in the pupil. Indeed, any sovereign who really educates the people might find that he, the ruler, had become a learner. But this is a long view ahead; let us turn our eyes to our next step.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MARKS OF PROPAGANDA

The dictionary definition of the word presents first an early and strict meaning, and then a broadened and softened meaning. Propaganda in the strict sense represents one mind as standing at a fixed point and endeavoring to bring other minds to the same position. The means employed may be anything whatever that is intended to move the other mind in the direction desired—anything, from threats of pains and penalties at one extreme, to offers of self-sacrificing kindness at the other.

In the present discussion the term propaganda will be employed in the strict sense. It will not mean influence in general, nor all intended influence. It will not include the movement of two minds towards a common point, but only the endeavor of one mind to remain fixed while causing another mind to move. The psychology of the matter was indicated many years ago by Professor Raymond Dodge.¹ Between inducing another to accept your fixed conclusion—you having done whatever thinking is necessary to validate the conclusion—and inducing him to consider a problem and to seek and weigh evidence, there is a deep gulf. A propagandist is not willing to submit his case in this manner to other men; the case is for him already settled, and what remains is to make the other fellow accept the settlement.

The inducements for accepting a conclusion are distinctly different from the inducements for thinking for oneself, though often they appear in similar attire. The initiative for either might proceed from

¹ In *Religious Education*, October, 1920, pp. 241-252: "Propaganda is the art of making up the other man's mind for him."

a teacher, but the teacher-pupil relation is not the same in the two cases. Most advertising, and nearly all solicitation by our political parties, fall under the head of propaganda. When an advertiser or a politician urges you to investigate or to think for yourself, the chances are that he is offering you a kind of flattery that tends to make you—not investigate, but—take a hospitable attitude towards his own interpretation of facts. There is an art of advertising, based upon psychological research, that employs pleasing pictures, catchwords or arresting titles oft-repeated, bold (often totally unsupported) assertions as to quality or value, selected facts, and straight appeals to vanity, cupidity, or pathetic hopes and fears, all with a view to producing comfortable and rapid motion in a predetermined direction. When advertisers speak of “educating the public,” they do not mean leading anybody to understand and weigh all the pertinent facts, least of all the process, effect, and cost of the advertisement itself; they refer to some narrower range of fact the recognition of which in isolation from other facts increases the sales of a given commodity.

Processes of a startlingly similar kind are employed in some sorts of character education. Pleasing pictures of the imagination, catchwords and slogans, reiterated approval or condemnation, selected facts, appeals to sentiment, exhortations to think (to think, that is, what the teacher already is thinking)—all these, just like advertising, have the purpose of producing comfortable and rapid motion of the mind in a predetermined direction! In point of psychological process, much of our training for citizenship could be classed with the selling of cosmetics. The reason for saying this is not to raise any question as to the va-

lidity of the ends in view by either advertiser or teacher, but rather to make clear the true nature of the issue when educationists distinguish between propaganda and education.

The conclusion that we reach might be succinctly indicated as follows: If I am a propagandist teacher of morals or of citizenship, I assume that I, or those whom I represent, have already performed a set of complete acts of moral or social intelligence—acts that include correct defining of problems, ascertaining the needed facts, and determining what to do about them—but that my pupils do not need to perform any such *complete* act of moral or social intelligence; they can reach the true goal, the highest character—so I assume—by doing only a part (selected by me) of what I or my own masters have done. The question to which this type of teaching leads us, accordingly, is this: Does education lead the pupil to perform the *complete* act of intelligence that the teacher assumes as his own background? If so, education and propaganda are antithetical processes.

THE METHODS OF PROPAGANDIST TEACHERS

The methods of propaganda flow directly, of course, from the psychology of it. Thus:

1. The propagandist teacher leans towards the maximum use of automatic processes such as imitation, response to suggestion in the form of frequent asseveration, the stated performance of ritualistic or symbolic acts, unquestioning obedience to commands (so-called “implicit” obedience), and crowd action (often idealized, even treated as itself a virtue).

2. The value-judgments called ideals, and even

judgments of fact (some of which always are included in or associated with judgments of value), are made attractive by teacher-planned emotionalization, not by promoting the utmost objectivity of mind upon the part of the pupil. Wherever real issues, important alternatives, or weal and woe are at stake, strictly objective contemplation of facts produces "drives" without additional incitement. But the propagandist teacher does not wait for such drives, nor trust them; he feels that facts, ideals, and drives must all be selected by himself. The result, when the method works, is that the pupil becomes emotionally attached to the *teacher's view* of facts, and to the *teacher's* programme of action.

3. A limited and minor intellectuality is cultivated as if it were the whole. Perhaps as good a term for it as any is "the debating attitude of mind." Without denying that some forms of debate can be fitted into a large and generous intellectuality, we can easily perceive that, for the most part, and usually altogether, debating consists in attacking or defending conclusions already held. The debating attitude is not that of correcting myself, nor of enlarging myself, nor of getting a truer perspective of my world and of my social attachments and repulsions. The propagandist teacher, when he is apparently most intellectual, is in reality engaged in debate, not in discovery, and his success in teaching consists in causing pupils to become like himself, not in making them become discoverers.

4. Interfused in all this, sometimes intentionally, sometimes unintentionally, is a tendency to develop a mind-set not merely for or against ideas and ideals, but also for and against persons. Social classifications go along with approvals and disapprovals of

ideas and of modes of conduct. The method itself creates emotional obstacles to listening to persons with whom we think we disagree; it creates sometimes fear, occasionally hatred, often contempt, often the sheer inertia of the closed mind. All this is possible without a word that advises it or approves it; it is done by teachers who have no inkling that they are doing it, and no approval for it.

5. The propagandist teacher sifts the facts of history and of social science through a subjective sieve. For he is on the lookout for material that can be so used as to bring the pupil's mind to rest at a predetermined point. The important thing in a historic event or in a contemporary social situation is not, for such a teacher, the opening of a problem, nor the experience of being jogged out of our complacency. He is actually upset when fresh research discloses heretofore unknown flaws in one's heroes, or unsuspected virtues in one's villains. This type of teaching reaches a logical climax when boards of education and even legislatures prohibit the finding of flaws in the founders of the nation!

PROPAGANDA THROUGH THE SCHOOLS BY BUSINESS CORPORATIONS

When the state acts as propagandist in its schools, special financial interests look longingly towards the teacher as a possible agency for propaganda on their behalf. If it were known that education by critical analysis is the rule, the temptation would be lessened.

The reaction of the educational forces to the revelations made in the Federal investigation of "the power trust" is sufficient evidence that propaganda by business corporations, provided that it is recog-

nized as such, will be kept out of our schools. The problem is how to make sure that it will be recognized. Flurries of excitement when flagrant instances are exposed after the evil is done, and resulting resolutions by the National Education Association, produce a temporary awakening only. The danger itself does not slumber nor sleep. The public schools, like municipal and other offices, continue to be looked upon by some of the corporations as potential business assets.²

Alertness against this danger does not imply hostility to anybody, but only insistence that the schools always and in every respect shall be schools of the whole people, and that they shall work in the interest of all. It is well to make pupils acquainted with the work of public-utility companies, transportation companies, factories, stores, farmers, newspapers, and professional men and women, as well as with the work of hospitals, libraries, churches, fire departments, and police departments. But this should be strictly a fact-gathering process—the social values are another matter.

When the social values are taken up, the whole people comes into view; and when the whole people comes into view, any wise teacher will perceive that a survey of the business and professional resources of

² Any one who imagines that the approach of power interests to the schools was stopped by the late exposure would do well to write to the Fuel-Power-Transportation Educational Foundation, 1116 Beggs Building, Columbus, Ohio, for a list of publications that may be had "free, singly or in quantities, for use of classes or teachers." There are pamphlets on coal, gas, electric light and power, transportation, and fertilizers. Not only so; a *Primer on Economics*, "23 pages of discussion of fundamentals set up in primer form so as to be easily used by pupils," is available; and even this is not the end, for there is offered also an elaborate *Shift of Civilization Chart*, with an accompanying 46-page descriptive manual, that purports to show that "today's machine civilization" is the glorious climax of all history. This "educational" foundation can produce plenty of testimonials from teachers who have used its materials.

a community does not yet make one acquainted with the community. The community is a fellowship of persons, not a complex of business and other establishments. The homes of the people are of more significance to a school than are all the business establishments combined. The income-levels of different population elements are vastly more significant than anything that any corporation has to show. And when the value of a given business is under consideration, the most important question concerns neither mechanical efficiency, nor financial success, nor even the supplying of particular wants. The really imperative question is, What relations among citizens does this business promote? Think of the folly of awakening admiration for a corporation that is exploiting the community in the interest of private profits! Or of regarding as efficient an establishment in which there is a gulf between citizen-employer and citizen-employee! If business establishments were to be subjected to social analysis in the school, the danger of propaganda on their behalf would about cease.

PARTISAN PROPAGANDA IN THE SUPPOSED INTEREST OF IDEALS

Whatever we like, however temporary or unfair it may be, we tend to think in terms of some attractive generalization or ideal. We don't call a spade a spade but something less suggestive of the earth. This idealizing of what we are and do is sometimes a deliberate device, sometimes an innocent but partly blind striving after excellence. Our social arrangements, however partisan they may be in fact, clothe themselves in the clean raiment of truth, justice, and the common good; and this clothing appeals to the

idealism of teachers. They then become propagandists for half-truths as if they were truths, and for class advantage as if it were a general good. Speech concerning a virtue in any social arrangement, if it be accompanied by silence concerning some evil that is associated with the virtue, may have the full effect of partisan propaganda. So, likewise, the mention of an evil may conceal the good; or the mention of a fault in one party to a controversy may cover up a fault in the other.

Examples are easily found in text-books. "Strikes are sometimes conducted in such a way as to cause riots and great disorder," says one of them. Another text-book directly attributes to laborers and to them only such rioting and disorder. From such statements no pupil could grasp the facts, much less the issues, in industrial controversies. Seeking labor laws, we are assured, "is always the better way for any group to improve conditions." One syllabus distinguishes between social and anti-social methods of settling labor disputes. The social methods are, conciliation, arbitration, and profit-sharing; the unsocial ones are, the strike, the lockout, the blacklist, and the boycott. Another text adds to the social methods, giving employees a voice in management. Here is a text that specifies as one of our American ideals, this: "All men and women, whether they belong to organizations or not, should have an equal right to work and support their families." In all these cases there is a rather obvious partisan leaning, but in the interest of an ideal.

The liberties of the citizen, to take another instance, can be explained in terms that, though they are idealistic, give support to partisan restrictions of our heritage. One educator says that the worthy citizen "interprets freedom as opportunity for service,

privilege to do the right." "Freedom of speech," says a text-book, "is the right to speak and publish the truth with good motives to accomplish justifiable ends." "The press," it comments, "must be free to publish the truth fearlessly on social, religious, or political topics." All of which has the "Yea" of those who are ready to prescribe in advance what is the truth, what motives are good, and what ends are justifiable. The statements just quoted were printed while a contest over our civil liberties was going on in several of the states of the Union, but there is here no hint of the nature of the controversy, no clue to the partisanship displayed in it. "Government officials," explains another text, "may forbid public meetings or the gathering of crowds if they think that such gatherings are likely to prove dangerous to peace and order." If a policeman *thinks* that something is *likely*!

DOGMATIC NATIONALISM IN THE SCHOOLS

"Every system of civic education is full of the glorification of the country in question and its general or specific superiorities over all others." This is one of the conclusions drawn from a close examination of the bases of civic cohesion in eight modern states.³ "Glorification," with a minimum of reflective analysis, "as if it feared the more sober examination of the alleged advantage or traits of the particular state, or area, or group." In other words, propaganda instead of education.

It behooves us to realize that this description applies to our schools in the same sense in which it describes those of European states. In what amounts to

³ Merriam, C. E., *The Making of Citizens*, p. 338. (Chicago, 1931.)

an exhaustive examination of civic attitudes expressed in American school text-books, Professor Pierce has shown that the dominant tone of the material that is put before our young citizens is that of jingoistic nationalism.⁴ There are noteworthy exceptions—noteworthy because they are more true to fact, and more revealing as to the questions that thinking citizens must decide. But for every one of these sober, educative texts there are a dozen or a score that are recklessly nationalistic, which is another way of saying that in the name of patriotism our children and youth are being subjected to propaganda on behalf of a kind of nationalism that favors special interests. This is the back-lying reason why too much inquiry, too much attention to historic fact, is avoided.

A committee of distinguished educators and historians presented at a recent meeting⁵ of the Department of Superintendence a statement in which the following declarations are made: "Text-books in history and other subjects used in most of the public and private schools of the United States still reflect more or less the distortions of war-time propaganda . . . propaganda of interested groups controlling national policies. The duty of educators is clear. . . . Only enlightened public opinion, based on accurate information and full and free discussion of facts and issues, can give to our nation real and adequate security. Dissemination of vital facts with honest discussion of the issues they involve is a major responsibility of the nation's schools." In other words, dogmatic nationalism has no proper place in our schools.

⁴ Pierce, B. L., *Civic Attitudes in American School Textbooks*. (Chicago, 1930.)

⁵ Presented at the 1932 meeting.

THE KINDS OF CHARACTER THAT PROPAGANDA CAN
AND CANNOT PRODUCE

By the means that have been described, many kinds of excellence—at least many aspects of desirable conduct—can be promoted, as: Foretellable, and in this sense disciplined, conduct, as contrasted with shiftiness; abstention from the evils that are condemned and shunned by the group or class within which one lives and moves; loyalty to this group or class as contrasted with anarchistic self-seeking; emotional attitudes of pity and merciful kindness towards recognized types of misfortune; likewise emotions of dissatisfaction and of opposition directed towards recognized types of intrenched wrong. This is not a mean list, certainly; the good man and the good citizen surely will exhibit something that can be approximately described in these terms. Yet, through the whole list there runs a qualifier that, if it were deliberately chosen, would be a catch. There is at every point a stopping-short that is not explained—an appearance of going the whole length with an ethical principle, only to end in ambiguity.

If we inspect the details of the propaganda process in the mind of both teacher and pupil, we shall discover essentials of character education and of citizenship that cannot possibly be promoted through this kind of teacher-pupil relationship. Thus:

1. The teacher does not accept nor make attractive the whole of what seemed to our predecessors to be wisdom and virtue; selection always takes place. But the ground of the selection is not disclosed to the pupil, and often the teacher himself is unaware that selection has been made, and still more often unaware

of the grounds of it. Similarly, selection is made among principles and motive forces of the contemporary group or class that expresses itself through the teacher. Propaganda for the virtues that appear in this group or class never tells the whole truth about these virtues themselves; in particular, the specific obstacles that a good man or a good citizen meets within the group or class whence the teacher derives his authority are kept in the background, or else only a selected part of the truth about them is disclosed. In other words, distinctions, facts, and concrete situations that are necessary to define a virtue and to give point to purposeful living are lacking. The goodness that propaganda produces is sure to be either narrow (in extreme instances, cranky), or self-deceived, or too diffuse and general to be efficient, or ambiguous at the points where the most difficult problems arise.

2. Teaching that takes the form of propaganda commonly transmits the shell of goodness rather than the kernel of it—this, not by accident or lack of skill, but just because propaganda is what it is. How this happens can easily be seen from examples of it. For instance, honesty in the marketing of goods meant for our grandfathers a face-to-face relation in which words told the truth about that which the buyer most needed to know, the words being in many cases backed up by a direct showing of the goods. This is the sturdy honesty that our schools and homes have endeavored to teach, and not without success, it would seem. For our merchants are in fact honest in the school sense. That is, they will not lie in a face-to-face meeting with a customer. But what about the accepted methods of advertising, dressing up and labeling of goods, price-fixing and tagging, and high-pressure salesmanship? Can these, by any stretch of

generosity, be called honest in any important sense of the term? But these are things about which the propagandist of honesty does not teach. He does not do it because, *qua* propagandist, he endeavors to bring the minds of pupils to a fixed point instead of adjusting their minds and his own to a moving point. Even if he starts with goodness in the concrete, he ends with goodness in the abstract. This method of teaching, in short, is out of harmony with the nature of experience. It is, so to say, irreverent towards the history of man. Innumerable examples like the one just given could be drawn from almost any sphere of life—not least from the political sphere, for here, as in the industrial order, the facts with which education for citizenship has to deal are first selected and then transformed until only a shell of civic virtue remains.

3. The most distinctive strength of character, whether in our ancestors or in our contemporaries, cannot be created or evoked by propaganda. In the nature of the case, wisdom and virtue could not be transmitted until first they had been achieved without being transmitted. Such racial wisdom as we possess has been derived from the conduct of men in situations in which precedents were insufficient as guides. Here men did the hard right without being told what to do. These are the points at which the meaning of goodness becomes most luminous, but goodness like this cannot be imitated or accepted from a teacher; it arises out of wrestling with a situation, never out of compliance with other minds.

It is of the nature of teaching by propaganda to arrive regularly behind time. This statement applies to radical propaganda, curiously enough, as truly as it does to that of conservative complexion. Radical propaganda regularly exhibits such phenomena as

these: Mentally mechanized dependence upon a leader, living or dead—something approaching apotheosis even takes place, or the creation of a secular Pope; a particular good (actual or imagined) is taken out of its context, and thus rendered abstract; some of the parties in interest fill the foreground and conceal others who are in the background, with resulting partisanship or injustice; or, a historically conditioned policy is treated as though it were an eternal and authoritative truth; all of which implies that the possibilities of present creativity are curtailed, and that character is not keeping up with the movement of events.

ALL PROPAGANDA IS PARTISAN

Many educationists who are strenuously opposed to propaganda in the schools on behalf of special interests approve, nevertheless, propaganda on behalf of what they regard as the general good. In such matters as love of country, our form of government, obedience to law, thrift, supporting any war that is declared by the officials who are responsible therefor, and much more, it is regarded as entirely proper that teachers, and especially the authorities that employ the teachers, should put their heads together and decide in advance what the pupils shall be made to think, how they shall be made to feel, and what governmental policies they shall be made to support. Such propaganda, it is believed, is not partisan; it offers itself as the voice of Our Country calling upon all citizens to promote the good of all.

But is it what it takes itself to be? The answer lies in two considerations, the one historical, the other psychological:

1. The necessary assumption of those who guide such propaganda is that the meaning that they themselves give to "Our Country" is both true and sufficient, and that their conception of the "good of all" is comprehensive, balanced, and true to all the facts involved. Here a view of history not only questionable but false is taken for granted, the view, namely, that judgment of a historical epoch upon itself can be freed from the particular forces that give this epoch its distinctive qualities. No epoch completely understands itself. The forces that are flowing through the United States in the current year will be better understood when fruits that are still unripe become fully mature. There is simply no justification from history for the assumption that either our grasp of facts or our estimate of values can deserve to be a stopping place for young minds.

2. The theory that would justify propaganda for the general good depends upon a psychological as well as historical displacement. No teacher, nor member of a board of education, nor school commissioner, nor legislator can quite free himself from the subtle temptation to identify the "general" good with some particular good, or apparent good, to which he himself is accustomed. This statement does not imply that every one who has a limited and partly distorted perspective is blameworthy, but it does imply that true wisdom must contain some distrust of itself. The wisest of us, growing up in a particular social environment, and deriving life's satisfactions within it under the conditions that it imposes, do and must reflect in some measure the limitations of this environment. The most broad-minded, would-be impartial educator remains somewhat partial. He is a bit more confident than the uncolored facts quite warrant; he

is a bit more ready to listen to those who agree with him than to those who disagree; he takes his own yesterday as a precedent for today. He is human!⁶

The greatest master of propaganda in all history, the Roman Catholic Church, grasps the logic of its position far better than most educationists grasp the logic of theirs. This great church understands clearly that propaganda, even for the general good, is necessarily partisan. The Catholic Church is frankly partisan; it is not democratic, and it does not pretend to be so; rather, it is an absolute monarchy. It censors thought; it purposely closes the ears of the faithful to some of their fellow men; it practices suppression upon principle, as in *The Index Expurgatorius*. It can be gracious; it can wait; it can bend temporarily to local pressure or to public sentiment, but always with a view to securing in the end unconditional subjection. It justifies this, its propagandist character, on the ground that the church is the custodian of an infallible revelation—that is, a body of propositions no one of which is in any degree historically conditioned. This is the Roman Catholic way of dealing with the first of the two points just made. The judgments of the church, it is held, do not arise, as do the judgments of school boards, in and through a still uncompleted historical process; they are eternal truths that have been interjected into the historical process from outside itself. The second, or psychological, objection to the theory of propaganda for the common good, is voided for Catholics by an extension of the concept of inspiration. It is true that the parish priest and the teaching sister are, as indi-

⁶ In my *Motives of Men* (New York, 1928), Chapter XXI, I have shown that the very process of becoming rational binds us, to some extent, to the irrational.

viduals, historically conditioned, even sinful, but they are under the command and correction of a head teacher, the Pope, whose official teachings are made infallible by a present influx of divine illumination.

Here is a boldly reasoned, definitely articulated, analysis of the factors involved in our present problem. But similar logical coherence is not found in the thinking of the many educators who approve propaganda through the public schools provided that it is intended for the common good. They cannot make their theory good without assuming to possess some equivalent for the Roman Catholic claim to infallibility. Can they even claim to have attempted the maximum approach to impartiality that is possible to us fallible men? Here is a nut for any propagandist to crack: Would your propaganda, both content and method, be equally appropriate in all countries? The Catholic Church claims to have one and the same message for all mankind. Do you make any parallel claim with respect to the teaching of citizenship in the public schools of the United States? You approve propaganda that is for the "common" good; but when is good actually "common"?

Any one who fancies that this is merely a catch in abstract logic will easily discover that it is not so if he will examine the propaganda in the schools for, say, thrift, and for particular ways of being thrifty. Let him find out who, outside the schools, has brought pressure for thrift-propaganda in the schools, and why; let him study the detailed advices given, likewise the motives to which appeal is made; then let him study the setting of the thrift-ideal within the economic system called industrialism; finally, in the light of all this let him define the sense in which this is propaganda for the "common" good. If analysis

like this be applied also to the political concepts that constitute the kernel of most of our training for citizenship, again we shall find that the notion of a common good shimmers and wavers towards complete obscurity. Yes, why not say what everybody who has examined the matter knows? The propaganda on its own behalf that is practiced by every modern state in its schools is directed towards a limited, often merely specious, good, and this unevenly distributed. The kind of good that some dominant class has experienced in its own limited environment is presented as the common good.⁷

WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE TO PROPAGANDA?

No human being has a valid claim to being completely free from partisanship in respect to social values. Therefore all influences that determine the experience of pupils in the school—both official and unofficial influences—require scrutiny. Yet no school survey, as far as I am aware, ever has entered this most important field of inquiry. Surveys of text-books have begun, however, with results that, as we have seen, are of immense import. There is likewise a considerable awakening to the problem among public-school men. They are determined that propaganda on behalf of special interests shall be kept out of the schools, but we shall find that in practice much remains to be accomplished even here. At the most difficult point—questions that concern the validity of the more general features of our economic and political

⁷ "America faces no greater problem in the next generation than that of deciding whether the schools shall be used for propaganda purposes or to teach the truth about American history and institutions." Newlon, Jesse H., "Social Studies and Citizenship." *Proceedings of the National Education Association*, 1927, pp. 684-692.

order—we are as yet scarcely beyond the letter “a.” There is, happily, a rising conviction that controversial issues must be brought frankly into the school, that antagonistic views must be fairly stated, and that greater reliance must be placed upon facts as contrasted with deliberate guidance of opinion. If, however, any one has analyzed the dynamics of this enlightened policy, exhibiting the required processes in the mind of both teacher and pupil, I have failed to note the fact. Let this be my excuse for hazarding the following suggestions.

When we approach the problem from the psychological angle, this is the form that it takes: How can teachers who have social convictions and moral earnestness (we want no other kind of teachers, surely) freely express in the school what is best in their own citizenship and yet refrain from propaganda? Conversely, how can pupils, in spite of the narrowness of their experience and the immaturity of their intellect, really “get into the game” without precipitately taking sides?

Some teachers would answer, “Let us restrict ourselves to broad, incontestable generalizations. Concerning these we need not be self-restrained; we can express our own feelings, and awaken feeling in pupils, without indulging prejudice or creating it.” But who is to select these generalizations? Why precisely these? Why not other generalizations also? What is the mental history that has produced your conviction that these are the most important social truths, and that they really are incontestable when they are given the full meaning that is in the back of your mind? Why, moreover, do you think that broad and incontestable generalizations, even if they are emotionalized, will furnish either the thoughts or the

motives that are required in contested issues or in unprecedented situations?

Other teachers advise an uncolored presentation of the facts within the area of social dispute or contest, leaving opinions alone. But who selects, arranges, and formulates this factual material? Some one who has already taken sides? Some one, perhaps, who is too timid to take sides openly? Some one, possibly, who is a mere onlooker, being uninterested in the human values that are at stake? Surely this policy neither guards against prejudice in the selection and presentation of facts, nor reveals the human meaning of facts.

Suppose, then, that the teacher presents both facts and opinions as objectively as possible, and stops there. Is his duty done? Has he really avoided the danger of partisanship? Again we must insist that propaganda is likely to be present in the selection of this material and in the presentation of it. What assurance have I that I can be perfectly poised when I give an exposition of a policy to which I am opposed, or of one to which I am utterly committed? How, moreover, can this method of teaching be expected to develop in pupils sound methods of judging social issues—for, surely, making onlookers is not enough?

Is it not clear that the school situation, if it is to be socially dynamic, must not hold itself aloof from the dynamics of the social conflicts that are going on outside the school? And does it not follow that true non-partisanship never can be had by splicing together a set of silences? Let us consider, then, whether we might check the propagandist in ourselves by increased self-expression instead of attempting to do so by self-repression. Might not the following outline of a possible self-examination for teachers be of use?

1. Has the pupil been made critical—that is, practiced in the use of free, cautious judgment in the light of facts—towards the social attitudes of the teacher and of the text-book? This question assumes not only that the teacher must endeavor to be rigidly objective as to facts, but that, precisely because he is intellectually conscientious, he must open the eyes of his pupils to his own possible one-sidedness. In the best sense of humility, the wise teacher is humble with respect to his most cherished beliefs, and he sees to it that lack of similar humility, or of intellectual conscience, in a text-book is exposed. The other day a fact of prime importance in the history of the events that led up to the World War was called to the attention of a high-school teacher of history by one of his pupils. The teacher was hospitable to the new information, which is to his credit, but his habit of mind and method of teaching were making both his pupils and himself victims of an inaccurate and socially prejudiced text-book.

2. Has the pupil been made critical towards *his own* social attitudes? Has he had experience in revising his judgments, especially where revision has involved both the learning of facts and resistance to prejudices of his own?

3. Is he acquiring a truly experimental attitude with respect to social policies? Can he hold to a hypothesis as a hypothesis until verification is made, not changing the hypothesis into an axiom? Can he do this in situations that arouse in him likes and dislikes? Has he a habit of thinking of social events in terms of cause and effect, and does he distinguish genuine causal relations from the *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* of political “ballyhoo”?

4. Have social facts, policies, and opinions, wheth-

er historical or contemporary, been so presented that the pupil has experienced a fellow feeling for all the different population elements involved? In particular, has he felt with minorities as well as with majorities? Is he in the habit of imaginatively putting himself into the place of individuals of the social groups or classes that he hears about or studies? If not, he lacks an essential qualification for making balanced social judgments. For values cannot be communicated in propositions; they can be understood only as they are felt either directly or by sympathy. There is nothing else that so broadens and steadies social intelligence as entering, at least imaginatively, into the satisfactions and the discomforts of those towards whom we are most antagonistic.

5. Has the pupil entered thus into the most acute present social conflicts, or is his social outlook merely historical or abstractly theoretical? Though the past always can throw some light upon the present, even the best knowledge of history leaves us unprepared to grapple with what is new and unprecedented in present experience. This requires of us a sympathetic entering into the unique elements in the weal and the woe of our contemporaries.

6. Has he voluntarily participated in the improvement, or in efforts towards the improvement, of social conditions, customs, or institutions? This question should be understood to refer to improvements both within the school and within the community.

Such is the alternative to propaganda by the state through its schools. Towards this alternative there is now a perceptible movement. It is implicit in the endeavors after a more dynamic character education, and in the new social studies, which in due time will

engage our attention. But, as if to mock both these contributions to the education of citizens, there is now coming into the school system the most extreme and unrelieved form of social and political propaganda that we have ever had. We shall encounter it in the course of the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

CIVIC EDUCATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES SEPARATES THE FUNCTION OF TEACHING FROM THAT OF RULING

Education within the states of the Union is a function of the respective states themselves, not a function of the Federal power. This is an axiom of our political tradition. Since authority to teach is not committed by the Constitution to the Federal Government, it is reserved to the several states and to the people. On the other hand, the constitutions of these states, one after another, not only assume this authority to be exclusively theirs, they also make education a fundamental and mandatory function. Departments of education, and taxation for schools, are just as basic in the life of each state as its legislature, its courts, its police departments, and taxation for these purposes. If the Federal Government should insinuate itself into a state's public schools, it would be, theoretically, as much out of place as it would be if the President of the United States should undertake to veto an act of a state legislature. Doctor Ray Lyman Wilbur, Secretary of the Interior, bluntly declares that "the nature of the Federal Union . . . makes it constitutionally impossible for the Federal Government itself to engage in education except in such cases as training officers for its army and navy, educating the wards of the Government, such as the Indians and the na-

tives of Alaska, and assisting through the District government [the District of Columbia] in the educational programme of the capital city.”¹

The peculiar distribution of the powers of sovereignty that is here displayed has educational significance that seems never to have been fully perceived. In no other country, I judge, is there any official recognition of an actual or possible dividing line between the state as ruling and the state as teaching. State schools, it is taken for granted, execute the present will of the sovereign; they do not judge, correct, or re-create this will; they are instruments for ruling just as truly as is a sheriff. The minds of pupils are an asset of the state in much the same sense in which taxable property is an asset; both are to be used. With us, on the other hand, one witnesses power to tax, power to punish, and power to conscript adults in war, coupled with powerlessness to touch the mind of one child.

The significance for education of a central power that rules but may not teach seems, I say, never to have been appreciated. The public school is conceived, even by critical writers upon civic education, as an instrument of the same power that makes treaties, levies tariffs, and wages war. One consequence is that an unresolved antithesis exists between the culture of national loyalty and the culture of the free spirit. Perhaps this antithesis never can be completely resolved, but it is profoundly modified, in our system, by the fact that the sovereign who is the over-teacher in a public school does not have his seat at Washington, but at Boston, or Columbus, or Lincoln, or Sacramento, or some other town that is “near home.” These sovereign states are not them-

¹ *Annual Report*, 1930.

selves official instruments of national authority or policy; rather, they cultivate home gardens. They are under no constraint to support in their schools any existing Federal policy; there is no impropriety in maintaining within their schools the most rigorous training of critical judgment with respect to all political facts. Here, then, is opportunity for the culture of national loyalty through the culture, instead of the restriction, of freedom. The reasons and the motives for loyalty are not handed down from Washington; they are discovered in the home garden. The Constitution itself, let it be repeated, separates the function of teaching from that of ruling.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MAY NOT CONDUCT CIVIC EDUCATION WITHIN THE STATES

This is our settled theory; probably no one ever has denied that general education, which includes the civic phase, is reserved to the several states and to the people. A part of the educational value, and some of the implications, of this principle, together with the fact that it has been much violated, are emphatically expressed in the recently published report of the National Advisory Committee on Education.² The committee strenuously insists that our constitutional system and sound policy alike forbid the central government to be a source of social aims for education within the states. Social aims, it is assumed, should originate at the periphery, within society as a whole; they are not to be provided for society by functionaries of the Federal Government;

² *Federal Relations to Education*. Report of the National Advisory Committee on Education. In two volumes: Part I, "Committee Findings and Recommendations"; Part II, "Basic Facts." Published by the Committee at 744 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

for which reason it is regarded as vital that school policies should be kept flexibly responsive to the various local constituencies. The function of teaching grows immediately out of the common life of the people, not indirectly through a distant political power.

But the committee points out that the custom of granting funds to the states for specified educational purposes has had the effect of Federal participation in what is properly a state function. Though the committee makes little direct reference to the civic phase of the Federal influence, this is, in fact, the most important aspect of the whole matter. The following remarks upon this influence are over and above the points made by the committee.

No educator who observes exhibits by "4 H Clubs" at agricultural fairs and live-stock shows can have any ground for doubt that the Federal Government is promoting genuine character education of a particular type through subsidies for education in agriculture. The state does the teaching, but inspiration and guidance are received from Washington. In this instance the effect upon the character of boys and of girls is obviously good, thrillingly good. For here we see them eagerly engaged in projects for the enrichment of home life and for putting high meaning into rural occupations.

The main reason for pointing this out is to illustrate the principle that specific effects upon character education flow from a policy that is officially classified under some other rubric. Promoting agriculture here includes promoting a specific change in the character of boys and girls. Similarly, the campaign against illiteracy is a campaign for one or another citizenship-value in literacy. The official

plan may specify that reading and writing are to be taught, saying nothing about the rest, but we know that this is the outside rather than the inside of the matter. Citizenship is not single, unvarying, self-defining. There are various, sometimes opposed, civic ideals, one of which rather than another goes into the campaign for literacy with every teacher, every method.

The Federal Government makes grants for vocational education. But what is a vocation? Is one's calling definable in the terms of particular skills, or does a just definition require also some indication of the life values, individual and social, that these skills can or do promote? In fact, whatever be our definition of vocations in general or of particular vocations, each has some inescapable relation to individual and social values. We simply cannot train anybody for a vocation without affecting his ideas or his sentiments with regard to these values. Patronage of vocational education by the Federal Government here again mixes Federal influence with state influence in character education.

Federal support of the teaching of military science and tactics has a parallel aspect. This teaching does not, and cannot, stop with a catalog of facts called science *plus* a set of skills in marching, shooting, and so on. Meanings, uses, national policies, the feelings of a citizen, final values and loyalties—toward these there is an inevitable slant. At least a slant; in practice, more than this, especially in recent practice. In a later section I shall show that the promotion of military instruction by the Federal Government at the present time carries with it a conscious policy of promoting a particular type of civic character.

INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WAR UPON FEDERAL
EDUCATIONAL POLICIES

In 1917 President Wilson requested Mr. Hoover, who in that year had become the head of the Food Administration, and Mr. Claxton, then Commissioner of Education, "to organize the proper agencies for the preparation and distribution of suitable lessons [on community and national life] for the elementary grades and for the high-school classes." The request was heeded, the lessons were prepared, and they were printed at the Government Printing Office as documents of the "Bureau of Education in Cooperation with the United States Food Administration." Three volumes, of 264 pages each, covering the high school and the intermediate grades of the elementary school, were issued in 1918 under the title *Lessons in Community and National Life*.³

What, now, did our government at Washington undertake to teach by means of these text-books? The preface of each is an appeal addressed by the President to school officers. The immediate occasion was the need of wise economy in the use of food because of the War, but the President went on to say that his plea was not for "a temporary enlargement of the school programme appropriate merely to the period of the War. It is a plea for a realization in public education of the new emphasis which the War has given to the ideals of democracy and to the broader conceptions of national life."

The texts, in fact, go far beyond problems that concern the management of resources in time of war.

³ For sale, each series (A, B, and C), at 15 cents, by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C.

A strikingly broad exposition is given of conservation in general; of the significance of inventions and of machine industry; of forms of government, laws, and customs; of current modes of business organization; of some population problems; and of the position of the worker in a wage system. The whole constitutes an endeavor by the Federal Government to promote a type of nationalism through education within the states. Here, then, what is implicit in educational grants to states becomes explicit; the Federal Government at last engages openly in character education.

This was, of course, a hasty move. Our present Chief Executive probably, his Secretary of the Interior certainly, whatever view of citizenship either of them holds, does not approve this form of Federal activity. The text-books themselves have apparently become little more than curiosities of our War history. Nevertheless, the incident is revealing.

On January 12, 1923, President Harding issued an Executive Order that created a "Federal Council of Citizenship Training" made up of representatives of the several government departments, the Federal Board for Vocational Education, and the U. S. Veterans Bureau. "The duties of the Council," says the Executive Order, "are to make constructive suggestions as to how the Federal offices may co-operate to secure more effective citizenship training, both in their own work and in co-operation with all other public and private agencies throughout the country."

Not all of the meaning of this extraordinary order appears in the order itself. Though it makes no reference to a particular view of what citizenship is or should be, such a view was in the background, never-

theless. For this new Council was a direct and intended outgrowth of a "Conference on Training for Citizenship and National Defense," held in November, 1922, pursuant to a call issued by the then Secretary of War. The significance of this Conference was thus appraised by the Secretary who called it: "The War Department finds itself in a peculiar dilemma. While the Federal Government is responsible for national defense, for the raising and maintenance of armies and a navy, the physical, moral, and mental education of our youth is reserved to the states and to the people. The Federal Government finds itself with a large responsibility, but with no jurisdiction over the fundamental factors upon which success ultimately depends." The problem in the Secretary's mind was, accordingly, how, in spite of constitutional limitations of Federal *authority*, Federal *influence* might nevertheless guide "the physical, moral, and mental education of our youth" in accordance with the military convictions of our officials at Washington. The constitutional limitation so bluntly stated a few years later by Secretary Wilbur was recognized, but the assumption prevailed that the social aims of education should be determined by a central authority. This principle was later to be flatly rejected by the National Advisory Committee on Education, which regarded such centralization as subversive of our political principles. It is clear that if the Federal Council of Citizenship Training, which was an outgrowth of this Conference, had been able to attain the desires here expressed, the social aims of education would have passed under Federal control, and at the core of these aims there would have been militaristic nationalism.

The Council did, in fact, attempt to induce all the state governments to accept the Council's point of view,⁴ and it prepared for general use a *Community Score Card*.⁵ But the Council, according to a letter from the Department of State, "ceased to function after 1925." Oddly enough, however, it still "has a name to live" in army regulations. The War Department publishes that it itself "promotes the military education of civilians through . . . the Federal Council of Citizenship Training."⁶ Moreover, the National Advisory Committee on Education recognizes co-operation of the War Department with the Council as one of the present educational activities of the Federal Government.

Though this particular incursion of Federal officials into government by the states has failed, another Federal agency is actively engaged in an endeavor to give a particular, centrally determined slant to the concept of citizenship throughout the nation. For the War Department claims that to it is committed the task of recruiting and training "the young men of the nation," and that this training includes "at least a basic course in the science of government and the privileges, duties, and responsibilities of the individual citizen."⁷ The War-Department conception of citizenship assumes the standpoint of militaristic nationalism, of course, and

⁴ See *Federal Council of Citizenship Training*, and *An Opportunity for the Promotion of Better Citizenship*, which can be had from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C., at 5 cents each.

⁵ Procurable from the Superintendent of Documents for 5 cents.

⁶ Army Regulations No. 350-5, entitled *Military Education*, 1925. The amended regulations, 1931, make no change in the clause above quoted.

⁷ Training Manual No. 2000-25, entitled *Citizenship*, pp. 1 and 2. Procurable from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C., for 30 cents.

an extraordinarily interesting educational procedure results, as we shall see in a later section. At the present moment our concern is not with procedures, but with perspectives that help to understand the full meaning of procedures.

What we now perceive is that an educational movement, partly drift but partly deliberate, has been going on in the Federal offices at Washington since the World War. The sentiment of nationalism that swept the country during and immediately after the War had a natural tendency to shift the constitutional boundaries of our school system, and likewise to change the content of civic education. The whole concept of "the good citizen" and of "the good man" is involved. Let those who can do so recall the "deportation delirium" of 1917, as it was called by Louis F. Post, who had official, inside knowledge of the facts; the semi-frenzy of "Americanization," which endeavored to make immigrants into good Americans by psychic violence; the sudden alarm over the extent of illiteracy in the country at large and of low I.Q.'s among our soldiers; the torturing of conscientious objectors during the War, and the heresy-hunt for them after the War; the suppression of civil liberties, which has continued to the present day. All these are symptoms of the same anxiety that began to call aloud for federally controlled education that should mold character for national ends.

In short, a movement for *nationalism* in education was upon us; we were actually in danger of being swept into the same educational philosophy that controlled the schools of the German Empire before 1914. Here the pupil was habituated to the assumption that the will of the sovereign is ethically right, an ultimate determinant of duty for the citizen, and

in fact an obligation of religion. We have not been swept into this philosophy, and we shall not be. Nevertheless, the post-War developments in public education in this country, and the significance of the report of the Advisory Committee, cannot be fully understood without taking account of the growth of nationalistic sentiment since the outbreak of the World War.

This sentiment emphasized a supposed national distinctiveness (without defining it); it emphasized national unity, not now as against "states' rights," but as against social and economic divisiveness (though the causes of our internal strains were ignored); and it assumed that armaments and readiness for fighting (euphemistically called "national defence") are a normal part of national life. The pressure upon education has been that of *militaristic* nationalism.

THE DEMAND FOR A FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, WITH A SECRETARY IN THE CABINET

In the period now under discussion a desire to transform the Federal Bureau of Education (now the Office of Education) into a full-fledged government department became widespread and clamant. Outstanding educationists argued for it; the National Education Association and the Department of Superintendence demanded it; Congress and the President struggled with the problem. The history of the movement cannot be so much as sketched here. But certain phases of the support and of the opposition that defeated the movement (at least temporarily) should be mentioned. The education of citizens, it was argued, is a matter of prime national

interest, yet the Federal Government treats it as if it were a matter of secondary concern. The reply that some primary concerns of the nation, this one among them, are by our Constitution reserved to the states, had some weight, but unquestionably the main objections grew out of fear that a department, with its great prestige and with large appropriations at its disposal, would, possibly by constitutionally correct procedures, go beyond its defined functions of investigation and financial patronage. The Roman Catholic forces of the country furnished the details of the argument. They pointed to the axiom of practical psychology that he who pays the fiddler calls the tune. To erect the proposed department would inevitably take the control of the ends and the content of teaching more and more out of the hands of parents and of local authorities amenable to parents, and concentrate it more and more in a remote and less responsive authority. This argument made it necessary for the friends of the measure to recast its form so as to place apparently strict limitations upon the proposed department.

The Advisory Committee, by a large majority, recommends the creation of the desired department, but with these restrictions: The function of the department should be simply and only the collection and diffusion of information; further, "The Department of Education as here recommended will have no legal or financial power and no regulatory or executive authority, direct or indirect, explicit or implied, by which it may control the social purposes and specific processes of education."⁸ The Catholic members of the Committee dissented, holding that in the course of time such a department would take on

⁸ *Op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 98 f.

administrative functions; that the Secretary would be a political appointee and therefore subject to party pressure, and that under these conditions the department would not be entirely trustworthy as an agency for research and the dissemination of information.⁹ One might add a query: Just what does the Committee majority mean by the following sentiment? "To realize the policies presented in this report, there must be in the Government, close to its head co-ordinator, the Chief Executive, a spokesman for the American spirit and method in education, who may on all occasions express that enlightened public opinion upon educational matters which is our surest guide in formulating public policy."¹⁰

One broad consideration that bears upon the educational effect of changing our Office of Education into a department of education has been much overlooked. If our national and international policies on the whole are to be controlled by a spirit of militaristic nationalism, will not such a department interpret the meaning of education accordingly? Will not even its investigations, by reason of the areas chosen for inquiry and by reason of the corresponding areas of silence, acquire the quality of militaristic propaganda? Under the supposed condition, would not this department become, in fact, accessory to the War Department as an agency for character education in the states?

WHAT ARE THE EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT?

This Act creates an Officers' Reserve Corps "for the purpose of providing a reserve of officers avail-

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-105.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 93 f.

able for military service when needed"; authorizes the President to establish and maintain Reserve Officers' Training Corps in civil educational institutions, and authorizes the Secretary of War to maintain "schools or camps for the military instruction and training, with a view to their appointment as reserve officers," and so forth. The intent of all this is plain; it is to provide a supply of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers—this, and nothing more.¹¹

The War Department reads into the Act, however, an authorization of character education under its control. The reasoning seems to be that a "defence" act must refer to all aspects of defence—mental, moral, economic, even religious—that therefore the fashioning of citizens' minds is required; that, finally, since all this is "defence," the function of fashioning citizens' minds falls within the War Department.¹² This is the route whereby the Federal control of war-making has now arrived at a Federal system of civic education within the states. For the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Citizens' Military Training Camps are, in fact, devoted to education in its civic phase, and this not as a mere incident of the presence of the military, with its inevitable suggestions, but as a definite policy.

The main features and the working of this policy will be found interesting, but before we turn to them we may well take note of an important hitherto unthought-out implication of the situation that has

¹¹ See sections 37, 40, and 47d. Copies of the Act can be had for 20 cents each from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C.

¹² In the ten previous pages I have quoted with courteous permission several passages at length from my article "Is Character Education a Function of the Federal Government?" which appeared in *Religious Education*, December, 1931, pp. 793-799.

been developing. This situation involves, in unqualified form, an assumption not only that the Federal Government may conduct general education within the several states, but also that civic education, when it is conducted by the central power, is a form of ruling. The relation of a student to the commandant of a corps in a college or a high school or a training camp is not the same as a student's relation to civilian teachers. Moreover, what military officers offer in the way of instruction when they act as teachers in these corps and camps is a rigid political orthodoxy. Any one who dissents from it becomes a political heretic. Military officers do not and cannot employ the methods of give-and-take that are freely employed by instructors in other departments. There the instructor and the student are fellow citizens who meet upon a plane of political equality; it would be unacademic and offensive if the instructor should undertake to dictate what the student shall accept. But in the department of "military science" the student encounters a political orthodoxy, with all the changed relations that this implies. Thought processes now come under military rule, and even history has to yield whatever is required as support for a dogma. So complete is the identification of teaching with ruling!

All this is drawn out of the National Defense Act, which doesn't contain a bit of it.

CIVIC EDUCATION BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT

What has been said as to the policy of the War Department does not have to be inferred—it is openly avowed. The official Manual No. 2000-25, enti-

tled *Citizenship*,¹³ is not concerned with the processes of military defence, but with ethical, economic, political, religious, constitutional, and historical phases of American citizenship in general. A method of teaching is prescribed that is simply military method applied to the mind.

A report of the Chief of Staff (the final report of Major-General Summerall) frankly says that the Citizens' Military Training Camps do not directly serve to promote any military objective; their service consists in giving "gratuitous opportunity for the improvement of . . . youth in habits, character, and qualifications for citizenship."

The primary object of the high-school R. O. T. C. has been defined by military men themselves as: "To lay a foundation of intelligent citizenship by inculcating in the student habits of precision, orderliness, courtesy, correctness of posture and deportment, leadership and respect for and loyalty to constituted authority."

The intent of the National Defense Act—to provide officers for the Reserve—is, in fact, not achieved in either the high-school R. O. T. C. or the C. M. T. C. High-school boys are too young, and the training is too slight. From the camps only the merest dribble finds its way into office in the Reserve. Yet both of these expensive enterprises have been promoted by the War Department. In other words, one would not sinfully exaggerate if one should say that the sole reason lies in an eager desire on the part of military men to convert the nation to the militaristic nationalism in which they firmly believe.

As for the college R. O. T. C., only a slight mi-

¹³ To be had for 30 cents from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C.

nority of the students upon whom training and instruction are expended become reserve officers. But these college corps provide opportunity, cherished by the War Department, for getting before students, male and female, certain political sentiments and for endowing them with the prestige that is conferred by military pomp and ceremony, and with the additional prestige of a political orthodoxy that identifies one variety of patriotism with patriotism itself.

The range of the camp, high-school, or college interests to which militaristic implications thus become attached is suprisingly large. Health, recreation, play, manners, morals, American history and biography, the Constitution, political philosophy, economic philosophy, public utilities, human nature, religion—all these, in one or another class or group, receive the professional military man's interpretation.

What! religion? Is it possible that the Federal Government enters this field? Not long ago the Department of War actually printed a document—no longer obtainable by the public—which, by numerous quotations from the Bible, endeavored to show that war is approved in both the Old and the New Testament, and that it is not repugnant to the Jehovah of the one nor to the Christ of the other! Teaching by the War Department concerning the will of God in respect to war is anomalous, but it accords perfectly with the logic by which this Department has made itself a teacher of civics. Naturally, War-Department religion is distinctly different from that which, through many of the religious communions, expresses itself in a glowing sense of world brotherhood. Our young citizens are being taught,

in fact, that individual self-interest is the real and true basis of personal life, and national self-interest the basis of patriotism.

All propaganda, we have seen, is partisan. War-Department propaganda is extremely so. Military leaders avoid free and open discussion of military training, and indeed take strong measures to prevent it. Moreover, the Department does not stop with glorification of our country; it goes on to declare for specific political policies as if they and they only were truly patriotic. Gaze upon this picture of dogmatic assertions offered as "education in citizenship":

The War Department declares that government ownership should be avoided as a peril that threatens the very foundation of this Republic.

The initiative, the referendum, the recall, and the election of judges are dangerous experiments that threaten to impair our representative government and ultimately to destroy it.

Under the representative form of government there is, in fact, no place for direct action.

Democracy is described as a government of the masses that results in mobocracy; its attitude towards property is communistic; it results in demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, and anarchy. (Compare this with the words of the National Advisory Committee on Education: "Let it always be remembered that in civilization and government we are a democracy. . . . Ours is a free society, and governments are designed to be its agents, not its masters.")

The War Department denounces what it calls "destructive idealism." "An impractical and destructive idealism called internationalism is being propagated by certain foreign agitators and is being echoed by many of the nation's intellectuals." Pacifism, the statement continues, "attempts to force the Government into poses of internationalism and false altruism, destructive of the real interests of the American people. . . . Pacifism is baneful in its influence. It

promotes distrust of country; debases the spirit of nationalism; is destructive of patriotism; undermines the policy of national defense; cooperates with destructive forces for the overthrow of national ideals and institutions."

Self-preservation is the first law of nature for individuals and states. "America has amassed unbelievable wealth which is being spent for the good of mankind. . . . It has fixed our standards of living at the highest point known to civilization." But there is a "maelstrom of world envy engendered by a knowledge of our wealth and power," and the present policy of national defense is necessary to protect ourselves and our property interests.

There is more material of the same import in Manual No. 2000-25, but this is sufficient to indicate the kind of citizenship that the War Department is endeavoring to foster. What we have here is militaristic nationalism controlled by economic self-interest. And this is being insinuated into the states of the Union by a Federal Government that has no constitutional right to carry on civic education within the states at all!

A Training Corps, once established, is under the control, not of the institution in which it operates, but of the War Department. An administrative oddity results. There are two independent methods of selecting and appointing teachers, and two independent methods of determining the curriculum and even the qualifications for graduation. It seems not to be generally known, but it is true that any student who once enters the R. O. T. C. must finish the prescribed work therein to the satisfaction of the military department upon pain of forfeiting his degree. That is, the case is settled by the War Department, not by the faculty. This is prescribed in the National Defense Act.

It is fair to conclude: 1. That we have here an

un-American identification of teaching with ruling. 2. That a constitutional principle is being transgressed, the principle, namely, that powers not granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are reserved to the states and to the people. 3. That the National Defense Act is so distorted as to make it a cover for what is dangerously like governmental lawlessness—this in the act of teaching citizenship. 4. That this kind of teaching lacks the historical objectivity, the non-partisanship, the democratic method, and the humane outlook that are essentials in a truly American plan of civic education.

CIVIC EDUCATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN ITS OWN SPHERE

At West Point, at Annapolis, in the District of Columbia, in schools for our Indian wards, and so on, the Federal Government engages in civic education, not indirectly nor by any legal quibble, but by unquestioned constitutional right. At certain points—for example, the chapel services at the Military Academy—our government teaches religion. It does so by maintaining worship, by following certain principles of selection in respect to the character of the chapel services, and by choosing certain types of preachers and leaders of worship rather than other types. It is well known that certain things are sure to be taught in the chapel, and that certain things that are widely held by religious bodies in this country will be excluded. The Federal Government is not religiously nor theologically neutral. Here we see the sovereign power authoritatively interpreting the relation that it sustains to the Divine Will. We can know in advance that such a teacher will discover a

comforting harmony between his own will and the will of God!

The reason for mentioning this particular situation is to call attention to the existence of a large problem within which this is only one of many items. At many centres, not only upon this continent (as in Indian schools and in Alaska) but also in our already numerous outlying possessions, character education, which includes civic education, is now being carried on by Federal agencies or by native agencies that are under Federal supervision. The report of the National Advisory Committee on Education contains much valuable information that concerns ethnic backgrounds, methods of control, and finance, but the political aspects of the schooling now being provided did not fall within the scope of the committee's study. In some of our outlying possessions, pupils are not young citizens, but only "subjects" of us, the sovereign. We need to consider, but the necessary information is lacking, what the state means, and what we want it to mean, in all these schools. Some one should make a thorough survey of the civic education that the Federal Government is carrying on in its own sphere, both upon this continent, and in our outlying possessions.

CHAPTER VI

TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE RULER-TEACHER

"WE, THE PEOPLE," AS EDUCATOR

If the sovereign were an absolute monarch or a dictator, he could fulfil his function as educator with relative ease. For teaching would take the form of propaganda, pure and simple. The objectives would be fixed by a dictum from the head of the state; the specific content and methods would be found by psychological research and testing.¹ Teachers would follow a straight line, looking neither to the right hand nor to the left for problems or issues. The handling of human nature in pupils would, of course, present secondary problems, but never the primary puzzle of tangled values in the state or in society. If the sovereign should discover such problems, and change his mind, an order would go down the line to modify the system accordingly.

But when sovereignty inheres in the people—in the very procession that is moving into and out of the schools—then the teacher and the taught, the ruler and the ruled, are not two but one, and education becomes a part of the process whereby the ruler-teacher makes up his mind and changes it. Propaganda, which presumes that some one rules without

¹ By the way, how and to what extent does our American movement for tests and measurements reflect an educational standpoint different from that of an absolute monarchy?

obeying while others obey without ruling, is now out of place.

We have arrived at the difficult notion that the whole people is teacher of the whole people through some of the same people to whom are committed special educational functions. These special functions are distributed among officials in a sort of hierarchical order. The people adopt a constitution and elect the legislature; the legislature provides the legal framework and the necessary compulsion (of pupils at one extreme, and of taxable property at the other); school departments and boards administer the laws by establishing particular schools and by managing the funds for administering them; teachers by profession, at last, deal with pupils face to face. All these are organs through which "we, the people," carry on the education of "us, the people." Organs, not tools, for the "we" is there in every one of them, and every one, even the pupil, wields original discretion. The old conception of the master-and-servant relation does not apply. Indeed, we are approaching a stage—the adult education movement—at which the adults who through their votes have legal control of the school teacher will in large numbers come to him for instruction concerning their own functions as rulers!

In general, we may expect the educational consciousness to become more and more specific as we move from public opinion and majority votes of the populace to legislatures, then to boards, and finally to teachers. Increasing focalization of function is obvious in matters that concern the technic of teaching. Here, clearly, legislatures are not within the sphere of their competence as educators, and boards of education, if they are wise, will in this respect

learn from the teachers whom they employ. But the relation is not merely that of client to technician. At every level of authority direct knowing, feeling, and judging with respect to public interests must be assumed to be a part of the educator's job. In this respect, too, we may look for increasing focalization of function as we proceed from the general public, through legislatures and boards, to the teacher who is in daily contact with pupils.

The legislature, then, needs to be thought of as educator, not merely as law-maker, and the board of education also as educator, not merely as administrator of school laws and funds. Both have discretionary authority in education, which means that they can legally do what is either foolish or wise. The question is, What is the special competence of each? What range of initiative and of discretion will wise legislatures and boards assume for themselves, and what will they pass on to teachers?

The base line for an answer to this question lies in the fact that teachers cannot effectively produce good citizenship through teaching unless they themselves not only know, feel, and judge public interests, but also draw pupils into a fellowship of such knowledge, appreciation, and judgment. This is the job of the citizen-schoolmaster. He is, indeed, a proxy of the public, but a proxy with discretionary powers that permeate not only methods, but also the content of instruction, and even the objectives of the school. The scope of his discretion, like that of the legislature and of the board of education, cannot be strictly defined. The schoolmaster must be trusted, not merely as a technician in the narrow sense, but also as a citizen, and in fact a more-than-ordinary citizen. He is to hold himself responsible for

expertness in citizenship. He is not to be an echo of the populace, but rather an incarnation of the better self of the populace, or—if you prefer—a leader in the expedition of civilization.

But does the sovereign people desire this leadership? Does it recognize any such better self, and will it tolerate and even pay for the judgments upon itself that this view of the public schools implies? A notion is floating around that leadership of the masses towards any excellence must be bestowed from outside, that it cannot arise from within. To this a retort might be made that every individual of “light and leading” has sprung, as a matter of fact, from the mass—he has not come to us from some other planet—and that qualities like his own continually sprout from the main stock of humanity. What is equally important, within the mass there is some spontaneous and general recognition of excellence, together with capacity for growth in appreciation. A school teacher who is known to be inferior in intelligence or character to the average of his community would not be tolerated; he must be above the average in order to be acceptable. Any one who understands parents knows that they are willing—the generality of them—to have the schools uphold standards that condemn their own habitual conduct. Indeed, the schools are expected (whether wisely so or not) to be silent about many current faults of individuals, of society, and of the state, lest the young should take these faults as normal! The public schools are society implicitly accusing itself, and explicitly seeking to transcend itself.

For this reason we can view without despair and even without alarm the limitations of “us, the people” considered as educator. This educator spends

almost as much for tobacco as for public education, elementary, secondary, and higher;² employs hundreds of thousands of essentially untrained teachers; accords to teachers no superior social recognition; pays them, on the average, less than a living wage;³ is slow to grant them any kind of security of tenure or of retiring allowance; passes shallow judgments upon the relative values of intelligence and football victories; is negligent of political duties, a minor indication of which is that only about forty-seven per cent took the trouble to vote in one of our presidential elections; is naïve in its choice of government officers; maintains an economic organization that is incompetent; desires peace, but taxes itself increasingly for instruments of war; relies for information upon the daily newspaper, and for recreation upon jazz and the movie.

Yes, yes! But the same people insist upon schooling for all; through our schools we condemn many of our shortcomings, and we provide at least the beginning of a supply of social critics in the persons of the more aggressive leaders of public education. The wedge is in! The people want it to go deeper in!

THE STATE LEGISLATURE AS EDUCATOR

Let us contemplate the level of citizenship that is exemplified in our state legislatures—the manner in

² For every \$100 for education, \$93.63 for tobacco! See *Can the Nation Afford to Educate Its Children?* Office of Education Research Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 5 (November, 1928).

³ In 1922 Charl O. Williams put the average salary at less than \$700. See *Proceedings of the N. E. A.*, 1922. In 1926 the average for teachers, principals, and superintendents appears to have been \$1275, which is less than the average income of workers in 25 manufacturing industries. These figures I take from *The American Teacher*, October, 1929, p. 5.

which nominations and elections to these bodies are brought about; the social and economic connections and predilections of members; their party affiliations and activities; the influences that determine legislation, both what is enacted and what is not; the accepted presumptions concerning the significance and functions of government; the grade of intelligence concerning social and political facts—let us contemplate this, and then ask ourselves whether, when they enact school laws, our legislators intend to perpetuate a citizenship of their own sort. The answer is patent. Every legislature intends to provide a civic education that, to the extent that it is effective, will raise the whole level of political life, the level of the legislature itself included.

This good intention, even when it is only a confused or half-intention, is a precious asset for American education. But its effect is qualified by two circumstances. In the first place, many legislators believe that the way to provide for civic education is to prescribe, not the ends that the schools are to seek, but the subject-matter of instruction, the time to be given to this or that subject, exercises to be required of pupils—in one instance, placards to be placed in school buildings. Much naïveté of this sort has been displayed. Many a legislator actually believes that the way to make good citizens is to tell the young this or that fact or alleged fact, expatiate upon this or that virtue, praise our country and its heroes, and require this or that ceremonial act. "Tell 'em and compel 'em!" What is needed here is a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the objectives of the state and of state education, and on the other hand, the educational processes and technics that are appropriate thereto. The processes and the tech-

nics—and these include subject-matter of instruction—should be determined by school experts, not by legislatures.⁴

A second reason why the good intentions of legislators lack effect is this: In spite of the fact that for a century and a half we have intended to separate ourselves from the monarchical system, the prevalent American view of patriotism has remained essentially monarchical. What legislators commonly mean by devotion to our country is scarcely distinguishable, in point of mental process and emotional attitude, from devotion to “our King” or “our Emperor.” Subordination to a sovereign is implied—glad subordination, of course, but gladness has not been absent from obedience to kings and emperors. As yet, in most instances, when legislatures undertake to promote loyalty and patriotism through the public school, they look upon pupils as “subjects,” not as junior citizens of a democracy. Teachers, likewise, are often treated by the law as if they were servants of a monarch.

The legislative indiscretions that grow out of these two circumstances have increased under the influence of post-War anxiety. J. K. Flanders has shown that in a period of twenty years—1903 to 1923—legislative prescriptions for the teaching of nationalism (the dominant purpose being to “foster local, provincial, and national pride and patriotism”) increased more than 100 per cent. Most of this increase occurred after 1913. Similarly, pre-

⁴ The suggestion, at the end of Chapter III, that legal provision be made for participation by pupils in a government that is “by the people and for the people,” does not imply that processes or technics should be legislatively prescribed. The suggested law would merely define, as no law now does, the place of the young in political society. The processes of school self-government would still have to be determined within the school itself.

scriptions of religious and ethical subjects (Bible reading, manners, morals, the virtues, etc.) increased 31 per cent. Laws that require the teaching of citizenship increased in ten years—1913–1923—from 1 to 14; laws that command the teaching of patriotism, from 1 to 12; the Constitution, 9 to 23; flag exercises, 4 to 10, etc. Some of the laws command, not the moral organization of school experience, but courses in morals. The virtues mentioned in these many laws number not less than 36. The list is a motley one.⁵ A more recent study has shown that not less than 154 character objectives are named in one or more State laws. One State has 37 specifications of this sort.⁶ Another State actually requires that a copy of the Ten Commandments (said to be called “the Ten Commandments of the Christian Religion”) be posted in every schoolhouse!

The clearly indicated need is closer acquaintance between legislators and school leaders—the kind of acquaintance that will enable the makers of school laws to take advantage of the knowledge possessed by educational experts.

THE SCHOOL BOARD AS EDUCATOR

Professor Counts has shown that the educational chaos that brought evil notoriety to Chicago a few years ago was caused in material measure by an unfortunate relation of the school board to the schools on the one hand and to the public on the other. He offers as his solution of “the riddle of control,” *first*,

⁵ Flanders, J. K., *Legislative Control of the Elementary Curriculum*. (New York, 1925.)

⁶ Whitney, F. L., “State Legislative Provision for Character Education,” *School and Society*, Vol. xxxiii, No. 844 (February 28, 1931), p. 306.

a board of education made up, frankly, of representatives of contending social interests—economic, religious, etc.; and, *second*, the development of education as an organized profession, all the teachers of the city being included.⁷

In a wider investigation of the social composition of school boards, Counts proves that, in general, the control of our city school systems is committed to individuals who represent a few narrowly selected types of social experience and outlook. Neither the laboring masses, nor the highly educated elements of the community, nor the social and philanthropic workers who are in close touch with problems of welfare, are chosen in any such proportions as one might expect.⁸

Though no member of a school board may intend to exploit the schools for the benefit of a class, nevertheless a drift towards one or another class interest can easily take place. This is practically certain to happen unless the board is definitely on guard against it. To be effectively on guard against it, a board must be reasonably distrustful of its own educational wisdom. Indeed, something that members of most boards do not bring with them must be provided, something that cannot be had by mere pooling of ideas.

Whence, then, shall come the necessary overplus of information and of vision? Only one answer seems to be possible: Educators by profession must be specialists not only in school technics, but also in patriotism in its broadest sense. The citizen in the schoolmaster must be brought into the foreground,

⁷ Counts, G. S., *School and Society in Chicago*. (New York, 1928.)

⁸ Counts, G. S., *Social Composition of Boards of Education*. (Chicago, 1927.)

and to be a teacher must come to mean that one is worthy to be consulted concerning both the ends and the processes of the whole school system, from the legislature to the school board, and on to the school itself. Is it too much to hope that sometime mayors, school boards, superintendents, principals, and teachers will study together the needs of the community, the country, and the world-family? What has to be avoided is not merely corrupt partisanship but also the usual commonplace, generalized patriotism that, without intending to do so, supports the defects as well as the virtues of the *status quo*.

THE SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE OF TEACHERS

The teacher, it should now be plain, is at the focus of the whole problem of making our schools into schools of citizenship. The term "teacher," let it be repeated, here means all persons who have either instructional or administrative functions within a school. Voters need enlightenment that none but teachers can give them; legislators need it; school boards need it. From every angle of approach we find ourselves at last depending upon specialized civic information, judgment, and creativity in those who directly handle pupils.

Have teachers, then, the requisite social interest and outlook? Seventy-one propositions that concern social facts and policies were presented by Manley H. Harper to a country-wide sampling of graduate educators, with a request that they indicate agreement or disagreement, or more of one than of the other.⁹

⁹ Harper, Manley H., *Social Beliefs and Attitudes of American Educators*, pp. 4-9. (New York: Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1927.)

Of the 675 respondents 33 per cent approved this proposition: "In teaching the vital problems of citizenship teachers should so impress on the students the approved opinions in these matters that life's later experiences can never unsettle or modify the opinions given." Thirty-seven per cent agreed that: "For the sake of our continued prosperity teachers should endeavor to give students of suitable age a firm understanding and belief in the protective tariff policy." Thirty-five per cent thought that: "Histories written for elementary or high-school use should omit any facts likely to cause students radically to question or doubt the justice of our social order and government." Forty-one per cent expressed one aspect of their patriotism as follows: "The practice of democracy, as developed in the United States, has no serious or far-reaching defects." Another aspect of the patriotism of 63 per cent of these teachers comes out in this: "During the dangers of impending war our government should firmly prevent any small groups of citizens from opposing, through public discussions or through publications, the government's most thorough preparation for the possible conflict." The list, in its totality, is even more astounding than these few samples can make it appear.

If this be the state of mind of the specified proportions of graduate educators, what must be the outlook of the rank and file of teachers? It is worth noting that some of the questions were so worded as to trip unwary minds, as when a complicated proposition puts a popular prejudice or slogan into a plausible setting. The effect, of course, is that the catch-word type of mind exposes itself. In a further study of 2900 educators, the author finds a surpris-

ing amount of inconsistency and instability of thought upon social questions.¹⁰ The fact seems to be that the social beliefs and attitudes of most teachers have "just happened." There are, of course, many teacher-minds of which this is not true, but they shine by reason of a contrast that ought not to exist. Clearly, the conditions for expertness in education for citizenship are not generally present.

Teachers themselves should be the first to question the extent of their professional capacity, and from them should come a material part of the initiative for raising professional standards. In fact, out of education itself are now coming not only such criticisms as the one just cited, but also marked improvements in both the content and the method of civic education.¹¹ A key position that must be won is definite study of concrete social conditions and problems by all prospective teachers. To this let us turn for a brief moment.

CIVIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS

The following question was put to the head of a large training school in one of our great cities: "What preparation are your students here receiving for handling the technical aspects of character education?" The reply was substantially as follows: "I regret to say, scarcely any at all. We endeavor to maintain among our students a high standard of conduct and character, and in this I believe that we succeed. But, as far as instruction is concerned, we are obliged to keep our noses to the grindstone of an official syllabus of studies." This was an institution

¹⁰ Harper, *op. cit.*, Ch. V.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, Ch. IX.

for undergraduate instruction, no doubt a typical one.

In institutions for graduate students of education a somewhat less rudimentary state of affairs is likely to be found. For study of the philosophy of education, or of method in teaching, or of the life of children and youth, commonly opens at least some questions as to how character is formed and how personality becomes socialized. But as yet, even in graduate schools, two essentials remain unassured. A citizen's outlook and inlook with respect to the present conditions of our society—such intelligence as defines the problems into which young citizens are about to move—has no such prominence as the more mechanical aspects of teaching-technic and administration-technic. In the second place, there is slight assurance that present experience within the society that constitutes a teachers' college will be of the American-citizenship type. This point is so important that a sharp word concerning it will not be out of place.

Even in graduate schools or colleges of education, authority is usually of the overhead variety, an obvious hang-over from monarchical, aristocratic, and paternalistic traditions. The students, though they are full-fledged citizens, are not represented in the faculty nor in the board of control by delegates of their own choosing; no, they have no representation whatever. Everything is matured—rather, supposed to be! before it is handed out to the students; they are still school children in the old sense of the term, that is, the sense that it had before even elementary schools adopted the principle of self-government.

Does this appear to be an exaggeration? If so, consider this fact: Institutions of this class can be found in which the board of control hands down rules

for the conduct of students in the halls and on the grounds of the college! It would be interesting to know in just how many teachers' colleges the students exercise the prerogatives of citizens to anything like the extent that pupils in well-managed high schools exercise them.

What should be expected, of course, is no mere repetition of practice in even the best of the lower schools, but advanced practice upon the same principles. Students in teachers' colleges should have a hand in determining the curriculum of their college, the budget, appointments to the faculty, and relations to the legislature, to donors, and to the school system. That is, these young men and women, who are destined to be leaders in the making of citizens, should have experience, within their own sphere, as makers of the American state.

What has been said concerning training schools and teachers' colleges applies in principle to departments of education in colleges and universities. Never yet have the presumptions of democracy been accepted or even understood in these institutions. Even state universities, which supposably have a direct and conscious political function, are not, as they should be, junior states within the state. Consequently, departments of education naturally become vocational in a narrow sense, the sense, namely, of preparing young people to make their living by teaching, and the sign and seal of competency is a license to teach.

THE NATION AS BOTH RULER AND RULED, BOTH
TEACHER AND TAUGHT

To many persons, no doubt, deliberate self-education by a democratic society is chimerical. Can one

rise by pulling upon one's boot-straps? The tradition of the schools presents the picture of a ruling class, the teachers, imposing their wisdom upon a ruled class, the pupils. Similarly, wisdom in a statesman traditionally consists, in part, in making the masses accept what they do not choose nor understand. Indeed, what is called statesmanship involves having two sets of principles, one set avowed only in inner state circles (such principles as appear now and then when diplomatic correspondence or hitherto secret state documents are published), the other set made up of reasons or incentives offered to the people to induce them to accept the consequences of designs that are only partly disclosed. Secret diplomacy, and secrecy in the management of domestic concerns are still in the order of the day, even in governments called popular. Who does not know that party platforms aim at popularity rather than at true self-disclosure? Who does not know that much legislation and much administration have an esoteric side? The President of the United States himself, besides keeping some affairs of state secret not only from the people but also from the Congress, speaks in two voices to the public through the press. In one voice he states what he is willing to have printed as his words, therefore what he is willing to stand by; in the other voice he says what he is willing or desirous to have printed, but not as his words, for he may have occasion to repudiate them! So full of the duplicity of monarchs is our own political management.

This duplicity affects our education for citizenship. Not yet do we really intend that the young shall come to full political maturity; not yet do we effectively believe that the people can manage themselves through their own intelligence. That is, not

yet have we grasped the political and the educational significance of the fact that here is a nation that is at the same time both ruler and ruled, both teacher and taught.

A man cannot reach the sky by pulling upon his boot-straps, it is true, but a bird can fly by pulling upon certain of its own tendons. Capacity to aspire and to make aspiration effective is not a class-prerogative, but a prerogative of the whole people. We can rise by virtue of our own inherent qualities; we do not have to be lifted, and we have no historical reason for trusting any class as authoritative lifters. Education for citizenship, accordingly, can become a process whereby, through co-operation of pupils, teachers, governmental agencies, and the public, the state continually rises into new life.

CHAPTER VII

THE SCHOOLS AND "THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE"

POLITICAL CUSTOM COUNTERACTS POLITICAL EDUCATION

The greatest single difficulty for character education grows out of the unsystematized, unintended, but pervasive influence of adult conduct upon the young. The readiness of the inexperienced to accept as normal and right the unchallenged faults of the surrounding populace constantly neutralizes good teaching, constantly reduces good principles to ineffective good sentiments.¹ In the sphere of citizenship, the impressions received by pupils from what they casually see, hear, or read in respect to local and more than local administration, nominations, elections, disputes, and motives, compete with the words of teacher and of text-book.

It behooves the teacher to take account of this competition. He will discover that it has its strength, not in the general fallibility of men that makes even their best institutions imperfect, but in specific controls of specific governmental organizations and processes by

¹ "Our society is . . . at war with itself. On the one hand all the really vital processes make inherently for a growing social inter-dependence. On the other hand the actual management of business educates, ruthlessly and all but inevitably, against the moral habits and attitudes necessary to take care of our more corporate society. We may talk, idly, of a hoped for moral and religious education from schools and churches, but our economic system is a more powerful educator, and it increasingly educates for suicidal selfishness."—Kilpatrick, W. H., "First Things in Education," *School and Society*, Vol. xxxiv, No. 887 (December 26, 1931), p. 849.

specific, formally or informally organized "interests" that substitute their desires for the just ends of the state. The pupil, not realizing the political alternatives that are possible, comes to look down upon politics rather than up. He assumes that, of course, one goes into politics "for what one can get out of it." He may resolve that some day he will "get his while the getting is good." He is still more likely to say, "They're all grafters. Bucking the machine is no use." The result may be degenerate partisanship, or cynicism, or simply civic lethargy. The greatest of our civic perils is lethargy; it is failure of the young to acquire the political habit of mind at all.

Education for citizenship, accordingly, must be recognized by the teacher as a competition in teaching, a contest with "powers behind the throne" that continually mask the creditable actualities and the glorious possibilities of our political state. Here again the central task is to reveal the nature of the sovereign. What must be made vivid is the true American state—the whole people organized in the interest of the whole people—as against the usurpation that employs the power of the whole people in the interest of a part of the people.

Education for citizenship has to be a contest in teaching in even a broader sense than this. For, just as the teacher must now and then take the side of the pupil's better self against a clamant specious self, so the school must be the voice of society's better self as against society's merely specious self. The specious self is obtrusive, like the ruffled surface of the ocean; the better self is unobtrusive, like the calm and mighty depths. There are gusts of public opinion, and there are drifts of interest and of conduct that, as we well know when we become self-critical, repre-

sent us, the people, in only distorted fashion. The business of the school is to make us self-critical, so that we may discover what we really want.

These are some of the reasons why the education of citizens for their functions in the state cannot be left to the influence of common experience. Common experience, taken unanalytically, is likely to be deceptive; it does not see through the specious self. Therefore the people must have a laboratory for social analysis—that is, schools of citizenship, of which the natural summit would be the social-minded, scientifically-critical university.

Can a teacher engage in such a contest in teaching without taking sides in current party contests? Taking sides would, of course, put propaganda in the place that belongs to education. Further, is bringing out “the better self of society” anything more than making prominent or attractive something in society that the teacher happens to prefer? Here we encounter not a demand for the impossible, but a test of our theory of teaching. The basis for an answer to both of these questions lies in the difference between greater and less objective-mindedness. The “interests” that would substitute their desires for the just ends of the state are subjective-minded. A fact, for them, is not just a fact, and a value is not something that ministers to men simply as men; no, everything leans towards or away from “me.” This is so even though no hypocrisy be practiced. Hence, the “interests” argue, but they do not discuss (in the sense of thinking together), and they do not present situations in their wholeness, with all the relations to the whole people made analytically clear. The “interests” are not learners; they always want to teach without learning.

What the teacher has to do is not to oppose argument by contrary argument; not to settle public issues for pupils, but to help them develop a technic for finding out what are the real alternatives for citizens. In other words, the spirit of science must be brought into play and made habitual. When this spirit controls the whole approach to social facts, not only "special interests" but also the "specious self" of society, are brought to the judgment of society's "better self." Prejudices, fads, the narrow "spirit of the times" that imagines itself to be broad merely because it is popular and indiscriminating, all shrink when whole situations are perceived in their wholeness and analyzed with reference to the alternatives that they contain. Objective-mindedness will show, without argument or partisanship, whether "the powers behind the throne" are entitled to rule.

PARENTAL AMBITION AS A GUIDE TO THE EDUCATION
OF OFFSPRING

Nearly all parents desire for their offspring a better life than they themselves have attained, and very many of them look to the schools as the chief means for making this better life possible. But only rarely, it seems, do parents conceive the better life in political terms. Most often they think of it as a "white-collar job," or as increase of income, in abstraction from the political actualities in all jobs and all incomes. Interest in politics, they think, is another thing; it is only an elective in life's curriculum.

It is true that the American Federation of Labor, which for many years has given closer attention to school problems than has any other body of citizens outside the teaching profession, has generally sup-

ported liberal and forward-looking educational standards. For example, it has opposed the kind of vocational education that subordinates the man to the job, and it has stood for liberal studies in order that the schools may make men rather than mere workers or employers. It is true, also, that in some of the labor colleges an ideal of larger life, or culture of the person, through the best in literature, music, and the drama has come to expression. One of these colleges, for example, employed one of the great orchestras as a means of developing appreciation of good music—this in a period when the populace was being devoured by “jazz.”

But, even in labor circles, political life has not been conceived as integral with the economic life, but as something *per se*. A few laws may need to be repealed, or a few enacted—this has been the attitude—but for the most part politics goes its way while we go ours; we will persuade political parties when we need to, but looking out for our jobs is the main thing. As though the major problems of state policy were not precisely labor’s problems!

If this were the occasion for going into the theory of vocations as an interest of the public schools, I should maintain that education cannot become liberal and humane until it becomes a cultivation of vocational consciousness—an effort to humanize our daily labor. When this is done, our vocations are seen to be in the state not only geographically and legally, but also spiritually. Realistic vocational sense will include awareness that the state always and everywhere is in my job and is my job. It should be evident by this time, even in America, that the relations between those who hire and those who are hired are political relations; that my dealings with a gas

company or an electric light company are suffused with politics; that with every machine I buy, and with every purchase of food for my breakfast, my country and I are involved just as truly as the seller and I. My country and I are here involved, if for no other reasons, because relations between labor and capital are involved. Unless this kind of knowledge is communicated by the schools, the learning of it—for it will have to be learned—will be unduly costly.

That close relations should be maintained between the school and the home is a truism; what is not truisitic is that the nexus, now so largely economic, should be economic-political. Scarcely enough praise can be given to the Parent-Teachers Associations for lifting the level of parental interest in the school experience of their children; but these Associations could become still more useful by adding to what they are now doing a definite campaign to make both teachers and parents political-minded in their mutual concern for the young. Surely, one of the functions of the school is to infuse into the ambition of parents for their offspring an insistent realization that political action is a necessary factor in the achievement of welfare.

EMPLOYERS OF LABOR AS MENTORS OF THE SCHOOLS

Employers as such, as well as parents, can help the schools to find their true tasks. What strengths and what weaknesses, what developed and what undeveloped capacities, in employees, are revealed in their work in factory or in store? Let all available information on this point be brought by employers and placed in the common pool. But it is quite another thing for them to assume that the needs that they have discovered should determine the main policies,

methods, or emphases of the schools. Employer-control of a school system does not bring pedagogical wisdom nor political enlightenment. When the head of a manufacturers' association philosophizes upon child labor as it is related to education, he should be heard, not because he understands education better than other citizens, but because he may contribute a fact or an idea that otherwise might be overlooked. There is no impropriety in assuming that his interest in the schools may not be comprehensive nor balanced.

It may be granted that schools should show characteristic differences according to the industrial character of the surrounding population, whether it be an agricultural, or a store-keeping, or a shoe-manufacturing population. But agriculture, commerce, and industry have a political aspect that does not appear in employers' demands upon the schools. In the mental background of these demands, in fact, there usually is a tacit assumption concerning general relationships between classes, and between the classes and the state. Ulterior designs need not be assumed; the employer who demands this or that may have his eye fixed simply upon a desired and reasonable competence in employees; but even so, the wholeness of education does not speak, the wholeness of the state does not speak; the employer, without realizing it, may be a pleader for special interests where there is a common political interest. Business is in politics, inevitably and properly so. The wise teacher will not lose sight of this fact. According to circumstances, and according to the degree of pupils' immaturity, he may or may not mention this or that instance of the interplay of special interests with general ones, but unless his thinking is realistic at this point, his notion of citizenship will be visionary.

POPULAR APPETITE FOR AMUSEMENT AS A GUIDE FOR
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

High schools, colleges, and universities have been getting into what a newspaper editorial article correctly calls “the show business,” especially the business of providing great football spectacles for the amusement of the populace. These spectacles are not education nor a part of education; only a rather obviously false rationalization can say that they are. The just-mentioned editorial article remarks that the universities could conduct both education and the show business better if the latter were frankly recognized as a business, and managed accordingly.

How has it been possible for educators to assume this dual function? No theory of education led them in this direction. Their faltering discovery of disciplinary values in football spectacles came after the spectacles began to need a defence. Value as advertisement, or apparent value, has had some influence; but, taken as a whole, the “football carbuncle” is a symptom of the accidental mingling of a false with a true conception of the relation of educators to the public.

A natural strenuosity of students in their games first led to gate receipts as a means of providing the costs; the response of the public stimulated the strenuosity still further, making larger gate receipts seem necessary; thus the enterprise enlarged itself like a rolling snowball; with increasing size came increasingly complex problems, and some significant changes. Football ceased to be play, in the psychological and educational sense of the term, for the “players” became entertainers. Management became

the exploitation of these entertainers in the interest of financial returns at the gate. The populace liked the entertainment; multitudes attached themselves to this or that institution through sympathy with "our" team, and administrators permitted themselves to dream that here was popular support for their institutions as *educational* establishments. Even if some support for real education was secured in this way, it was secured at a cost that education itself has to pay. For the public mind is diverted from the meaning of education—diverted, that is, from citizenship at precisely the point where popular attention and support are most needed. The new popular attachment is to institutions, not to their educational functions, and administrators' grateful recognition of this attachment makes them subservient to un-civil notions of what education is for.

If privately controlled schools and colleges insist upon persisting in this folly, perhaps they should not be restrained except by the shame of exposure. But, surely, wherever the people are taxed for the support of a high school, a college, or a university, they should pay for education, not for spectacles. One who notes at a tax-supported establishment the great stadium, the enormous current expense, the absorption of the student mind, the mass-emotion, and the well-known duplicity in respect to amateur status—any one who ruminates upon all this is justified in wondering what meaning is given to citizenship in this institution, and just how prominent the life of the state, and life in the state, are made. This, at least, is certain: There are some tax-supported institutions in which vociferous football is accompanied by silence upon some of the most acute current problems of the state and of citizenship.

FEAR OF REVOLUTION AS A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS

That some, or many, of our citizens are in dire anxiety lest our economic and political system should be undermined by radical forces like Communism is a fact that should have weight in the teaching of citizenship. Whatever these anxious fellow citizens have to say should have the sympathetic hearing that is due to all who show concern for the public schools. But there are two necessary precautions.

The first precaution concerns the motive and the tone of the school, and not less the motive and tone of healthy intercourse of citizen with citizen. Fear cannot furnish the main motivation, nor any large part of the motivation, for education in citizenship, nor, for that matter, for *education* in anything. The function of fear is to sharpen attention; its function is not that of guidance. Even when an epidemic of influenza or of cholera threatens a community, guidance must come from analysis, which is best when it is cool and collected. However certain the present danger to our civilization, however profound the peril, panicky feeling cannot be trusted to ascertain a single fact, nor to show just where good or evil resides, nor to define any issue. On the contrary, a mind that is possessed by fear has a tendency to over-rate any present impression as to facts, values, and issues. In other words, we have to be on guard against the pseudo-authority of emotion.

Fear, when it becomes our guide in social relations, leads us towards savagery. Before me at this moment lies an editorial article from a prominent newspaper that is published in a city where fear of change is acute. The editorial is entitled, "A Healthy Riot." It

is a joyous commendation of the violent and riotous conduct of a crowd of high-school students who gave a beating to a minority of their fellow students who were known as "reds." According to the news columns of the same paper, "fighting started when two adult Reds started to harangue the students. The boys attacked them, and several were knocked down by the radicals, but reinforcements turned the tide of battle," which lasted nearly half an hour. About 150 boys appeared at what was reported to be a Communist restaurant, and in a tussle with Reds there noses and windows suffered. The principal is quoted as regretting the occurrence. The school board passed a resolution that, in the words of the editorial article, "declined to censure, even perfunctorily . . . and even indirectly" approved this expression of students' sense of their citizenship.

The second precaution that is necessary when fear summons the teacher to this or that in respect to character and citizenship concerns the possibility that the agitated voice is not the voice of our country but of special interests. It is easy to test the matter. Civilization is such a clumsy thing at best that always somebody is being hurt by it, always some kind of revision is needed. Have those who summon us to the defence of our civilization considered where civilization at this moment is hurting human beings? Have they listened to those who are being hurt? Does the proposed defence of our civilization include the changes that certainly are needed? Is it proposed to strengthen civilization by making it more just, more a fellowship? If not, the summons comes from special interests, not from our country.

The educational thinking that is represented by the now discredited and repealed "Lusk laws" of

the state of New York—one of which required from teachers an oath of allegiance, another of which created a committee authorized to deal in secret with supposed disloyalty in teachers—is, in fact, guided by suppressed or unconscious major premises that, if they were openly stated, would clearly reveal themselves as un-American. This statement does not imply hypocrisy upon the part of any one. It is a common weakness of men to see and understand only a part of their own motivation. The point is that fear of revolution, though it be not hypocritical, may be essentially unpatriotic at the moment that it appeals for patriotism. Teachers and schools, therefore, must have a “bill of particulars”; the school system must not be made the organ of anything less than the whole people seeking the good of the whole.

In all cases like that of the Lusk laws educators who are worthy of their calling will not decline to accept the contest that is thrust towards them. But they should conduct it upon grounds chosen by themselves, never yielding to the suppressed element in the premises of the alarmists. There should be no pretence that the school is already doing or ever will do what the alarmists desire. They are ready—many of them, at least—to act the part of prosecuting attorney, witnesses, judge, jury, and sheriff, all in one. Education is not in all their thoughts, but only propaganda and external force. To this must be frankly opposed the democratic educational process of problem-setting and problem-discovery, fact-finding, analysis, and thinking together. This is particularly necessary at points of conflict and of social deficit. “This is what we are here for,” the teacher might say, “and this we are ready to do with all our might.” Support for this position is available in influential parts of the popu-

lace, such as many groups within organized labor. The readiness of labor to protect American standards in American schools is not sufficiently recognized and used.

If educators be challenged to say how much and what change in our industrial and political system the schools will tolerate, the answer should be that education does not practice tolerance towards anything, but rather analysis. What the schools have to do about social change is to develop a citizenry that is competent to understand its own wants and to co-operate in supplying them. The fear of revolution has no proper place in a school, but only fear that citizens may not be competent to understand their wants nor to co-operate in supplying them.

WHO IS TO BE MASTER OF THE SCHOOLMASTER?

The school board, or other board of control that "hires and fires"? Or, a power or powers behind the board—ambitious parents, employers, special interests, mass sentiment? Or, does the schoolmaster serve the America "that partly is and wholly hopes to be"? The America whose agent the local school board is; the America that is above as well as in all the arms of government; that is likewise in all "the powers behind the throne," but is also beyond them?

A school physician, though he be an employee of a school board, and an agent of all that is behind school boards, cannot acknowledge any or all of these as his master. He is a co-operator with them, and to them he is answerable for nothing but co-operation towards the ideal health that they desire but can neither define nor control. As an expert he is answerable to his profession, and to this only.

The schoolmaster's relation to society is much the same. His mandate comes from the whole people organized and functioning as the state. His mandate requires him to be an expert, and within the scope of his expertness to use his own discretion, much as a physician does. He will escape narrowness, arbitrariness, and servility just as a physician does, by subjecting himself to criticism by his professional compeers. Researches, discoveries, improvements must be expected to originate within his profession, just as they do within the medical profession, and consequently he is required to be an educational guide not only of pupils but also of those who employ him, and likewise of the powers behind his immediate employer.

Nothing is more needed in state education just now than leaders who make themselves competent to fulfil this function, and then have the courage and the patriotism to carry the burden that it implies. They will not be dictators; if they are expert educators they will be learners, they will have trained capacity for listening, and they will be trained in co-operation. But they will listen to all, not merely to some, and they will evoke speech in classes of the population that usually keep silence with respect to the schools. They will be adaptable; they will know how to wait. But at two points they will serve their sovereign by becoming creative sources of the sovereign's character: They will continually re-create in the populace the meaning and the consciousness of “we, the people,” and they will perennially recall the populace from temptations to be hasty, prejudiced, partisan, and selfish, to an objective view of social facts and social cause-and-effect.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS OF NON-STATE SCHOOLS

NON-STATE SCHOOLS ARE CLASS INSTITUTIONS

This proposition is the base line for any accurate survey of the relations of privately controlled schools and colleges to the common or public interest. The proposition may make some persons wince, especially persons interested in schools that are under church auspices, and some persons may question whether this is the truth. In the institutions in question we find private ownership of property; privacy of accounts and of management; financial support of one institution by one set of persons, of another institution by another set; educational scope and policy in each instance beyond the reach of the people as a whole; pupils drawn from limited classes of the populace (a social class, a religious class, or an economic stratum); the ethical and social traditions of a group or class coming into a controlling position in the school through the designs of founders, donors, and administrators, and also through the habits of the entire clientele. The case is not altered when a school invites whosoever will to enter, for only the children of certain classes do enter. Nor is the case altered by an intention to teach a universally valid ethics or religion, for what is regarded by parents, donors, administrators, and teachers as valid depends upon the history and social setting of their particular segments of the population.

If it be objected that for similar psychological reasons the public schools also must have an inherent tendency to become class institutions, the ground of the objection must be accepted as true. In fact, a not inconsiderable part of our discussion in this book has been directed towards the problem of rescuing state schools from control both by special interests and by class assumptions on the part of teachers, school boards, and others. Public education is required by its profession, however, to do its best to transcend all class assumptions and all class interests. A privately controlled school could escape being a class institution only by definitely setting out similarly to transcend its origin, and to emancipate its pupils from the social and intellectual limitations of its clientele and management. It would not be profitable to inquire whether this ever has been accomplished, though it is fair to say that a few schools, founded in the interest of industrial democracy, appear to be more democratic than most public schools. But it should be profitable to confront the class tendencies in private institutions with the necessity of providing somehow for the pupils of these schools an education in political living in a democracy. Further, it is desirable to bring to light the political tendencies of privately controlled institutions.

SCHOOLS FOR THE EDUCATION OF "GENTLEMEN" AND OF "LADIES"

The preceding section purposely lumps together schools of many sorts, ecclesiastical and other. For all have a common problem, whether they feel it or not. It takes the most tangible form in schools that depend upon the desire of economically privileged

parents to enable their children to maintain an economic and social status. These schools are of so many types, and so many excellences appear in one or another of them, that generalizations should be made with caution. The following proposition can be affirmed, however, without danger of unfairness: Children of privilege, segregated and schooled by themselves, are always and inevitably miseducated politically.

The grounds for this assertion are these: *First*, when the human contacts of pupils are thus restricted, undue reliance has to be placed upon imagination as a means of appreciating one's fellow citizens. Some teachers do their best to make pupils sympathetic towards persons not of their own class. Contacts are arranged, as in sports. But, of course, a privileged-class team playing against, say, a proletarian team, retains its solidarity and its sense of superiority. Charities are encouraged, but with the result of establishing a class-consciousness of "the poor" as contrasted with "us." Democratic relations within the school are encouraged as if this were a training in democratic citizenship, whereas the effect may well be to cause a privileged class to stand together against other classes. Noble words may be uttered about men as men, as though this would counteract the present enjoyment of special immunities. The social effect, at the best, is condescension and mercifulness; it is not justice. The basis of justice is respect, not pity, not even generosity nor *noblesse oblige*; and justice, not condescension, is the foundation of the democratic state. In short, the real social world of these segregated pupils remains a narrow one; imagination of "the other fellow" is insufficient to emancipate them into true democracy.

Second, both the present and the prospective enjoyments of the pupils depend upon superior ability to spend. But high expenditure by the few has, as its obverse, low expenditure by the many. Further, high expenditure amounts to ability to require service from others, and this is an invitation to keep these others in a permanently servile relation. The children and young people who attend these schools expect, of course, to enter occupations or modes of life that imply exactly this on the part of their fellow citizens.

Third, the usual conception of culture that these schools take for granted has its history and its implication in the exploitation of man by man. For this sort of culture is contrasted with the labor that wrestles directly with the basic conditions of physical existence. In the historical background is a refined life supported by slavery, or serfdom, or conquest, or the compliant inexperience of native populations, or the labor of masses of men whose personality is unawake. The foreground is the status of college alumnus, or that of "a success" in business, profession, or society.

By such education the health of the state is not promoted. Whether the state should tolerate it is another question, but there is food for thought in Professor Thomas H. Briggs's suggestion that such schools should be suppressed.¹

THE SUPPOSED SEPARATION OF RELIGIOUS FROM POLITICAL INTERESTS

When we come to schools maintained by religious bodies (Sunday schools, young people's societies,

¹ *The Great Investment*. (Cambridge, 1930.)

week-day schools of religion, academies, and colleges), the term "class institution" is still applicable, and it points to a characteristic political problem. In the circles that we now contemplate it is customary to say that religion is a normal aspect of life; that to leave religion out of education is to omit an essential, and indeed to make education partisan, and that therefore the existing religious schools are justified and necessary. It is noteworthy, however, that whereas the argument is for "religion" in education, the schools in question do not represent religion in the wide sense of the argument, but rather the particular religions of particular groups, often competing religions and sometimes antagonistic groups. Endeavors have been made to identify within the religions that are promoted by these schools a common "religion" that could give them a claim to universal support, but these endeavors have not succeeded.

When these schools undertake to define their proper relation to the state, an odd situation is created. On the one hand, they accept immunity from taxation—even claim it—on the ground that their teaching furthers the general good for the sake of which the state exists. Here they assume to be religious in some general, broadly human, even political sense. But if any one infers that, inasmuch as they receive partial support from the state in the form of tax exemption, therefore they should be supervised by the state, they promptly insist that the religious and the political functions are distinct and should be kept separate.

That they are not kept separate, and that, in fact, different types of religious teaching have different political effects will be shown in a moment.

Meantime, it should be said that the inability of religious bodies to distinguish and clearly point out what is broadly human in their teaching, and to set it upon its own feet, as the state school does, without dependence upon divisive or particularistic group standpoints, is a permanent reason for refusing state support to religious schools. No arbitrariness on the part of the state is here involved, no imposition of hardship, no double taxation; the state merely refuses to participate in educational processes that are permeated by purposes and controls that are sectarian. Let us remember that even when a religious body undertakes to teach a political virtue that nobody questions, the thing actually taught includes the authority of the teacher, and therefore whatever, besides this political virtue, the group that employs him regards as essential. In any school, as we have noted, the type of organization itself is a primary determinant of the real meaning of its social teachings.

If it be retorted that then we are forced to choose between the finality of state authority in state schools and the finality of religious authority in religious schools, the reply is that these are not our only alternatives in education for citizenship. When the sovereign of a democratic state teaches, he performs a function that is different from that of ruling; at the points where he is most completely the teacher, he is most surely a learner also. The public school at its best is the state surveying its own faults as well as virtues, and there is no point at which it may say to its critics, "Thus far, and not farther." That is, the state, functioning as teacher, claims no final authority over its citizen-pupils; they themselves are the final seat of political authority.

Not only this. The state, when it is true to the principles of our democracy, claims no exclusiveness as teacher even within the strictly political sphere. The churches themselves take advantage of this by approving one state policy or law and disapproving another. This is done by churches that would deny the propriety of any corresponding comments upon themselves by the state. In short, the state does not put any parents nor any pupils into the position of having to choose between the finality of religious authority and the finality of state authority.

There is therefore no necessity upon us of adjusting to each other two co-ordinate educational authorities. Such necessity could arise only where mutually exclusive spheres of interest could be identified. We have seen already that the oft-assumed separateness of the religious from the political interest is nothing more than a convenient fiction, or an inconvenient one. It is a simple fact that ecclesiastical organizations do take part in the making of citizens. What is more, the different organizations foster different phases of citizenship and even different types of political sovereignty. To these differences let us now turn.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF RELIGION TEND TOWARDS DIFFERENT TYPES OF CITIZENSHIP

It is to be hoped that some day some one will have the courage and the resources for making a circumstantial survey of these type relations. At present the most that can be said is that some broad inferences can be drawn from religious teachings known to be practised. Thus:

1. The felt meaning of "fellow citizen" that is acquired by pupils whose entire school experience is within a church school can hardly be the same as that which is acquired in public schools that contain a wider variety of population elements. In respect to its composition, each church school, even in spite of its desires, is a class school.

2. Church schools that exercise the most rigorous ecclesiastical authority foster also rigorous obedience to the political sovereign. This is well illustrated by the fact that, though all the churches are for peace, doubt concerning the ethical right of the state to command men to fight is least in evidence in authoritarian religion, and most in evidence in religion of more liberal types. The explanation is partly a sort of logical gravitation of thought that likens the human sovereign to an absolute divine potentate; partly the ancient doctrine that God delegates a part of his own authority to the king or other ruler; partly protection of church authority from encroachment by guaranteeing not to encroach upon state authority. This attitude makes it possible for ecclesiastics to dignify and bless human governments without inquiring into the ethical quality of their acts. Education for citizenship, consequently, rests upon the tacit assumption that political virtue consists rather in obedience to the state than in using the state. It should not surprise us if pupils who receive this impression from religion grow up unalert to needed distinctions, and unready to transform the state where it needs transforming.

3. On the other hand, authoritarian religion exerts pressure upon the state to make or enforce laws of certain types, as: Laws against blasphemy; sabbatarian laws; censorship laws; laws that restrict di-

voice as much as possible; laws to prevent contraception. Here is definite participation in affairs of government, with an implied philosophy of the state. What this philosophy is can be inferred in part by comparing points at which interest in law is strenuous with those at which no strenuousness is manifested. For example, what is the record of this type of religious thought and education with respect to the legal status of women? Of laborers? Of aliens? Has religion of this kind been quick to protect minorities, to promote humanitarian legislation, or to restrain our national drift towards economic imperialism? Two things appear rather clearly: *First*, that authoritarian religion experiences difficulty in assimilating some phases of democracy, for it seeks to have *a priori* rules of its own enforced by general law. *Second*, that education for citizenship under these conditions cannot include all the fundamental essentials.

4. Groups that adhere to more liberal types of religion tend, on the whole (though not always without ambiguity), towards a different philosophy of the state. They are less concerned with obedience to the sovereign, and more concerned with the duties of the sovereign. They are more interested in the liberties of the citizen taken in their entirety. They are less likely to demand that the state enforce an *a priori* religious morality, and more likely, at the same time, to identify the common weal with the Kingdom of God. From within these groups there have proceeded in recent years both individual and group pronouncements that are definitely critical of our civilization, especially in its politico-economic phases, and in favor of profound political reconstruction. If the most outspoken of these groups were

to conduct citizenship training in accordance with certain of the principles that they profess, we could expect therefrom a contribution to humanitarian, critical-minded democracy.

But the political ideas of these groups are partly unorganized, sometimes inconsistent with themselves, sometimes ambiguous, and not well equipped with educational implements. These bodies are in politics, as are the more authoritarian bodies, but in a hodge-podge politics. There is an incongruous mixture of democratic aspiration with the old assumption that the state is to be the agent of remaining fragments of an old moral code—a code, in fact, that has a background of special privilege. There is precipitate focussing of religious zeal upon particular measures regardless of political perspective. In the relation of churchmen and of their ecclesiastical leaders to party politics, one witnesses little of the political creativity that seems to be promised in broad professions of libertarian, humanitarian, and international standards for society and for the state. Finally, the Sunday schools, week-day schools of religion, church academies, and church colleges have provided little in the way of material or method for education towards any kind of citizenship.

5. These comments would end in unfairness if we stopped at this point, however. What has been said is true of religious organizations or faiths taken as wholes; it does not represent minorities and individuals who find in religion an inspiration for what might be called creative democracy. In both conservative and liberal ecclesiastical circles a religious leaven of this kind is working. Nowhere is more daring displayed on behalf of real democracy in relations between races; nowhere else so large a swing

of conviction that the whole world must be organized on behalf of the whole human race; nowhere else in our part of the world such a growth of fundamentally reconstructive attitudes with respect to war and peace. In the defence of human liberties some representatives of religion stand shoulder to shoulder with secularists. Ethical judgment upon economic injustice is repeatedly heard that is worthy to stand beside the classical pronouncements of the ancient Hebrew champions of the poor. What is most significant for our present purpose is this: Teachings like these are already beginning to have a place in the stated religious instruction of various church bodies. From year to year more and more of the problems that are acute acquire a place in widely used curricula. In young people's circles, particularly, there is a marked spread of uncompromising democracy. Finally, it should be remembered that unhesitating support for the public-school system always can be counted upon in religious bodies of the more liberal types.

THE POLITICAL VALUE OF THE SEPARATION OF THE CHURCHES FROM THE STATE

If this were a treatise upon religious education, a strong word would here be in order concerning the value to religion of separating the churches from the taxing power. I should be ready to affirm that only a completely voluntary religion can be completely religious. But our present concern is with the political value of separation. This value is usually conceived as follows: Since the state is one, but the churches are many, any union of church and state must in the nature of the case make the state partisan. Separation

tion removes an unjust inequality of citizens before the law and before the tax-gatherer. It also untangles and simplifies the administration of political functions.

In order to make this separation effective, distinctions have been made between the political and the ecclesiastical spheres. One is said to be secular in nature, the other religious. Hence, the completed view, in most minds, is that, though separation broadens the state by making it non-partisan, it also restricts the sphere of the state by making it indifferent to some supposed values.

There are difficulties in this view. It is open to question, *first*, because of the meaning that "secular" has acquired in political administration. Under the plea that the state is to be purely secular, the least defensible principles of our economic system have been taken over into the government as axioms for official conduct. Secularity has come to have the implication of practical materialism in state affairs. It is materialism because predominance in government is given to possessors of wealth. Here the modern state has performed a somersault into a partisanship as deep and as deadly as the union of church and state! The irony of the situation becomes complete when leaders in this secular state laud religion, the church, and Sunday schools as bulwarks of government! Bulwarks, that is, of the very materialism that they are supposed to condemn.

The current view of separation is open to question, in the *second* place, because of the inherent difficulty of putting into law any workable definition of "religion" or of "secular." In fact, it is difficult to define "church," or "sect," or the constitutional term "establishment of religion." The contradictory

decisions of our courts abundantly testify to this difficulty.

If, then, we are not to put into law (either directly or by implication) any antithesis between what is religious and what is secular in conduct, does it follow that we should relax our vigilance with respect to real and effective separation of the churches from the taxing power? Not at all. For the value of separation does not depend upon any supposed distinctness in the motives or the objectives of religious and political conduct respectively; the sole gain consists in avoiding civic discord and in facilitating the democratic political expression of men's deliberately chosen objectives. To dissolve the union of a church with the state is to remove an official intermediary between citizens and their government. Henceforth the government consults the citizens directly as to their wishes; it consults all the citizens, and it puts equal weight upon the franchise of each. Here separation has immense political value. Freeing ourselves from ecclesiastical entanglements means that henceforth we have no measuring stick for the good state but the weal of men as they themselves in their totality judge their weal. That this advance of democracy should have been largely offset by substituting captains of modern industry for ecclesiastics in the councils of the state is one of the grotesqueries of history.

But the separation is not yet complete. For sovereignty still wears habiliments that it acquired when kings were also priests. There is an esoteric element in it, for even popular governments are not perfectly open with their own people. There is aloofness in it, for government officials still manipulate whole peoples for ends that the people neither chose nor

understand. Witness, for example, the militaristic manœuvring of nearly all governments at this moment when all the peoples are longing for peace. The state has not yet been fully domesticated. We have not yet been thoroughgoing with our own convictions. The sovereign is neither a god nor the surrogate of a god; he dwells in no temple, apart from the humble homes of toiling men; he has properly no secret purposes, no wisdom that is withheld from common scrutiny. In a democratic state the sovereign is just ourselves when we co-operatively insist upon providing for ourselves what we want. This is the ultimate meaning of the separation of the church from the state.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS FAITH TO POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Probably some religious faiths have nothing to contribute to political intelligence nor to the motivation of the citizen as citizen. But wherever worship is addressed to a divine being who is vividly conceived as interested in all the interests of men, a being who in the ethical sense loves all mankind, there, potentially at least, is a contribution to political intelligence.

Statecraft, in its commonest form, is a combination of shrewdness with mental dulness—a dulness that arises from insensibility to the happiness and the unhappiness of some of the human beings who are affected by the shrewdness. To an astounding degree, in fact, political astuteness can live in the same mind with what, under popular government, must be accounted as stupidity. In a democracy, surely, there can be no sense in abstracting the state

and statesmanship from plain, homespun fellow-feeling. How, then, can citizens and their political leaders acquire a habit of noticing, and feeling with, the happiness and the unhappiness of every section of the populace? Education for democracy has no more important problem than this. And here is where faith in a God who does take notice of the happiness and unhappiness of the last and the least of men can increase our political intelligence.

The prophetic strain in the Jewish and the Christian tradition—the reiterated call to think of the oppressed and the disinherited, the reiterated rebuke to those who amass wealth at the cost of the laborers, the reiterated declaration that God wants justice and not sacrifice—is religion insisting upon social realism. At the present moment there is a revival of this type of religious consciousness. Religious leaders, both Jewish and Christian, are calling to us to look at the deficits of life, the prevalence of injustice, the stunting and the distortion of personality that are tolerated by our social system and protected by the state. These leaders are accused of confusing the affairs of the church with those of the state, but rarely is the accusation justified. The point at which the shoe pinches some of our politicians and industrialists is an entirely different one; what causes their discomfort is the recalling of their minds from abstractions to actualities. This approach to life and to the state involves no seeking of special favors, no insinuation of ecclesiastical authority into state affairs; rather, its tendency is towards a larger and ever larger political enfranchisement of all citizens.

Here, accordingly, is reinforcement for real political education in the public schools. Teachers who are imbued with this kind of religious consciousness

have within them a stimulus to be objective-minded and scientific in their approach to social facts, a stimulus to be analytic in their handling of political questions, a stimulus to build forth our democracy. To the extent that church schools conceive their own mission from the standpoint of prophetic religion, they reinforce the public schools when they are at their best. Church schools may even lead the way.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF WEEK-DAY SCHOOLS OF RELIGION

The movement for these schools started with a plea for more time for religious education, but quickly a special plea became prominent—that the needed time should not be added to the ordinary school day or week but included therein. At once church-and-state relationships were involved. Is there such a thing as “school time,” the property of the state? May the state give away any of “its” time? If the churches are to have a part of this time, must there not be state-imposed conditions concerning the use of it? The churches ask for co-operation from the school authorities, but can school authorities actively co-operate without lending the power or at least influence of the state to sectarian bodies? Anyhow, will not the scheme bring sectarian distinctions into the public school, or at least to the entrance of the school grounds?

Into the ensuing tangle of special problems we are not here called to enter; the exposition of them requires whole books.² There is, however, one neg-

² See Lotz, P. H., *Current Week-Day Religious Education* (New York, 1925); Gove, Floyd S., *Religious Education on Public School Time* (Cambridge, 1926); Lotz, P. H., Ed., *Studies in Religious Education* (Nashville, 1931), Ch. XII; Jackson and Malmberg, *Religious Education and the State* (New York, 1928).

lected aspect of the situation that demands a word. These week-day schools profess and intend to back up the character education and the education for citizenship that the public schools provide. Supposedly religion is to add something that is politically important. What, then, is the supplementary factor, particularly the political factor? We cannot grant that religion simply as such conduces to the ends of the state regardless of the kind of religion and of the kind of state. The public schools of our kind of state conceivably have a valid political reason for co-operating with some week-day schools of religion, but no such reason for co-operating with others. It is customary to say that schools of religion are schools of character; but we have seen that some kinds of character education favor an undemocratic subordination of the citizen to the powers that be, while other kinds move in the opposite direction. We have found, too, that the real education for character and for citizenship that any school provides is found primarily in the social experience that the organization of the school then and there fosters.

The import of these remarks is not that public-school authorities should consent to be censors of week-day schools of religion, nor that considerations that concern education for citizenship are the only ones that should determine the extent of co-operation. Doubtless anything that a community desires for its convenience, or as a means of fulfilling an aspiration, is worthy of consideration, and of course educators cannot be dictators, even though they be specialists and experts. The import of what has been said, then, is chiefly this: That any church or religion that is prepared to promote genuinely democratic citizenship by methods that will stand criti-

cism by educational experts should bring this qualification definitely into the foreground whenever relations to the state or to state schools are in question. It is probable that in many communities there are latent church resources that might multiply their political value by expression through a well-organized week-day school of religion. But the proof that this is so needs to be furnished; the conclusion cannot be taken for granted; and, though school officers must take into account much more than this, and though they must not become censors, nevertheless they can justifiably be passive towards agitation for week-day schools that promise nothing definite in the way of education for the democratic state.

STATE SUPERVISION OF NON-STATE SCHOOLS

Some supervision is already here, for the various states as a rule require that the common branches be taught (which implies authority to find out whether they are sufficiently well taught); compulsory-education laws are applied to school attendance in private and public school alike; sanitary regulations also are the same; in some states statistical reports are required; in some, teachers in private schools must be certified; in some instances the right of visitation and inspection is specifically affirmed.³ In principle, then, the state is competent to see to it that the essential ends of public education are attained also in private schools. If private schools choose to follow other ends in addition, this is their affair. Let us ask, then, whether the states do, as a matter of fact, see to it that private schools fulfil

³ See "State Regulation of Private Schools," by W. B. Belleau, in *School and Society*, Vol. xxxiv, No. 874 (Sept. 26, 1931), pp. 436-440.

the political purposes that are obligatory in public schools, and if not, what additional supervision is needed.

Such subjects of instruction as the Constitution, civics, and patriotism are required in a majority of the states. But this is an obviously formal requirement, compliance with which proves next to nothing with regard to the kind of citizenship that these schools, taken as total living organisms, are helping to produce. We really know very little—though there may be ground for opinions—as to the relative accomplishments of public and private schools.⁴ There is every reason for wanting to know. I say this, not because I think that we should be better off if we had only state schools. My opinion, in fact, is that interplay and cross-stimulation between publicly controlled and privately controlled institutions are good for both. But this good can be had only through reciprocal criticism upon the basis of known facts.

How, then, might the government, without curtailing the traditional freedom of private schools, supervise them sufficiently to make sure that they are efficient, to at least some irreducibly minimum degree, in the education of citizens for our kind of political state? Let us suppose that the irreducible minimum is the achievement by pupils of the rudiments of American political intelligence. This minimum should undoubtedly be the same for all pupils of the same stage of advancement, whether they attend a public school or a private one. Much more is desirable, especially experience of democracy in the

⁴ A beginning of research in this field has been made by L. V. Koos in his *Private and Public Secondary Education*. (Chicago, 1931.)

form of school government, and this, too, might conceivably be required in private as well as public schools. But, for the present, enough supervision of private schools to insure a minimal amount of political intelligence would be a sufficiently great achievement.

This amount of supervision could be substantially accomplished by giving tests, reporting the results to the schools concerned, and providing advice and training for any teachers who apply for it. Intrusions into the administration of private schools could be avoided; the state would not give teachers any orders; there would not need to be any state prescription as to curriculum. But, unquestionably, the testing of pupils would lead administrators and teachers to find a way.

At the risk of being rash a remark or two may be made concerning the desirable content of such tests. Certainly they should be as far as possible from everything that savors of heresy hunting, or the smelling out of political affiliations. Therefore, estimates of political values should not be asked for nor encouraged. What should be ascertained is:

First, whether the young citizen is acquiring an understanding of his fellow citizens. Does he know enough concerning their lives, fortunes, groupings, and ways of thinking and feeling to meet them in friendly conference upon social and political measures that may need to be discussed and voted upon? Appreciation of one's fellows is the corner stone of democracy.

Second, is he getting acquainted with the major issues of his time? Does he penetrate beneath words and slogans? Can he state the position of both sides in a current political controversy?

Third, has he the rudimentary facts, and can he handle them? How much does he know about how things are done, and why things happen in the sphere of government? Can he relate social facts to one another, as in the simpler causal connections?

Fourth, has he enough acquaintance with history and with our constitutional system to employ appropriate political categories in his thinking about facts and issues?

Fifth, is he familiar with the main common-law rights and obligations of men, the constitutional liberties of Americans, and the ways in which a citizen may make his judgment count in matters of government?

If this looks like a stiff requirement, let us remind ourselves that citizenship in a democracy is no pulpy thing! Let it be noted, moreover, that gradation is possible in each of these items, so that progressively intensive tests could be provided as pupils advance.

THE POLITICAL CAPACITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER PRIVATE CONTROL

In one of our cities many citizens had become concerned with respect to a great problem of human welfare and of state policy. They desired to awaken the interest of fellow residents of the community, and also the interest of students in two institutions of higher education that had their seats in the vicinity. Not only speech-making, but also discussion was desired. No issue of party politics was involved. Where do you think it was found practicable to have the desired meetings? You will answer, of course, "Upon the two campuses." What is a college or university campus for, to be sure, unless it be a place

for opening eyes to wide horizons? At one of these institutions of higher education, in fact, a great assembly was held in which most of the students and most of their professors took interested notice of the problem as if it were their own. At the neighboring institution of higher education, however, students who desired to hear about it were obliged to go outside their campus in order to do so. It is immaterial to our present discussion to inquire whether this was due to formal official action or to mere campus habit. The significant fact is that this sort of meeting does not occur upon this campus.

Guess which of these two institutions is a state university, and which a denominational college! Your guess is right; access of students to great public questions is taken for granted upon the campus of the denominational college, but not upon the campus of the state university.

State universities and colleges are not all alike in this respect, and denominational colleges differ among themselves. Yet, even though no formal survey has proved it, it is safe to say that privately controlled institutions as a class, even denominationally controlled colleges, have a more diffused and penetrating civic-education consciousness than state universities and colleges as a whole. The theological inertness and stand-patism of some church colleges is fully equalled by political inertness and stand-patism in some universities that are supposed to provide intellectual leadership for a progressive state. Professors find it inexpedient to discuss some of the liveliest questions—inexpedient because the academic and scientific standard of freedom cannot be assumed. Speakers who are gladly heard upon denominational campuses are kept off the grounds of some

state "universities." These restrictions of citizenship training are then rationalized, of course, as non-partisanship, etc., etc. A professor who had had long experience in state universities was heard to say, concerning a matter of public concern, "That is a constitutional question; it doesn't belong upon the campus!"

The regents of one state university have adopted a by-law to the effect that: "If any professor or teacher of the university shall become a candidate for any public office, or for a nomination thereto, or be a delegate to any political convention, or openly seek a nomination thereto, he should be taken and considered as having resigned his position as such professor or teacher as the case may be."⁵ If Charles E. Merriam had been a professor in this state university instead of holding a chair in a privately controlled institution, he could not have offered his expert services to the City of Chicago without sacrificing his professorship. Further, the enrichment that came to his work as teacher of political science from his first-hand participation in local politics would have been sacrificed.

The separation of a state university from statecraft on the ground that education must be kept non-partisan has the precisely opposite effect. For, by keeping aloof from overt political activity on the ground that it is, and is to remain, partisan rather than patriotic—a scramble for office rather than public service—the university loses its one opportunity for promoting fitness in legislatures to vote with intelligence and appreciation when appropriations for the maintenance of the university are to be

⁵ *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, April, 1931, p. 337.

made. We know, as a matter of fact, that administrators of the higher education in various states feel themselves compelled to curry favor with unenlightened legislators by silence and soft-peddalling. The sails of education have to be trimmed according to the wind that happens to be blowing at the capital. The effect upon the university, of course, is to make it a participant in one of the meanest forms of partisanship, namely, the concealment of issues from those who have a right to know.

“Politics and education,” says Dean Judd, “are intimate and inseparable aspects of public life.” “Let us realize,” he adds, “that, unless we [educators] devote energy to the guidance of public policy, public policy will be taken in hand by those who would exploit educational institutions as has been done in state after state, and in city after city.”⁶

The distinction between the state as ruler and the state as teacher is everywhere in order. Even in the elementary school civic education suffocates without it. If, in institutions that profess to carry forward the lamp of learning, and to represent the aspirations of the state, the distinction between ruling and teaching is blurred, is it not fair to say that this fact is both an educational and a political scandal?

A contest is going on, in fact, between two views of the relation of state universities to other branches of the state. According to one view, “higher education is a minor subdivision of the executive function of the government, co-ordinate with such other subdivisions as charities and corrections, road-building, and health and business supervision.” The opposite

⁶ Charles H. Judd, as quoted in the *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, November, 1931, see pp. 542-546.

view is that education is a major function, co-ordinate with such constitutional departments as the legislative, the judicial, and the executive.⁷ In this case the function of the state university is not at all to control the thinking of students in the interest of any policy that other departments may be following. In other words, it is possible for even a state university to exercise all the freedom that science claims for itself. Whether some state constitutions do not withhold this freedom, however, is another, and a most important, question.

The political significance of higher education under private control has to be seen against the background of the political significance of higher education under state control. A professor writes: "The institutions of learning under the auspices of religious groups have their shortcomings and disadvantages, but in this state their presidents and faculty members take a much more active part in public affairs, especially where the question of politics may be involved, than is the case in state institutions. No one connected with a state school would dare take the bold and courageous stand that presidents of denominational schools in our state often feel called upon to take where important issues are involved."⁸

Until such conditions in state universities and colleges become unthinkable, privately controlled institutions of higher learning will be essential to the health of the state.

⁷ See an illuminating article, "Conflicting Theories of Social Control of Higher Education," by M. M. Chambers, in *The Phi Delta Kappan*, April, 1931, pp. 186 ff. The article contains valuable references not only to state universities but also to state schools in general.

⁸ *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, November, 1931, p. 573.

CHAPTER IX

THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES: WHITHER?

AT LAST, THE PRESENT CITIZENSHIP OF CHILDREN IS
RECOGNIZED

The term "Social Studies" is here used as a name for the whole introduction to social living that is planned and provided by elementary schools and high schools. "Telling about" social living is a part, but only a part. The "curriculum" has come to mean, not what is said by text-book and teacher, but what is experienced by the pupil. Direct pupil observation of social institutions and of governmental organs in action, and school-induced social acts that lead on to social habits are, in fact, becoming central in the earlier parts of the curriculum of social studies.

The greatest single achievement in education for citizenship by the public schools of the United States is the initiation of pupils into inquiries and activities *consciously performed as a citizen*. Not all schools, by any means, have revised their curriculum in accordance with this principle, but already it is an acknowledged standard, and to it all schools must come.

The commonest term for this type of introduction to social living is "community civics." A movement in this direction has been going on for about two decades. The early inspiration and guidance for it came largely from A. W. Dunn, who brought the method to high development in the schools of Springfield, Illinois, and subsequently contributed to the spread of it through committees and publications.

Text-book guides to it already are numerous. The underlying ideas seem to be these: That the child is already a citizen; that he should be made conscious of the fact; that he should become acquainted with his local community by observation and by direct communication with its leaders and officials; that acquaintance with what is near at hand is the way towards understanding of the larger and more remote institutions of society; that acquaintance with social institutions and organs should be suffused with a sense that these are "our" institutions and organs—our police department, our fire department, our city council, our mayor, our public library, our hospital, our parks, our streets, our school; that children should co-operate here and now in the official work of such institutions and organs—with policemen, firemen, street cleaners, garbage collectors, health officers, librarians, supervisors of parks and playgrounds, for example; that all this is strictly continuous with self-government in the school, and also with the development of courteous good will and helpfulness between individual and individual.

If this kind of experience were to be consistently developed through all the school years to the end of the high school, with full utilization of the growing capacity for judgment and initiative, a regeneration of citizenship might result. It is easy for children to take a democratic attitude, easy to learn to co-operate—easy, that is, unless contrary habits have been learned first. The notion that human beings are innately destined to go through a period of selfishness before they can become socialized is not a conclusion from scientific child study but a popular misinterpretation of children's inexperience, particularly of the habits that they form in environments that pro-

voke and then reward egoistic self-assertion. If the environment is so arranged that from the beginning abundant ways of co-operation are open and perceptible by children, and abundant joys are attainable by co-operation, habits of mutuality grow with their growth. Further, to suppose that adolescence automatically brings socialization is to substitute romanticism for psychology. No law of growth obstructs democracy in children nor allures adolescents towards it. The main obstructions are habits that arise from imitation of grown-ups (race prejudice, class prejudice, getting and spending, exploiting others, etc.) and from efforts to expand in an environment that does not definitely provide for expansion through co-operation. Hence, practically all the obstacles to growth in democracy can be unmade by adults who care to do so, and all needed allurements can be provided. The school, under the present theory, becomes a community enterprise for counteracting the undemocratic influence in the community and for giving the young a growing experience of democracy itself.

THE WIDENING SOCIAL HORIZON OF CHILDREN

Co-ordinate with the social experience called "community civics" is that provided by membership in the Junior Red Cross, an organization that includes more than 39,000 schools and some 7,000,000 pupils, with their teachers.¹ Organized by school men for the specific purpose of social education, the society stimulates and guides children, first, in relief work—local, national, and foreign. Herein the young be-

¹ See "Social Ideals through the Junior Red Cross." By Ruth E. Henderson. *School and Society*, Vol. xxx, No. 781 (December, 1929), pp. 814-816.

come participants with their elders in the actual work of the world, sharing the giving, the labor, and the planning. This is no mere imitation of grown-ups, no passive floating in a current of popular emotion; rather, the young, through their own study, planning, and administration, perform services that their elders do not and could not perform.

But a second function—one still more significant for our present discussion—is performed by pupils thus organized. For the Junior Red Cross has spread to many countries, and it is uniting the children of one country with those of another in what might almost be called a junior world-citizenship. Does a great disaster occur in the United States? Messages of sympathy come from other lands, and not only messages, but also gifts of money for relief! Moreover, groups and masses of pupils on one side of the national boundary exchange friendly letters and gifts with pupils on the other side. Several hundred thousand cartons of such gifts have been sent from this country, and correspondence has been had with children of half a hundred nations.

The reason for mentioning these facts is to point out the bearing that they have upon education for life in the political state. Such studies as geography are vitalized, of course; there is an improved grasp of facts; but beyond this is an expansion of the feeling of "our." Acquaintance with foreigners, especially recognizing as "our friends" those who suffer from race discrimination, helps liberate from the provincialism that is fundamental in modern nationalism. Children are here engaged in building a kind of society that will require for its political expression something far different from our present narrow, self-centred, mutually suspicious national states.

Our jingoes, if they realized what is here going on, would perceive that a bar of judgment is being erected before which their philosophy of the state must ultimately appear. By the way, what would a jingo say *to children* in opposition to the internationalism that they so much enjoy?

Experience with community civics and with the Junior Red Cross proves that education for citizenship in some of its large aspects can be carried on within the elementary grades. The meaning of sovereignty itself can here unfold; yes, it can be caused to grow towards maturity. The fact is that our greatest problems of state concern the simple social relations and needs that even young children can grasp—enough to eat, a good home, a job, health, play, schools, peace, freedom, beauty. Let us not deceive ourselves by assuming that children's social thinking is politically unimportant because it is rudimentary. The simplest facts that have to do with living, and with living happily together, are the things with which political thought most needs to concern itself, and they are the very things that conventional statesmanship is most likely to compromise or slur over.

What is now needed in connection with the new recognition of children as citizens of the United States and, in a nascent sense, of the world, is such clarification of the details of social observation and practice as will make the state a distinct instead of hazy actuality for the pupil. The common law and the statutes contain considerable material that touches ordinary problems of youthful conduct, as ideas concerning assault, libel, theft, negligence, health, contracts, animals, schools, children, and parents. The procedure of courts, and our penal system likewise,

can be made a stimulus to discriminating, forward-looking citizenship.² At many points the pupil can and should be interested in what the state does, why it does it, and how to judge whether it is well done. That is, it never is enough to produce in the pupil a conviction as to how *he* should act; he can and should begin early to learn how the state also conducts itself, and how it should conduct itself.

POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE NEW SOCIAL STUDIES FOR THE HIGH SCHOOL

That a veritable educational revolution has begun in the form of curriculum revision for the high school, junior and senior, must be evident to any one who keeps track of the greater movements of thought in the world of the schoolman. The social studies are going to become central, and they are going to be transformed in content, organization, and method. Thus much is clear. What is not quite so certain is the place that the specifically political phases of society are to have in this new-type curriculum.

This is not the place, of course, for a general survey or critique of the total movement in the area of the social studies—that would require a volume rather than part of a chapter. Moreover, until such a survey is made, one must avoid over-certainty as to the political outlook that is here developing. Yet any one who is at all familiar with the swing of thought during the last seventeen years within the National Education Association, the Department of Superintendence, and the National Society for the Study of Education;³ acquainted also with the in-

² As Ellsworth Collings has shown in his *An Experiment with a Project Curriculum*. (New York, 1923.)

³ See the *Twenty-second* and the *Twenty-sixth Yearbooks*.

creasingly critical philosophy of education as it appears in books and periodicals, and with any considerable part of the recent text-books of social studies for the high school, can see for himself that a new image of the state is emerging, and with it a new standard for the political phase of education. With the proviso, then, that what is about to be said is and can be only a preliminary interpretation of a movement that is young and not yet near to maturity, the following notations are offered concerning political trends in the new social studies for the high school.

1. *The state is not much longer to be presented to students in terms primarily of skeletal structure and mechanism, but rather in terms of functions performed and values experienced.* The dynamics of human life is now coming towards the focus of attention.

2. *Political realism is supplanting political sentimentalism.* "Our country," "America," "the government," "we" are coming out of a half-dream world into a wide-awake world. Instruction concerning the forms of constitutional government did not make the state a real presence, nor did the sentimental treatment of history do so. Rather, both of these left the actualities in obscurity—an obscurity that favored manipulation of the powers of the state for obscure ends. The fact of such manipulation was not recognized in the older teaching.

3. *The scientific method is becoming a control for this political realism.* What we have here is not the moody thing that some literary men call realism; it is not a mood nor a style; it is not the making of exposés; it is unemotional inquiry into ascertainable facts, and when they are ascertained it is analysis

that reveals causes and effects. It is emancipation from the everlasting *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* of the age of political innocence. And this scientific deliberateness is to become a part of patriotism! If this is not revolutionary, what could be so?

4. *A new background-idea is developing—the idea of society.* To say that until very recently our schools lacked this concept may seem strange, but it is true. Such concepts as the individual and his duty, the family and its members, the church, the school, and the sovereign state were there, but of society as the matrix of them all there was no clear consciousness. As a consequence, some of the most influential determinants of the state and of the course of history were as if they did not exist, and corresponding possibilities of control were entirely missed. This, in turn, tended to make good citizenship only a vague sort of goodness.

5. *The political order is ceasing to be conceived as the administration of a given system of government; rather, the political order is seen to be a mass of instruments and processes that are continually being created because they are modes of the self-fulfilment of a self-outgrowing society.* We now know that there never has been anywhere such a state as the schoolteachers of yesterday supposed. The real Constitution, we now see, grows and changes faster than the words change; the real control of men is a step ahead or a step behind what is in the law books; much of our legislation does little more than record and standardize some change that has already taken place. Thus, the real nature of law, coercion, national policy, and loyalty is for the first time to be revealed to the mass of our citizens.

6. *The new social studies present a new, because*

realistic, picture of the relation of economic forces to political action. Heretofore young citizens have been given to understand that government is something *per se*, and that economic activity is something else *per se*. The two interests were supposed to exist side by side in the mind and conduct of the citizen. What had citizenship to do with plowing corn? During the war we learned that plowing corn can be a citizenship function. We are now learning that this was not an isolated or exceptional relationship. Not merely occasionally, but always, government is in business, and business is in government. This is the fact, and this is as it should be provided that the agencies of the state are democratically controlled. We shall soon cease to apologize for mixing economics and politics. As far as we have a commonwealth at all, it is an industrial commonwealth just as truly as it is a common participation in other kinds of weal, such as health, the beauties of nature (our wonderful national parks, for example), convenience (the postal service), and science. The young citizen who is under the influence of this trend in the social studies will come to maturity with no division in his mind between his daily work and the functions of the state. As a citizen his main problem for some time will be, in fact, how to employ the power of the whole people, acting as the state, to further the economic well-being of the whole people.

7. *The new social studies are reviving and intensifying the democratic ideal.* There is less hesitation at this point than there was in the minds of some of the founders of the Republic, far less than there is today in wide circles of the populace. Our experiment in popular government has encountered difficulties; multiplied failures are upon its record;

its unsolved problems weigh us down; but in the new social studies these problems stretch the mind instead of paralyzing or obstructing it. For the first time in American education we have a fusion of realism with respect to political data and idealism with respect to political ends.

8. *The facts of social conflict are brought into the school, and controversial issues become the warp of the fabric of the social studies.* Here again an evil precedent is shattered. For heretofore the ideal of social and national unity has been presented in such isolation from facts as to conceal the necessities in concrete situations. For example, the well-meant assertion that the real interest of capital and the real interest of labor are the same. Here a theory that there ought not to be a class struggle was substituted for inquiry into the actual tensions in society. One effect was to leave the causes of tension almost untouched; another effect was to provide a specious justification for whatever element in society happened to have the economic upper hand, and a specious condemnation of opposing elements. Consequently, teachers' efforts on behalf of unity have tended towards disunity. The new studies, by bringing conflicts and controversies into the open for discussion by students who have various social and economic backgrounds, tend towards whatever unity the facts themselves make possible.

9. *The tendency of all this is towards a firmer, because critically chosen, loyalty.* Heretofore the incitement to loyalty has been emotionally toned suggestion. The aim was to fix, once and for all, a mental habit, an automatic response. But the inherent limitations of automatic responses were overlooked. One trained to automatic responsiveness re-

acts in the given manner to whatever seems to be the original or right stimulus without being able to make sure that it really is what it seems to be. The automatic patriot is for this reason a positive menace to his country. He jumps at conclusions, is led around by the nose, and fancies that he is especially devoted to his country when he is merely excited. When the new social studies have borne ripe fruit, a critical attitude towards political events and policies will be a part of patriotism; not to inquire, not to discriminate, but merely to repeat or follow, will be unpatriotic. Reliance for steady loyalty is now to be placed, to a degree that never has prevailed even in the colleges, upon acquaintance with issues and alternatives; the weighing of evidence by the student himself; the development of clearly defined preferences, and thus a reasoned conviction as to where the permanent values lie in all the changing situations.

These are the outstanding characteristics that the present observer finds in the new social studies. He believes that these tendencies may well be accepted as a forecast of general practice in the not distant future. Of course, not all the characteristics that have been named are found equally in all the recent text-books; far from it. At least three types are discernible: The first is characterized by large increase in the amount of fact-material that concerns the processes of government, but chariness about bringing conflicts and issues to sharp definition; the second by largeness of social outlook, comprehensive views of the movements of our society or of civilization as a whole, together with a generalized, more or less philosophical, presentation of current issues; the third by sharp accent upon social deficits, conflicts, and problems in the less generalized form that they

take in the current experience of particular population elements in particular situations. The difference between the second type and the third is much the same as that between the study of generalizations with the help of illustrative examples, on the one hand, and case study, on the other. All three rely for improved citizenship upon enlargement of the citizen's knowledge; all three have the sincerity of science in their approach to facts; all assume the validity of the democratic ideal; but they differ as to the kinds of knowledge most needed, and as to the kind of pupil interest to which appeal is to be made. The suggestion may be ventured that one test for the social studies of the future will be this: Do they produce a habit of recognizing the social and political forces at work here and now in the pupil's immediate environment, and do they reveal the consequences for the state of alternatives for conduct that are clearly open to him?

THE DOMINANT MOTIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN

The image of the state that is emerging in the new social studies is that of a progressively self-transforming democracy—self-transforming through a progressive process that goes on within the citizens themselves. The final problem for civic education, accordingly, and the hardest one, concerns the motive force that can cause individuals continually to transform themselves into better or more efficient democrats. Our greatest danger is not that citizens will be insufficiently attached to the state that now is, but that they will not move on to something better until a cyclone shatters their house. What mo-

tives, then, do the new social studies bring to the fore?

Either explicitly or implicitly, the value of persons as such is assumed to be the ultimate ground and motive for democracy in the state. Hence a constant tendency to bring towards the foreground the actual life of ordinary men and of ordinary groups. The state is coming to have no glory whatever except the glory that is in a high general level of life and in men's opportunity and incentives to rise to higher levels.

One consequence of this is that a true democrat will take sides in particular social contests that involve the maintaining of a given level of life, or that involve opportunity and incentive for raising the level. A further consequence, pointed out by Professor Bode, is that vital civic instruction cannot be wholly neutral with respect to all phases of contemporary social issues. To be a democrat is to have a *cause*, and to educate for democracy is to have a cause. "Life is still an adventure and a struggle in which there are no neutrals." It is only by taking sides in the present contest of democracy against privilege and economic exploitation that students can regain "the participation in social life which has been so largely lost."⁴

But how can zeal for democracy be kept alive? Further, how can students espouse causes without becoming partisans? Finally, how can a school lead them to such espousals without becoming a class institution? I believe that these questions can be answered, and that in fact the answer of all of them is to be found at one and the same point.

⁴ Bode, Boyd H., "Education at the Crossroads." *Progressive Education*, VIII, 7 (November, 1931), pp. 543-549.

Generalizations alone will not kindle the fire; emotionalized ideas of democracy will not keep the fire burning; knowledge of current issues brings one into the fire-light but not into the full warmth. There must be also the experience of fellowship with those who suffer the consequences of the imperfections of our present society. Democracy in me will be progressive and self-transforming if I truly identify myself with the least-privileged of my fellows. First-hand acquaintance with the deficits of life, and actual or imaginative participation in the experience of injustice, this is the living spring of progressive motivation for which we are looking.

The result of such experience is a demand for more democracy at specific, designated points. As long as these demands focus upon the human end to be achieved rather than upon means that may be uncertain, they can have full expression without becoming partisan. Before a legislative committee that was holding a hearing upon a bill to require safety devices in factories, there was brought, "as an exhibit," a man who had been cut, deformed, and crippled by unshielded machines—nothing ever would restore him to the semblance of a normal human being. Was this "exhibit" an instance of partisanship? Representatives of an organization of manufacturers were hostile *to the exhibit*, and undoubtedly the exhibit was hostile to something to which they were clinging, but, surely, being for human life and against industrial accidents is not partisanship. In fact, it is frequently possible to detect the presence of partisanship merely by noticing where there is opposition to bringing into the open the simple, unquestionable experience of persons who are hurt by the present organized ways of men.

Professor Rugg turns to æsthetics as the area within which to seek the spring of democratic motivation. He thinks that architects, painters, and literary men have seen the actualities of civilization with unique vividness, and that the artist's reliance upon the integrity of his own mind points the way for education as a whole. Rugg takes Whitman and Emerson as the true prophets of American civilization because of their sturdy expression and advocacy of self-appreciation and self-reliance.⁵ If we ask how a developed reliance upon my own inner integrity makes one a democrat, and what this "new individualism" is—an individualism that is yet democracy—Rugg answers that "the cultured man pays allegiance to . . . the concept of 'live and let live' . . . an implicit acceptance of the integrity of each other person concerned except where there are indubitable facts to the contrary" (p. 249). "It is not superiority to another person that is being postulated. It is, on the contrary, the recognition of the superiority of each integrated person. The theory states that the only sound basis for society lies in getting each individual to recognize the worth of other persons and their philosophies of life" (p. 255). Apparently he regards society as an aggregation of such self-contained units (p. 236), and apparently society exists by virtue of a set of external relations among these units (p. 235) rather than by reason of anything inherently involved in personality as such.

Emerson's appreciation of the inner integrity of the individual included something that Rugg strangely fails to mention, namely, the New England transcendentalist's glowing sense that individuality is a

⁵Rugg, Harold, *Culture and Education in America* (New York, 1931), Part IV.

specialized instance of a universal, creative, divine urge. For Emerson the ground of unity between two neighbors when they converse with each other is that "Jove nods to Jove" over the head of each.

It seems a bit odd that Rugg should ignore religion to the extent that he has done. "Culture" is defined for pupils as "all the ways of living, thinking, and feeling of the people"; it includes economic customs, education, government, recreation, and social life; not a word here about religion or ecclesiastical institutions.⁶ He follows Tawney's exposition of the economic significance of Puritanism,⁷ but he seems to be unmindful of the contribution that contemporary, non-Puritan religion is making to the democratic motivation of great numbers of citizens. Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant agencies are presenting vividly the contrast between the value of persons and the value-scale of current industrialism. Those who profit from the undemocratic *status quo* are making loud outcries to the effect that ministers are getting out of their proper sphere, that a "destructive idealism" is abroad, and that the young are being insidiously inoculated with a revolutionary virus. It is open to doubt whether any other organized agency is doing as much as religious agencies are doing to make young people have the *feeling for people* that is fundamental in the motivation of democracy.

Is it not pretty well established that society does not arise nor persist by combining psychic atoms? Do we become self-reliant individuals at all except in and through a social process that takes place within each of us, making us members of one another willy

⁶ Rugg, Harold, *A History of American Government and Culture* (Boston, 1931), p. 13.

⁷ *Culture and Education in America*, pp. 21-31.

nilly? And, does not this willy-nilly sociality mature into democracy where most we notice other persons and spontaneously experience their weal and their woe as our own? This is something more than "let live." It is more akin to religion than to art. It is not created by our social philosophy; rather, it is the creative impulse of philosophies of democracy.

THE PLAIN CITIZEN AND THE POLITICAL EXPERT

Nearly all the specific functions of the democratic state have to be performed by a few persons who hold commissions directly or indirectly from the people. In the nature of the case some of these functionaries must have wide discretion and not a little initiative—they cannot be mere tools. Ideally, they will be experts in their respective offices. How, then, are the citizens to find or produce genuine political experts, and how are these experts to be kept from abusing their opportunities? Why, it is asked, have we so few men in the public service who can be regarded as able and skilful in any large sense?

The new social studies touch here and there upon the necessity of having leaders who have vision, skill, and trustworthiness, and then trusting them. But how a supply of such leaders can be had, how the voters can discover and select them, and how they can be held responsible for their stewardship, are less clear.

Why, then, the scarcity of men of "light and leading" in political life? The argument of this book contains the answer. We have no schools of citizenship that lay the foundations of political intelligence and interest; no schools that act as selective agents and stimulators of talent for politics in a high sense

of this term; and our colleges and universities, which ought to be devoted most of all to statecraft, are devoted to it least of all. Further, and of course, such an educational system does not equip the mass of the citizens to recognize expertness when it appears, nor to reward it with enlarging opportunity.

From this muddled condition some persons draw the inference that democracies are necessarily inefficient, and that we shall most effectually counteract the tendency to inefficiency by letting a few strong persons do the actual ruling, while the people as a whole continue to fancy that because they have the ballot they have popular government. I am not sure that some text-books of recent date do not seek salvation through the creation of a specially cultivated minority that will take matters into their own hands.

All such views ignore what the scientific movement can teach us concerning the relation of experts to their clients. The picture of a knowing few doing what they will, and keeping their clients pacified by illusions, is a picture out of the pre-scientific ages. Science changes not only medical practice, for example, but also the relation of the physician to his patients. At the present moment we witness the medical profession spreading all the medical information that it can among the people. The more the people know about health and disease and growth, the better—so the doctors assume—for all concerned. The amount of medical information that has reached the people in the last twenty years is, in fact, amazing; and this, mark, occurs at the moment in medical history when the medical expert reaches the highest pinnacle of recognition and of reward. The point of this is not only that people are learning to trust

physicians rather than advertisements of patented medicines, but also that, the more the people take into their own hands the control of health and growth, the more certainly do they appreciate the expert and depend upon him.

Government by the knowing few corresponds to the pre-scientific practice of healing; their supposed expertness is illusory; they do not really "deliver the goods"; in fact, usually they destroy their own power. The day of the real expert in government simply does not dawn until the governed call for him as their agent in accomplishing what they discriminatingly desire.

For our civic education we require, then, a process that will do two things: First, develop in the mass of citizens such information and such interest in public affairs as will discriminate between the political expert and the political rule-o'-thumb man, hold public officials to inescapable responsibility for results, and reward skill by giving it enlarged scope; second, select for special training those who have the talent and the interest of the potential expert, and then provide this training abundantly. These conditions will be met when public education follows the principles outlined in this book.

THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF MAJORITIES AND OF MINORITIES

There is dire need that the schools should give attention to the current assumption that it is ethically right for a majority to do anything that the Constitution and the statutes permit it to do. For time and again we see minorities treated as if they were of no account in the body politic. Conversely, there is need of training for the experience of being

a member of minorities. At neither of these points, as far as I have been able to ascertain, are the present social studies quite awake. In particular, the value to society of determined minorities, and how to make minorities most useful—these things seem to be ignored.

As I have elsewhere said: "Up to the present time we in America have almost entirely failed to develop and utilize the capacities of political minorities. The popular assumption is that the function of a minority party is to win the next election. . . . If the election goes against us, we think that the next thing to do is to expire or to make terms with the dominant majority. . . . The assumed principle is, Win the election, or else give up, or—Compromise and divide the benefits! . . . To make the party in power aware that all that is hidden will be brought to light; to make it conscious that nothing is settled until it is settled right; and to keep alive the idea that the last and the least of our citizens must be taken into account—this is a service that the majority cannot perform for itself, and that neither a short-lived nor compromising minority can perform, but only a minority whose convictions are deep enough to sustain it indefinitely. . . . The most important changes that are to occur tomorrow are in the keeping of some minority now in existence or soon to arise. The most creative thought will take its rise from discontent and criticism, not from fattened respectability. . . . The most significant part of any society is some minority in which creative changes are germinating. Without minorities society, as an order of reason, would perish."⁸

⁸ Coe, George A., *The Motives of Men* (New York, 1928), Chapter XXVII. This chapter contains comments upon mis-education with respect to this matter in the colleges of today.

WHAT WILL THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DO WITH THE
PROBLEM OF RACE RELATIONS?

Particularly with respect to relations between white and colored citizens? There is enough silence in the text-books to deafen any one who has sensitive ears. I do not mean that the problem is being dodged, nor that race prejudice is in control where democracy is professed. Both are possible, even probable; but it must be admitted that possibly the surest and quickest way to get at the race question effectively is first to develop a sound method in civic instruction by working for a while at easier tasks.

However this may be, this most delicate, most temper-disturbing, most democracy-testing matter must soon be frankly faced in our schools. Our almost complete failure, thus far, to look our difficulty squarely in the eye is an outstanding illustration of the lack of realism in our supposed education for citizenship. The methods that are developing in community civics and in the new social studies for the high school, however, are now for the first time opening a practicable route. The route is not without difficulty, to be sure. To follow it will require courage, patience, a generous tact and friendliness, and—inflexible faith in the democratic method of studying democracy.

The democratic method of studying democracy is, first of all, the creation in pupils of respect for facts as such, ability to look at actualities calmly while holding judgment in suspense, and confidence that reasoned, deliberate conduct best takes care of our real interests. This is at once the scientific attitude and also a faith that is nothing less than religious.

It is the hoisting of anchors from the muddy bottoms of shallow bays, and setting out upon the high seas. Were not ships, even ships of state, made for this? In the second place, the democratic method of studying democracy is to find out how it feels to be a victim of the imperfections of such partial democracy as we already have. How *does* it feel, then, to be a Negro in the United States of America? Why not ask those who know! In the third place, the democratic method of studying democracy is to study and think together—to think not merely about somebody out there, but with somebody right here. It is, in short, to experience fellowship in study as well as through study.

Nothing short of this educational approach to the questions of race will satisfy any true American who knows what Americanism is, nor any teacher of democracy who knows what teaching is. If we are timid towards the frank and unqualified inclusion of the race problem within the social studies, the reason is that we are timid towards democracy, towards real teaching, or towards both. If we follow to the end the spirit of these new studies we shall see our way where now we are “going it blind”; and, if we get our eyes open early enough we shall solve the problem by the calm use of the reason that is an inherent possession of all the races.

CHAPTER X

THE SCHOOL TEACHER QUIZZES THE SOVEREIGN?

SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT A FIXED POINT OF REFERENCE FOR THE SCHOOL

How comfortable would be the job of a teacher if he could say to himself, "Precisely this is what I am commanded to teach as fact and as truth; and these are the virtues that I am commanded to inculcate. When I have thus instructed and thus inculcated, my duty is done." Probably many, even most, teachers do take an attitude like this, and supervisors and training schools share in the responsibility for it. In particular, there is a tendency to rest back upon an assumption that political values, at least basic ones, have been determined and fixed; that any questioning of them in the school would amount to disrespect for the sovereign state, and that an attempt to revise them would make one's loyalty questionable. This attitude assumes that within the political structure there is a holy of holies that one must not enter, and that within it, in self-contained majesty, dwells an authority that must be revered but not approached. To drop the figure, the idea prevails that teaching is to adjust the people to the state, not the state to the people. The teacher must quiz the people in the persons of school pupils, but he must not quiz the sovereign state. The state, conceived as sovereign, is taken as a fixed point of reference for the school.

But is it really fixed? And, what is there about it that can be pronounced sacred? If we carefully examine our thinking at the points where it seems to

perceive finality and sacredness in the political structure, we shall discover that inadvertently our attention has shifted from political structure to ethical value. That which ends our search is not the structure, but the kind of human experience that it is supposed to protect and promote. Persons only are sacred. Since persons realize themselves only in and through mutuality or fellowship, the proposition that persons only are sacred carries with it the meaning that society in this sense is sacred. Society, that is to say, as fellowship; the finality never is in laws, nor constitutions, nor any kind of authority of men over men, but solely in the experience of personal or inner unity with one another. This is not a fixed point of reference; it is something that grows, diversifies itself, creates and re-creates itself as it goes along.¹

When, moreover, teachers think that they are standing guard over a political holy of holies, the most that they accomplish is to bestow an odor of sanctity upon something that is not holy. For invariably this kind of teaching attributes finality to something that is incomplete, temporary, or partisan. Usually the teacher, in this case, has unwittingly become a defender of an unavowed class interest. The common, and possibly the most effective, defence-mechanism of special privilege consists in the tacit inclusion of the desired privilege under a high-sounding generalization that does not suggest inequality. If teachers can be induced to glorify "our country," "the Amer-

¹ The "respect for law" for which Professor W. C. Bagley pleads in *Education, Crime, and Social Progress* (New York, 1931), if it is not ambiguous, is at least obscure. It cannot mean respect for all law, all commands of the sovereign, for Bagley himself says that some laws are not "respectable" (pp. 12, 28). I should like to think that "respect for law" means readiness to perform one's part in doing and promoting justice. Apart from the *functions* of law the phrase cannot, I judge, be construed at all.

ican system," "our national honor," "our vital interests," "our destiny," and so on, without looking under the surface, the trick is done—the emotional halo irradiates the whole status "as is." Hence, teachers who do not quiz the sovereign put themselves and their pupils into captivity to a pseudo-sovereign.

THE OFFICIALS WHO WIELD SOVEREIGN POWER ARE NOT SACROSANCT

When we do quiz the sovereign, insisting upon actualities instead of emotionalized abstract concepts, this is what we find: The people rarely expresses its sovereign will directly; instead, nearly all the functions of the sovereign are delegated to government officials of various sorts, such as presidents, legislatures, senators, congressmen, governors, courts, and so on. We now have to determine how much reverence can reasonably be claimed for acts of sovereign authority performed by these individuals and bodies.

There is a theory that the office is to be respected regardless of the use that is made of it. Here is a grain of truth, namely, that government office always represents an ideal or standard (justice, equality, welfare, security, etc.) that outruns present accomplishment. But to make this idealistic aspect of office a shield against criticism, instead of making it a stimulus to criticism, is sheer perversion. Sovereignty, as it operates through these officials, deserves as much respect as is due the wisdom and probity of these fallible and usually partisan men, and no more. Indeed, if respect for the office as such means anything of importance, it signifies a call to the public to be alert to what happens through the office; it

means that realistic, critical judgment concerning all official acts of all functionaries of government is always in order wherever citizens confer with one another upon matters of state.

Such criticism is nowhere more in order than in the schools. For here is where we must expect citizens, through appropriate practice, to acquire ability to penetrate beneath political generalizations, abstractions, prejudices, and pretense, to the human actualities of government. Nothing short of drastic political realism is educationally sound. To this an objection is sometimes made on behalf of the idealism of youth—let it not be frost-bitten by too early acquaintance with the imperfections of men. But note the implications of this view. It seems to say that our public men are so generally and so deeply in the wrong that to know the facts about their conduct of public affairs is to endanger our idealism! I make bold to say that this is not so, and that, if it were so, the surest way to avert catastrophe would be to give the greatest possible publicity to the facts. We shall continue to respect our neighbors who are office-holders after we have turned all their conduct inside out. Some of them we shall respect to the point of reverence because of their outstanding wisdom, or devotion to the public weal; we shall respect all of them because of the humanity that, in them as in the rest of us, mixes inextinguishable value with faulty performance. We shall not, if we are wise, induce pupils to esteem any act or function of sovereignty beyond its own inherent worth.

This applies to both historical characters and contemporary officials. It isn't necessary for pupils to admire any worthy of the past; indeed, upon the degree of the admirer's discrimination depends the

educational value of admiring even what is admirable. Similarly, it is a false policy that induces children and youth to regard with awesome reverence any person who chances to be the incumbent of—say—the presidential chair. Respect is due to all men as persons; honor is due to those who serve, but reverence for an official as such? No! This applies to all branches of the government, the courts not exempted. Increasingly it becomes evident that, in the interest of justice, all the human factors that go to the making of judicial decisions need to be understood by the general public, and therefore by pupils during their school days.

In short, neither the sovereign considered as a single entity, nor yet the individuals and bodies that exercise the powers of the sovereign, can properly be taken as fixed points of reference for the school. Sovereignty in its actuality is wholly included within the flux of experience; it never becomes immune to the defects of particular individuals; it never is aloof from the ordinary tangled interests and motives of men; it never can deserve unquestioning obedience. It deserves, however, such ever-renewed scrutiny as will bring into the foreground of reasoned and glad conviction whatever at any point it contributes to that which truly is sacred, the fellowship of person with person.

THE STATE DOES NOT POSSESS ETHICAL SOVEREIGNTY

One feels like apologizing to the reader for proclaiming anything as trite as that ethical sovereignty is no part or parcel of political sovereignty. Yet there are reasons not only for repeating this proposition, but also for giving it the greatest possible

emphasis at the present juncture in the history of public education in the United States.

A never-ceasing need for distinguishing between what is legal and what is just, between instrumented power and non-instrumented persons, arises from a simple characteristic of mass conduct. Whenever any mass of people acts under the influence of strong emotion, what is done appears to the performers of it to be rational; any common desire appears to be ethically right. For, under the conditions here named, the inhibitions, the pauses, the recollections, that make real thinking a complex process, disappear. Whatever judging process remains dispenses with such intermediate factors; it is direct and self-executing; no alternative for thought appears to be possible. Simplicity is now taken for clarity, and the absence of any question about evidence is taken as self-evidence. Whatever is most desired appears now to be most right, and whoever stands in the way is regarded as perverse.

This description does not apply merely to mobs and crowds; for, under modern conditions of inter-communication, individual minds scattered over a whole continent can be melted into a mass mind almost overnight. Given a nation thus excited, political sovereignty tends automatically to assert itself as ethical sovereignty. Our country then becomes for us a sort of transcendent being who inspires officials at the national capital with supernal wisdom. Taken corporately, they become a secular Pope. This sort of thing reaches a climax in the making and waging of war, but it does not end here. It is too seductive to end abruptly—seductive both to those who hold office and to those who do not. The simplicity or all-oneness of the citizen's emotional idea of his coun-

try continues to fuse and confuse all the fish, flesh, and fowl at government headquarters. Moreover, those who have passionately committed themselves to something as right and good have a self-consistency motive for pushing on in the same direction.

The total result is that the many become subject to a pseudo-moral authority that leads them they know not whither, while the few take advantage of the situation by furthering policies or interests that could not of themselves lay claim to any clear ethical sanction. Unless the schools make explicit the fact that political sovereignty is not ethical authority and cannot under any circumstances—under popular excitement, say—become ethical authority, the education of young citizens is bound to be sentimental rather than practical, and noble sentiment will be harnessed and driven by interests that are not noble.

There is a special reason for unqualifiedly challenging just now the confusion of the political with the ethical. For the confusion has become rampant in a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the *Macintosh* naturalization case a majority of the court—the vote was five to four—declared that whenever the Congress votes for war the decision must be accepted as expressing the will of God. The court's reasoning distinctly holds that not only must an applicant for naturalization totally subordinate his conscience to the state at this point, but also that all native citizens are in the same relation to the Congress. Here, at last, we have an unequivocal, official proclamation that the sovereign ruler possesses supreme ethical authority. A pointed and vigorous minority opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, however, maintains that this decision runs counter to the hitherto accepted assump-

tions of our government, and he does not fail to assail the decision as divisive and discriminatory as between unquestionably good citizens.

This amazing departure from American tradition appears to be a culminating point in the growth of modern nationalism. Undoubtedly the war stimulated this growth, but the seed was sown before the war and by the same influences that produced the great catastrophe. In his article on "Citizenship and Education" in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*, Professor J. W. Jenks flatly declares that "the citizen exists for the state." The ethical significance of this proposition he makes clear in these words: "Only when the mass of the citizens stand ready to place their obligations towards the state before all other obligations—those to self, to family, to friends—do we find the best state." Another educator (whose name I withhold because I surmise that his words reveal a tendency of the times rather than his own permanent conviction) remarks: "When the church was supreme it required ultimate loyalty or dealt death or excommunication. Now that the state is supreme, not to give it ultimate loyalty is treason." What he means by "ultimate" loyalty appears in a further statement that life properly contains many loyalties, but that the state is "the proper arbiter of loyalties." The historian, Carleton J. Hayes, maintains that nationalism has become a religion with us. It has an object of supreme devotion; saints and saints' days; sacred symbols; holy places and times; ritual and ceremony; even a creed and persecution for heresy.² Harry Emerson Fosdick bluntly asserts that "the dogma of nationalism, as it has developed

² Hayes, Carleton J. H., *Essays on Nationalism*. (New York, 1926.)

in the last two centuries, has become a competing religion." He calls it "Christianity's supreme rival."³

See how precisely the majority of the Supreme Court confirms the words of Hayes and of Fosdick. The will of God is final, of course—so runs the sentiment of the five judges—but the Congress tells us what the will of God is!

SOCIETY IS PRIMORDIAL; THE STATE IS ONE OF ITS
AGENTS

How, it will of course be asked, can the schools deal with a ticklish topic like that of modern nationalism? Shall a decision by our highest tribunal be brought into question? A part of the reply is that at least the dissenting opinion of the minority of the court may be quoted as a part of the public record. But the problem is more general than this. If plenary moral authority is not to be attributed to the state, and the claims of churches to plenary authority may not be canvassed in the schools, how can there be any effective teaching of the duties of a citizen? The answer is that duties are to be apprehended through appreciation of values rather than through any *ipse dixit* of teacher, text-book, or government body or official, whether within the school system or outside of it. That is, let pupils be led habitually to notice the happiness and the unhappiness of men, women, and children; to see social conditions through the eyes of those who experience them, and to trace conditions to causes. There is no surer road than this to the discovery that no man can live to himself alone; no surer road to an understanding of what the state does for people and

³ In a sermon that bears this title, preached at the Park Avenue Baptist Church, New York, November 13, 1927.

of what it might do. That is, we find our duties as citizens by studying the state of society and of its members.

The fundamental reasons for the state lie within common experience; they are so simple and pervasive that school children can perceive them and even generalize them. "Miss Rankin," said a child to the teacher in charge of a play school, "I think we ought to have a president." "Why?" "Because we get into scraps that interfere with building our playhouses." "Well, why don't you get together and elect a president, then?" Thereupon the children not only got themselves together and elected a president, they also made and posted a set of regulations—naïvely funny rules they were—and thereafter the building of playhouses went forward more smoothly and happily.

Actual, living sovereignty, as I have said, is wholly within the flux of experience; it was not created in some other star and bestowed upon us ready-made; it is not entailed by the will of men now dead; it is in continuous creation and re-creation, even within ourselves. It is one of the functions or modes of life in society. Society itself is primordial—that is, persons engaged in fulfilling themselves as persons through mutuality, fellowship, co-operation. Persons are spontaneously members one of another; they are not made so by law, and they cannot be. Rather, the state is one of the ways in which this self-creative mutuality provides for its own efficient operation. There are other ways also, as circles of friends, families, organized religion, sports, the sciences, and the various arts in which men work together and enjoy together.⁴ These were not created by the state, nor

⁴ Since the above words were written, Dean C. H. Judd has employed the same principle as a determinant of the place that the teaching of government should have in the curriculum. "Govern-

do they exist by consent of the state. They are not secondary in either time, or function, or ethical authority. There is a much-neglected clause in the Constitution of the United States that mentions rights reserved "to the people" in addition to both the rights that are reserved to the various states and the rights that are granted to the Federal Government. Here is legal recognition of the fact that self-regulating human functions exist that are entirely beyond the scope of the political structure. One of these functions has recently been recognized by the Supreme Court in its decision concerning the Oregon compulsory education law.⁵ The purport of the decision is that, in respect to their own children, parents have an educational right that is co-ordinate with that of the state.

What laws and courts mainly do with these inalienable functions is to protect their freedom. If, from time to time, functions hitherto outside the structure of the state are transferred within it, as when a state constitution makes public schools mandatory, the change occurs in our society by consent of those affected by it; it is their free ethical choice; it involves no submission to an authority outside themselves. That is, the same persons act sometimes as the sovereign people, sometimes otherwise. They

ment," he says, "is only one phase of civilization." The purpose of the school is to pass on to the new generation "the larger whole to which government belongs." Before pupils are ready to understand and appreciate political structure, they must learn a considerable part of what it means to live together as civilized beings. In the process of this basic learning, they come upon needs which the state meets. Here appreciation of the state begins, and it furnishes the true approach to the study of government. "The sympathy of pupils for government must be cultivated if the lessons of government are to be really understood and appreciated." "Teaching Government in Public Schools," by Dean Charles H. Judd. *School and Society*, Vol. xxxv, No. 891 (January 23, 1932), pp. 103-108.

⁵ *U. S. Supreme Court Reports*, Vol. 268, p. 510; 69 Law Ed. 1070.

take up the functions of sovereignty, and they lay these functions down, at will. The sovereignty of the state is inclusive, then, only in the sense that it covers the whole of a given territory and all the persons therein; it is not inclusive in the sense of applying to all the functions of persons. The state does not so much as recognize most of the functions of myself as a person except by protecting me from invasion, and it even protects me from invasion by itself!

This principle has received noteworthy expression from Professor W. E. Hocking. Perhaps no contemporary writer upon the philosophy of politics would maintain more strenuously than does he that the state is necessary to man as man, that the scope of its prerogatives is exceedingly great, and that it must exercise coercion in large areas of life. But he says: "What the state bond means is that, given any two men dwelling together in space and time, there you have two men concerned in justice. . . . Men recognize justice as prior to society—not made by it, but a necessary ingredient of it. It is this developed sense of the priority of justice that finally sustains the independent state bond."⁶ "The individual is a micro-state . . . he never surrenders these functions to the state. . . . The individual, in the state or out of it, retains all the functions of a complete man."⁷ Men, he goes on to say, "owe nothing to it [the state] as a superior order of being. Having no separate selfhood, no capacity for enjoyment or suffering, it has, literally speaking, no 'welfare' proper to itself; *there is no welfare in the case except their welfare*. Statolatry we can dismiss as hav-

⁶ Hocking, W. E., *Man and the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), p. 133.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

ing no shred of sense.”⁸ “The state embodies no realized perfection except the will to realize perfection. . . . The state is not, but has that in it, which the individual is bound to serve with his life.”⁹

Citizens have no duties *to* the state; rather, acting *as* the state, they have duties to *persons*. This truth is so important, and it is so little understood, that a few words of exposition may be permitted. It would be a mistake to suppose that what has been said is an echo of what Professor Coker calls “the attack upon state sovereignty.”¹⁰ On the contrary, everywhere in this discussion the assumption is present that we require law and coercive authority, and more rather than less of it, as one mode of social self-fulfilment. As our national societies merge into one world-society, sovereignties also will move on out of their present enclosures into a larger, not smaller, place. A first stage of this movement was international law, which was not as much law as it was the confessional of sovereigns. A second stage is seen in consultations among sovereigns, and warnings to sovereigns, in fulfilment of the Paris Peace Pact. Already a third stage has come into being in the system of mandates. For the triangular relations: the states, the League of Nations, the mandated territories—cannot possibly be formulated in the terms of the old purely nationalistic sovereignty. In the mandate system sovereignty is divided, shared, and *fluid*.¹¹

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 378. The italics are in the original. ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

¹⁰ Coker, F. W., “Pluralistic Theories and the Attack upon State Sovereignty.” Chapter III of *A History of Political Theories*, *Recent Times*, edited by C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes. (New York, 1924.)

¹¹ My attention has been called to this point by *Information Service*, December 5, 1931, in an abstract of Quincy Wright’s *Mandates under the League of Nations*. (Chicago, 1930.)

Education for citizenship, if it follows the principles set forth in our discussion, will not only make citizens keenly conscious of state authority, it will also produce increased participation in the activities of the sovereign state. It will do this by making pupils realize the great human values that are possible through law and apparently not otherwise. What has been opposed is the present deadly habit of placing sovereignty in an abstract, supposedly idealistic, realm, and then attributing indefinite authority to it.

The attribution of ethical finality to state action becomes in the end the greatest attack upon sovereignty itself. For, a state that is endowed with indefinite authority is exactly fitted to be the tool of special interests that cannot afford to be realistic and literal in their approach to the public. Sovereignty thus conceived divides citizens instead of uniting them. If this be sovereignty, the attitude of citizens towards it will be a mixture of surreptitious exploitation, honest partisanship, distrust, confusion, and indifference. Meantime, vital common interests, lacking an organ, will go unfed and hungry—and hunger will urge towards anarchy.

When education for citizenship brings the sovereign out of the fog and down to the ground where boys and girls can look at him, they will perceive that the finality with which their conduct as members of the state must reckon is human persons who grow, enjoy, and suffer. Beyond them there is no political reality, but only fog and hocus-pocus. The ultimate claim upon the citizen is simply that of neighbor upon neighbor. The basic and inclusive political value is the value of a person. Hence, democ-

racy is the only principle of political unity that can make a completely realistic and completely sincere educational approach to the young. Finally, sovereignty in a democracy is an organization of fellowship in the interest of more fellowship. Thus, the final test of the individual's conduct as citizen is also the final test of national policy and of law, namely: Does this conduct, policy, law express respect for persons, and does it make for fellowship among them?

Like our congressmen and senators, I request permission "to extend my remarks" by inserting in the record a few quotations from writers upon political science. My purpose in making these citations is not to argue for any whole system of political philosophy—pluralism for instance, which I do not find convincing—but only to illuminate the one phase of the problem of sovereignty that cannot be escaped in education for citizenship.

First of all, a word that concerns the issue that the schools must meet. Professor Coker, who rejects the theory of the pluralists, remarks, nevertheless:

"Pluralists have, however, made clearer than has been made before the superiority of society to law. And this is a valuable service, for various incidents in recent political experience and recent political discussion show that the Hegelian and the Treitschkian distortions of the traditional idea as to the place of the state in society threaten again. We have absolutist notions that what the state commands is necessarily right, that one who denounces an oppressive act of government is anti-socially minded and inciting disorder, that rebellion is a baser offence against society than injustice, and that the state is competent to shape the moral life of its citizens and to force back into an old channel the stream of economic development when it has shifted into a new channel. But one can effectively resist such perversions

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of the doctrine of sovereignty without abandoning the doctrine."¹²

Not everything that exists within society exists by permission of the state, argues Harold J. Laski. For example, our judgments upon the state exist in their own right, not by consent. He says:

"If I am penalized in weighing right and wrong, I become, sooner or later, a merely vacant recipient of decisions, and lose the qualities that make me distinctly a person."¹³

Moreover:

"A working theory of the state must be conceived in administrative terms. Its will is the decision arrived at by a small number of men to whom is confided the legal power of making decisions."¹⁴ In fact, bodies that, in law, are inferior to the state—as, economic groups—actually compel the sovereign to act according to their desires.¹⁵ So little does actual sovereignty correspond to what is usually taught or assumed in our schools!

That we are in peril from this source is the conviction of J. A. Hobson.

"The self-esteem of nations still exercises so powerful a hold upon group-sentiment as to prove the greatest and most urgent peril to society in its widest sense. The assertion of the absolute sovereignty of the state is not yet realized as the supreme anarchy, the sin against the holy spirit of humanity."¹⁶

¹² *A History of Political Theories, Recent Times*, edited by C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes (New York, 1924), p. 116. By permission of the Macmillan Company, publishers.

¹³ Laski, Harold J., *A Grammar of Politics* (New Haven, 1925), p. 29.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁶ Hobson, J. A., *Free Thought in the Social Sciences* (New York, 1926), p. 257.

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Until quite recent times, says Professor R. M. MacIver, all attempts to reveal the nature of the state were vitiated by failure to distinguish the state from society.

"Society is ultimate, inherent in the meaning of life, rooted in the nature of personality. The state is but one of its expressions, necessary, but not ultimate. If man is a political animal, it is only because he is a social animal."¹⁷

"The state is an organization created by the community, with limited objects and modes of attainment. It is no self-substantial entity, existing in its own right and for its own welfare. It is an instrument to serve the purposes of its members, and its whole structure is meaningless save as it is built and maintained to further that service. The unity of the state is not to be found within itself at all. Its unity comes from without; it is kept together only by the community of those who use it as their instrument. Its sovereignty is nothing final or self-determined, but a form of trust, a derivative power, a commission."¹⁸

"Social order must be judged not only good but enduring in proportion as it expresses and is created by free personality. . . . The deeper bond of community is the character not of class nor of nation, but of free human personality which from within its own small circle is capable of reconciling in one community the whole world."¹⁹

THE SCHOOL AS AN ORGAN OF WORLD-SOCIETY

We have reached the conclusion that the state, when it teaches, acts as an agent of society for social ends that include but outrun the state. Society employs the sovereign as over-teacher. The sovereign must serve.

Where, then, and what is the society that is to be

¹⁷ MacIver, R. M., *The Modern State* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 447.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 451 f.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 491 f.

served by the sovereign through the school? No one thinks that the schools of Maine are for the benefit merely of the people of Maine, the schools of Massachusetts for the benefit of Massachusetts society alone, and so on through the Union. No; the humblest school anywhere within our boundary shares in the significance of the whole Union. But is our society coterminous with our geographical boundary? Not so. Our society is present wherever we are in interaction, direct or indirect, with human beings. This means, in the twentieth century, the whole of mankind.

Education, as distinct, on the one hand from ruling, and on the other hand from propaganda, has as its sphere the humanity that is in pupils and in all men, and as its objective the bringing of this humanity to goals that the human in every man can approve when he clearly sees what is there. We come at last to this: The school, though it be maintained and conducted by the sovereign of a particular territory, is properly an organ of world-society.

How fascinating is the up-springing of world-consciousness within education. The World Federation of Education Associations comes into being as a natural, almost inevitable expression of what it is to be a teacher in this day of dawning world-acquaintance. Our own National Education Association, made up largely of teachers who can bear to use the propagandistic, narrowly nationalistic textbooks that Professor Pierce exposes,²⁰ puts itself sincerely and fervently on the side of internationalism. Ordinary teachers take the culture of international and interracial friendship through the Junior Red Cross as a true expression of what a school is

²⁰ See p. 65.

for. The more specialized and critical organizations, such as the Progressive Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, are of course outstandingly humanity-conscious. What is, possibly, most striking of all is the the bold initiative of French, German, English, and other European teachers in efforts to reconcile the recently warring peoples and permanently to prevent the inculcation of national prejudice. An association of German teachers calls the attention of an association of French teachers to books that are believed to foster anti-German feelings; the French association welcomes the hint, examines the books in question, and acts upon them in the spirit of world friendship.²¹ This is the teacher-mind engaged in its very own task. Such things are not done because a secretary of state recommends them or a secretary of war approves them, nor even because public opinion has demanded them; no, education does not merely echo and obey, it creates.

That this cultivation of world-fellowship must have political reverberations is clear. The "we" of society is changing, and the sovereignty that expresses it is changing likewise. I have said that in the public schools the sovereign is the over-teacher. It must now be added that in the public schools the sovereign is the over-learner also. The teacher quizzes the sovereign, and his mind expands!

MY COUNTRY, RIGHT OR WRONG? YES!

When we realize that simple, homespun neighborliness, organized and in action, is the lifeblood of any nationalism that is worthy to exist, we have in

²¹ Prescott, D. A., *Education and International Relations*. (Cambridge, 1930.)

our hands the clue to the meaning that patriotism should have for the school. Patriotism, if it is realistic and not visionary, is an attitude towards concrete human beings; love of country is love of Jack, and Mike, and Hans, and Ole, and Giuseppe, and all the members of their families. The *reality* of "my country" is these persons; the finality of my country's claim upon me is the finality of the worth of these persons. The "national interest" concerns their development and happiness, and—fundamentally—nothing else whatever.

The significance of "our" history and of "our" land is that here a large-scale fellowship of persons actually has formed itself; that it has held together through generations, and that it now exists, with yourself and myself privileged to be members of it. To be devoted to my country is to maintain and promote, as far as in me lies, this co-operation, this mutuality of persons, this achievement together of a satisfying life.

This is not the conventional view. The usual concept of patriotism abstracts from persons, who alone are the concrete objects, and it does not look upon simple neighborliness as the summit of national greatness. Instead, we are offered as the object of the patriot's devotion something with which we never shake hands, never exchange a "Good morning" or a "How do you do?"; something that neither enjoys nor suffers; something that has no sense of right and wrong such as all the neighbors possess.

This abstractness infects, rather obviously, the kind of patriotism that now has the largest representation in text-books and in newspapers. The patriot, according to these printed sources, is one who unreservedly supports an undefined something in state

policy. He signs a blank check upon his own personality, and hands it over to undesigned persons for indeterminate uses. This abstractness can be traced in the conduct of citizens. For, what actually happens with those who boast that they follow the flag wherever it goes? They do not, in fact, acquiesce in every move of our country, for they do not hesitate to condemn and even to nullify (if they can) both domestic and international policies that have been officially promulgated. Further, such a patriot never knows exactly what he means when he "responds to the call of his country," for he has no method for analyzing the voice that proceeds from the capital of the nation. To what extent is this which he hears merely the voice of the person who holds the office whence it proceeds? To what extent does the desire of a special class or interest speak through this official? In what sense is his voice the voice of the men, women, and children who are one's fellow citizens? This is the kind of patriotism that is exploited by special interests as though they were not special. If we cultivate it in the schools we shall at the best produce citizens whose very idealism will cause them to sacrifice neighborliness to something that is less worthy.

When patriotism is understood in the fully concrete and democratic sense, the slogan, "My country, right or wrong," acquires valid meaning. It means that I am to be neighborly to my neighbors through thick and thin, and that I am to make the state, as far as I can influence it, a promoter of neighborly unity. It means that I am indissolubly one with these other persons, that "my country" is there in each of them.

Suppose that one of these neighbors commits a

crime. My country is still there, in him. The sickness of our penal system, from the "cop" on his beat to the warden of the prison and thence on to the courts and the laws, lies precisely in this, that we do not recognize our country in certain of our countrymen; we leave the personal level, and descend to mechanism.

"My country" is in political minorities as truly as in majorities. It is in the discontented elements of the population as truly as in the contented elements. Every victory of one class over another is a defeat for our country; our country can win only through the reconciliation of persons, only through increase of fellowship. If I discover that I am a member of a class that is likely to clash with another class, my duty is not to my class; I must be for the men, women, and children in the other class as truly as for the men, women, and children in my own class. There, in both, is my country.

Are there grafters among the councilmen of my city? Still, this is my city, these are my councilmen; if there is filth in the city hall, it is my filth. What a perversion of patriotism it would be to plume myself upon my country's virtues, but yet feel no unity of myself with my government when it is faulty. My country, right or wrong!

My country is in my undernourished countrymen. Their desire and mine that they should be able to feed themselves (not be fed by charity) is part of their and my patriotism. For the political state is interwoven in the whole economic fabric. If I should claim to be patriotic at the same time that I exploit the hunger of my fellows as a means of profit for myself, I should probably not be a hypocrite, but I should be—well, abstractly patriotic, sentimentally patriotic, quixotically patriotic. If I am a patriot

in the concrete, I shall go to any length with economic reconstruction that may be necessary in order that my fellows as well as I may eat. What am I, anyhow, that I should have a loaded table while millions of my brothers hunger? In them my country hungers.

Is not the true patriot willing to sacrifice his life in defense of our country? Certainly; of course. Our country must have the best possible defence against the occurrence of war. If preparation to win battles is the best possible defence against the occurrence of battles, then let every patriot ask for a definite part and function in a military establishment. Let the facts as to the causation of wars be determined, and then let political realism rule.

But let us not deceive ourselves; the politically "hard-boiled" are not the politically realistic citizens. Among them an abstract and visionary notion of "our country," "our vital interests," "our national honor," and "patriotism" is dominant—with special interests, robed in general idealism, sub-dominant.

Let us be realistic, likewise, about self-sacrifice for our country. Laying down one's life in war is not "the supreme sacrifice." Something far more difficult is demanded. It is easier to accept the risks of battle for oneself, and even for one's own son, than it is to subordinate desire for profits to love of country. This is a terrible assertion, but experience shows that it is true. The supreme test of the patriot does not come when he faces a foreign enemy, but when he faces his own neighbors—Jack, Mike, and the rest—as persons possessed of the same final worth that he claims for himself. The supreme sacrifice is not the giving of one's blood, but the giving up of opportunity for power over persons by reason of pos-

sessions. The stern call to patriotism today is a call repentantly to identify ourselves, as citizens, with the existing economic injustice and futility, and then to form a co-operative industrial commonwealth that shall express, as the political finality, the value of persons.

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